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Abstract

In the aftermath of the Second World War, towards the end of the 1940s, BritishRomanian relations were strained, marked by accusations of espionage directed towards
Britain’s diplomats and requests for recalls. The British Government reacted moderately,
acquiescing to recall their diplomats but refusing to concede to the Romanians when it
came to their ‘flimsy’ accusations. Negotiation was preferred to reprisals especially when
certain Britons had to be rescued from the Communists’ hands.
In one respect Britain was not that indulgent: when money was involved,
particularly the assets of oil companies nationalized in 1948. Trade remained a priority
for both the British and Romanian governments. After laborious negotiations, a trade
agreement was signed in 1960 and the ascendant trend continued into the 1970s when
Harold Wilson and Nicolae Ceausescu established a close relationship. Britain’s interest
in Romania was defined at this juncture as being firstly political, then mercantile and
cultural, in order of priority. As far as Romania remained a ‘thorn’ in the Soviet Union’s
back, a means to reach the remote Chinese or a mediator between various sides of the
world in conflict, politics was priority. Trade remained an issue for both parties. AngloRomanian cultural relations however, were almost nonexistent for the duration of this
period. Concern for human rights, Helsinki agreements notwithstanding, focused entirely
on the predicament of a few persons who wished to marry or to reunite with their family
in Britain.
When political interest in Romania declined in the 1980s, due to the regime’s
eleventh hour attempt to reconnect to the Eastern Bloc, Britain’s economic interest still
remained. Relations between Britain and Ceausescu’ Romania remained strong until the
Revolution of 1989 that swept away Ceausescu and the Communist regime.
ii

At the close of the decade, Romania's foreign and domestic policies were fiercely
criticized by the Soviet Union’s more liberal Communist leader, Gorbachev. Although
the “value” of Romanian deviance within the communist camp seemed to be diminishing
in importance during the 1980s, Ceausescu’s fall was as big a surprise to London as it
was to himself. Although Ceausescu’s policies of national assertion abroad, and promises,
censorship and repression inside, had produced a seemingly a stable state, neither
Ceausescu nor London, had grasped that a changing Eastern Europe would challenge
even the existence of a complicated balancing act between the West and East which
culminated with the disappearance of the Soviet led organizations and the Soviet Bloc.
Once renowned for an assertive foreign policy, Romania was again in the spot of world at
the end of 1989, this time for having executed its dictator and bloodily ending a regime.
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Introduction

This dissertation grew out of a paper which I presented in a seminar held by
Professor Neville Thomson on British history. After reading my paper my colleagues were
interested to find out more about Ceausescu and his foreign policy. My presentation had
focused on British-Romanian relations in the mid-Cold War: the sixties and seventies.
“How was Ceausescu perceived today”, my colleagues wanted to know. Is he still
considered a ruthless dictator or is he praised for his stance during the Czechoslovak crisis
when he condemned the Soviet led invasion by the Warsaw Pact countries in which
Romania did not take part?
To many people Romania was and still is a remote country whose relations with
Britain were not of much interest. To many Romanians, Britain still represents the country
of Churchill -- the ‘betrayer who sold us at Yalta’ -- and a country where it is good to go to
work, particularly given high currency valuations. The eldest may recall that, in their
youth, they had watched on TV the great pomp of Ceausescu’s visit to London and most of
them would remember that the Queen took Ceausescu into her carriage. Only some would
know that it was the first State visit by a Communist leader to Britain since the War and
very few might draw a connection between Ceausescu’s stance of 1968 and his subsequent
state visit to Britain of 1978.
In the aftermath of the Second World War Romania was not of much interest for
Britain. Churchill ‘never felt’ that Britain’s relations with Romania in the past ‘called for
any special sacrifice’ from Britons.1 Although changing sides on 23 August 1944, Romania
was still a former Axis power.

1

Churchill, The Second World War, II, Their Finest Hour, Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company,
1940, p. 208.

1

At the beginning of the Second World War Romania’s leaders adopted a policy of
cautious neutrality and King Carol II looked to Britain to help offset the developing
hegemony of Germany. In 1939 the Foreign Office conceived a plan by which military
assistance could be given to Romania in case of a German attack. This implied an intention
to form a bloc of states in Eastern Europe which would be able to provide direct military
aid to Romania in case of attack.2 Following a request for economic assistance, on 20
March 1939 the Foreign Office announced that it would send a trade mission to Bucharest.
The mission arrived at the end of April and had the purpose of granting of five million
pounds in credit and the promise to purchase two hundred thousand tons of Romanian
wheat from the next harvest.3
In order to gain a free hand against Poland, Hitler made important concessions to
the Soviets, including the recognition of Bessarabia as a Russian asset. Following the
secret additional protocol to the Non-Aggression Pact of 23 August 1939 signed by
Ribbentrop and Molotov, the Soviets invaded Bessarabia and Bukovina. In a Foreign
Office memorandum of 5 September 1939 Orme Sargent stated that it was in Britain’s
‘vital interest’ to strengthen Romania. 4 This remained however just an intention. Romania
led by General Ion Antonescu joined the Anti-Comintern Pact and six months later, on 22
June 1941 declared war on the Soviet Union. The Romanians would soon find themselves
engaged in war with the Soviets’ allies without wanting it. Britain declared war on
Romania on 7 December, followed by the United States on 12 December 1941.5

2

Paul D. Quinlan, Clash Over Romania. British and American policies toward Romania: 19381947, American Romanian Academy of Arts and Sciences, Los Angeles, 1977, p. 42.
3
Ibid,, p. 46.
4
Ibid., pp. 49-50.
5
Nicolae Ciachir, Marile Puteri si Romania, 1856-1947 [The Great Powers and Romania, 18561947], p. 296 and 303-305.
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On 23 August 1944 the King Michael arrested Antonescu and announced the
unilateral cessation of hostilities with the Soviets. Then, he decided to join the Allies
against Germany. Romanians fought against their former allies until the end of the Second
World War contributing decisively to shortening the war.
In the aftermath of the war, in the new European split by the Iron Curtain, the
British maintained interests in other Eastern countries, but not in Romania. The rise to
power of the Communists, supported by the Soviet troops, made the split with Britain more
dramatic. The British representatives in Bucharest witnessed how their employees were
arrested and tried for treason and their war-time contacts were caught and accused of
espionage in favour of ‘the Imperialists’. The fact that the Anglo-Americans were the
Russians’ former allies and the ‘spies’ had worked for the Allied cause did not count to the
Communist regime newly installed in Bucharest. Some of them, sentenced for up to twenty
five years, died in Romanian prisons, while others ill, tortured, but surviving to be
released, had their health severely shaken, and were prohibited from working as a
prolonged punishment which denied them any means of survival.
To the average Romanian the West, Britain included, remained inaccessible for
the whole Cold War period. Nevertheless the hope endured that ‘salvation’ from
Communism would come from the English speaking world. One of the most persistent
rumours and convictions following the Second World War was that ‘the Americans would
come!, ultimately.’6 The opposition parties’ leaders who, during the Second World War
had supported the Allied cause, could not believe that the British refused to offer the
Romanians minimum support against the recently installed Communist regime. The help
they expected was like that offered to Greeks and Turks to fight the Communists. When it
was obvious that neither the British nor the Americans would become involve in the
6

Bogdan Barbu, Vin americanii! Prezenta simbolica a Statelor Unite in Romania Razboiului Rece
[The Americans are coming! The symbolic presence of the United States in Romania during the Cold War],
Bucharest, Humanitas, 2006.
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survival of democracy in Romania, there was another rumour circulating: ‘They sold us!
They sold us at Yalta!’ The very few optimists believed that, due to the isolation of the
country and the Eastern Bloc in general, the West could not know what the real situation in
Romania was. Western representatives were not only carefully watched but also confined
to a perimeter of 50 km around Bucharest and when allowed to visit certain cities, they
were accompanied by a Romanian official who produced their itinerary. Western
representatives could only trust what the Communists were telling them since they had no
way of knowing what was going on beyond ‘the red carpet’ set up for them. Moreover,
Romanian officials were truly skilful in presenting the bright side of the country to the
carefully selected visitors.
Disappointment was profound when the news that Ceausescu had been offered a
state visit to Britain was published in the press. It was like a second betrayal. While the
regime hid its atrocious nature and sequestered dissidents in psychiatric hospitals the
British were inviting the dictator to the Queen’s House! Letters sent by Romanian
immigrants and knowledgeable Britons complaining about the harsh rule of Ceausescu
received a stereotyped, and unfriendly response.
The official response followed from the assessment of post-war British diplomats.
None of them believed that Ceausescu was a democrat or a liberal leader. They were aware
that he was in fact a complete and sophisticated dictator who totally controlled the
Communist Party which, in turn, controlled the country. However, Britain had developed a
renewed interest in establishing close relations with Romania, even though it was a
Communist state. In the list of British interests, politics and trade were predominant.
Cultural relations were almost nonexistent, while human rights concern focused entirely on
the predicament of a few persons who wished to marry, or to reunite with families in the
United Kingdom.

4

When political interest in Romania declined in the 1980s, due to the regime’s
eleventh hour attempt to reconnect to the Eastern Bloc, Britain’s economic interest still
remained. Relations between Britain and Ceausescu’s Romania remained strong until the
Revolution of 1989 that swept away Ceausescu and the Communist regime.

My dissertation is based mainly on recently published and unpublished documents
available in the National Archives in London and the National Archives in Bucharest, the
Romanian Diplomatic Archives and the Council for Studying the Securitate Archives.
Certain documents confirm what is already known about British and Romanian foreign
policies in the 1970s while others contain new information on the evolution of the bilateral
relations in the 1950s and 1960s.
Outside the archives, very little has been published in English concerning Western
relations with Cold War Romania. Most of the literature is Romanian and recent. A few
memoirs and diaries belonging to former Western representatives to Bucharest have been
published, such as that of Burton Berry, the American Political Representative to Romania
between 1944 and 1947, offering new perspectives to the complex period of transition to
the establishment of the Communist regime.7 C.V.R. Schuyler’s diary, the head of the
American Military Mission in Romania, has also been translated and published. Much
useful information concerning the decisive three years during which the Communists
supported by the Soviet troops succeeded in taking the power is provided.8
The memoirs of former detainees who worked for the British and the Americans
and were condemned for espionage by the Romanian Communist regime are now

7

Burton Y. Berry, Romanian Diaries, 1944-1947, Iasi, The Centre for Romanian Studies;
Oxford; Portland, 2000.
8
C.V.R. Schuyler, Misiune Dificila. Jurnal (28 ianuarie 1945 – 20 septembrie 1946) [Difficult
Mission. Diary (28 January 1945-20 September 1946)], Bucharest, 1997.
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accessible to a Romanian audience.9 These are fascinating accounts of Romanians
condemned for real or imaginary offenses against the regime. The myth of the Americans
coming to rescue the people from Communist domination persisted for several years after
the Second World War. It was analysed recently by Bogdan Barbu in his book Vin
americanii! Prezenta simbolica a Statelor Unite in Romania Razboiului Rece [The
Americans are coming! The symbolic presence of the United States in Romania during the
Cold War], published in 2006.10 The National Council for the Study of the Securitate
Archives edited Arhivele Securitatii [The Securitate Archives], a series published in 2008
attesting to the vigilant surveillance of any ‘subversive’ organization.11 A book by Valeriu
Florin Dobrinescu and Ion Patroiu focusing on England and Romania between 1939 and
1947 published in 1992, still remains an important reference for bilateral relations during
and in the aftermath of the Second World War.12
Some few historians such as Mark Percival, Maurice Pearton and Dennis
Deletant13 have considered Britain’s relations with Romania during and after the Second
World War. Mark Percival analysed the motives behind “Britain’s ‘Political Romance’
with Romania in the 1970s”,14 while Maurice Pearton approached the dynamic of BritishRomanian relations in “British-Romanian relations during the 20th century”, a conference

9

Leonard Kirschen, Prisoner of Red Justice. An account of Ten Years’ Captivity in Communist
Romania, Barker, London, 1963 and Annie Samuelli’s Women Behind Bars in Romania. First edition was
published in the United States in 1967. Two Romanian editions were published in 1992 and 2001.
10
Bogdan Barbu, Vin americanii! Prezenta simbolica a Statelor Unite in Romania Razboiului
Rece [The Americans are coming! The symbolic presence of the United States in Romania during the Cold
War], Bucharest, Humanitas, 2006.
11
Arhivele Securitatii [The Securitate Archives], edited by the National Council for the Study of
the Securitate Archives, Bucharest, 2008.
12
Dobrinescu, Valeriu Florin, Patroiu, Ion, Anglia si Romania intre anii 1939-1947 [England
and Romania between 1939 and 1947], Editura Didactica si Pedagogica, Bucharest, 1992.
13
Dennis Deletant, Maurice Pearton, “British Policy towards Romania: 1939-1941,” Romania
Observed, Bucharest, Editura Enciclopedica, 1998.
14
Percival, Mark, “Britain’s ‘Political Romance’ with Romania in the 1970s”, Contemporary
European History, 4, I (1994), pp. 67-87.
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paper presented at a colloquium hosted by the British Council in Bucharest.15 Given the
lapse of time, some documents concerning Anglo-Romanian relations in this period have
begun to appear in British Archives, mainly concerning preparations for the State Visit to
London of 1978 and the fallout. Much however remains closed. The British and Romanian
newspapers of the time covered the event extensively, the first focusing on reasons for
having the Ceausescus invited to Buckingham and the nature of the regime, while the latter
focused largely on pro-regime propaganda. An unusual degree of attention was devoted to
the event since it was the first State Visit to Britain made by a Head of a Communist
country. A book about Ceausescu’s visit was published in English in Romania in 1979,
including favourable excerpts from British newspapers, interviews granted by Ceausescu
in anticipation of the visit, and highlights of the visit.16 Elena Ceausescu’s translator,
Violeta Nastasescu, published her memoirs in 2010, recalling, among other events to
which she accompanied the President’s wife, the London State Visit of June 1978 and
offering details about the behaviour of the Ceausescus.17
From time to time, the Romanian press tackles certain aspects of bilateral
relations, a sign that there is still an interest in analysing events involving BritishRomanian relations. An article published by the Romanian historian Mihai Retegan, for
example, documented a 1966 visit by the former vice-premier Barladeanu to Britain to
negotiate the purchase of equipment for modernisation of Romania. By Retegan’s
showing, Britain’s interest in the 1940s was primarily strategic, and Romania irrelevant.
The British focused in the aftermath of the Second World War on the line Gibraltar-MaltaSuez-Aden-India. To control it Britain needed not Romania, but Greece. Part of this
15

British Council, Romania, British-Romanian Symposium, New Europe College, Bucharest, 45 April 2005, Romania and Britain: Relations and Perspectives from 1930 to the Present. The colloquium
marked 125 years of bilateral relations.
16
State visit of President Nicolae Ceausescu to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland, June 13-16, 1978, Media Publishing House, 1979.
17
Violeta Nastasescu, Elena Ceausescu. Confesiuni fara frontiere, Bucharest, Editura Niculescu,
2010.
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strategy was the Anglo-Turkish treaty of October 1939 and the ‘percentage agreement’.
Otherwise, Retegan also indicated renewed bilateral interest in the 1960s for solving
lingering financial issues in order to restart what had once been a substantial trade.18
The main moments of Anglo-Romanian relations are thus familiar to a
knowledgeable audience. Less known are the tactical variations which involved shifts of
focus from high politics to economic or cultural interests. Emphasis changed from time to
time as the conditions of the day seemed to demand while ideology and human rights
counted for very little.
My dissertation will focus on those specific junctures critical to the evolution of
bilateral relations. First, would be the difficult moments in the early Cold War (1948-1949)
when a newly installed Communist regime accused British diplomats and employees of the
British Legation of espionage. Second is the relaxation in the mid 1950s, following
Khrushchev’s search for peaceful co-existence. In the 1960s relations improved as the
result of new policies promoted by Bucharest, including the release of political detainees in
which the British were interested in. Since 1964 Romania was an oddity in the Eastern
Bloc – uniquely independent in foreign policy, and open to economic collaboration, but
also unusually repressive even given Soviet norms. Romanian willingness to move on
vexing financial issues, the British reaction to Ceausescu’s denunciation of the Soviet
invasion of Prague in 1968, and Ceausescu’s stopover to London in 1975, the subsequent
meeting between Harold Wilson and Ceausescu in Bucharest in the autumn of the same
year, and Ceausescu’s State Visit to London of June 1978 represented the apogee of a
rapprochement in train for some time. I placed my analysis within the more complex
international framework in which greater realities – particularly intra-Communist Bloc

18

Mihai Retegan, “Un vice-premier pe Tower-Bridge” [A Vice-premier on Tower Bridge”],
Jurnalul National, 20 December 2004.
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dynamics, and Britain’s implication in general ‘Western’ policy shifts - which helped to
mould bilateral relations.
The reports sent from Bucharest by the British representatives are particularly
important in locating essential detail, for they accurately depict the atmosphere of
Communist Romania, in contrast to the regime’s propaganda. The despatches sent by the
Romanian representatives in London do not offer such a richness of details. They are dull
in describing Britain’s internal realities and focused to a greater extent on finding useful
contacts beyond the Iron Curtain willing to support the regime. In much greater measure
than their British counterparts, Romanian diplomats were involved in amplifying
Bucharest propaganda and presenting Ceausescu as an innovator and a progressive leader.
When, for example, it was assigned the task of preparing for Ceausescu’s State Visit, the
Romanian Embassy in London had the task in finding journalists to write positively for
Romania, editors to publish Ceausescu’s books and diffuse the image of a modernized
Romania, a country which was achieving a major success due to the rightness of policies
initiated and propagated by its leader.
Strained at the end of the 1940s, almost inexistent for the most part of the 1950s,
British-Romanian relations resumed in the 1960s, reinforced by both sides’ desire to
develop trade, initiate cultural exchanges and solve financial issues. The British were
interested in a settlement of financial issues, specifically Romania’s debt, while the
Romanians, still cautious, insisted on cultural exchanges in large measure to resist Russian
domination. Interest in increased cultural interchange gradually subsided however as
Bucharest became aware that cultural contact was not without risk while leaving the
regime vulnerable to criticism concerning its prior treatment of the local employees of
cultural institutions, particularly the British Council. Financial issues involved prolonged

9

negotiations for two decades until they were finally settled during the Prime Minister
Harold Wilson’s visit to Romania in September 1975.
Success on these issues set the stage for increased economic contact. The volume
of Anglo-Romanian trade increased in the 1970s regardless of the different socio-economic
systems. High politics had also their place in this framework strengthen by the special
relation between Ceausescu and Wilson. Politics figured first on the agenda of all their
meetings, followed by trade. Courted by many world leaders, Ceausescu gloried in the role
of statesman, mediating between the West and Far East, and during fraternal fracases in the
Communist World. Throughout, he bridled at Moscow’s pretensions. He not only courted
the West, but retained friendly relations with China and Yugoslavia. He openly opposed
the Brezhnev Doctrine, particularly during the 1968 Czech Spring. He recognized the
Federal Republic of Germany. He involved himself in the Middle East crisis, maintaining
friendly relations with both Palestine and Israel – recognized in 1967 -- and sought to
encourage negotiations between the two sides without interference by Cold War patrons.
Ultimately, Communist Romania was celebrated for its liberality, even though it remained
one of the most repressive states in the world. In the end, Ceausescu was not executed as
statesmen. He was not called to book, as Imre Nagy had been, as a deviationist. He was
shot by his own people as a tyrant– a fact much of the West, including London, appears to
have deliberately ignored, while other agendas were pursued.
My dissertation analyses the evolution of British-Romanian relations from the
establishment of the Communist regime in Romania to its end to find the answer to the
close relations between a Liberal and a Communist country. By encouraging Ceausescu
and his regime and letting him reap political and diplomatic dividends from his
independent line in foreign policy, Britain contributed to the maintenance of a regime
careless about human rights and the free flow of people, information and ideas as provided

10

by the Helsinki Final Act of 1975. Britain, together with other Western states, facilitated
the creation of a system which could not survive the sudden disappearance of the
conditions for which it had been designed to cater.

...
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‘We still have ten percent’

I had never felt that our relations with Rumania and
Bulgaria in the past called for any special sacrifice from us.19
(Winston Churchill)
Once completed, the percentage agreement was broadly observed by
the heads of empires, even though for the eyes of the world, they protested with
indignation at every consuming act of the drama. Britain agreed with the
abolition of the opposition parties in Romania and even with King Michael’s
dismissal while, in exchange, the Soviet Union left General Marcos and his
revolutionary troops to die from lack of food and ammunition in the mountains
of Greece. 20 (Silviu Brucan)

On 2 April 1944, Vyacheslav Molotov, the Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs,
stated publicly that the Soviets had neither the intention of threatening the territorial
integrity of Romania, nor transforming it into a communist state.21 All they wanted was a
friendly neighbour on their western frontier.22 The declaration was issued in a moment
when the Romanians were negotiating their withdrawal from war and renewed
immediately after Romania’s switch of sides. Molotov confirmed his April declaration.
The Soviet Union had no desire to acquire any part of the Romanian territory or to change
the social order in Romania and, in that way, to infringe Romania’s independence. The
19

Winston Churchill, The Second World War, II, Their Finest Hour, Boston: Houghton Mifflin
Company, 1940, p. 208.
20
Silviu Brucan, GeneraŃia irosită. Memorii [The Wasted Generation. Memoirs], Bucharest, 2007,
pp. 9-10.
21
The Soviet Union ‘does not pursue the aim of acquiring Romanian territory or of altering the
existing social structure of Romania.’ OJR Report no. 4456, 18 July 1947 Department of State, Division of
research for Europe, Office of Intelligence Research, referring to telegram T-1150, Moscow, April 3, 1944.
Romania in anticamera Conferintei de Pace de la Paris. Documente, [Romania in the antechamber of the
Peace Conference of Paris. Documents], Bucharest, Arhivele Nationale ale Romaniei, 1996, p. 448;
Memorandum of the King Michael of Romania to President Roosevelt, 24 January 1945, Mircea Ciobanu,
Convorbiri cu Mihai I al Romaniei [Conversations with King Michael of Romania], Bucharest, Humanitas,
1991, p. 256.
22
In reaction, the German Minister of Foreign Affairs, Joachim von Ribbentrop, characterized
publicly the Molotov’s declaration, as insincere and underlined the danger the Soviets represent for Romania.
Romanian National Archives [henceforth RNA], The Central Committee of Romanian Communist Party,
[henceforth CC of RCP], Collection 147, Dossier 11/1947, vol. 2, f. 11.
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Soviet government was just interested in re-establishing Romania’s independence together
with the Romanians and free the country from the fascist yoke.23
However, it must have been difficult for Romanians to believe that, after three
years of confrontation on the battlefield, the Soviets would suddenly become Romanians’
loyal friends. Four years before, on 26 June 1940, the Soviets had issued an ultimatum,
demanding the immediate surrender of Bessarabia, Romania’s Eastern province, and
annexing also northern Bukovina.24 In the summer of the same year, vexed by Romanians’
determination to remain neutral, Hitler took the side of Hungary and favoured it against
Romania. Through the Diktat of Vienna imposed by Hitler and Mussolini on 30 August
1940, Romanians were obliged to cede the north-western part of Transylvania (an area of
42,610 km square with a population of 2,388,774 of which 50,2 per cent were Romanians)
to Hungary. One week later, on 7 September 1940, Romania gave up a southern province,
Cadrilater, to Bulgaria. Overall, a territory of 101,129 km square representing 34.27
percent of the country comprising a population of 6,821,007 inhabitants, of whom the
majority were Romanians, had been lost.25
On 23 November 1940 Romania led by General Ion Antonescu adhered to the
Anti-Comintern Pact and sixth months later, on 22 June 1941, declared war on the Soviet
Union.26 The Romanians would soon find themselves engaged in war with the Soviets’

23

On 25 August, V.M. Molotov reasserted the pledge that his government had no intention of
annexing any part of Romania or changing the social and political regime. Valeriu Florin Dobrinescu, Ion
Patroiu, Anglia si Romania intre anii 1939-1947 [England and Romania between 1939-1947], Editura
Didactica si Pedagogica, Bucharest, 1992, p. 231; RNA, the Ministry of National Propaganda, Office of
Intelligence, D 939, f. 5 cited by Gheorghe Onisoru, Instaurarea regimului communist in Romania,
Bucharest, 2002, p. 29.
24
Part of Romania since 1918, Bessarabia was annexed by the Russian Empire in 1812 as a result
of the Russian-Turkish war. Bucovina had never been a Russian territory and was not mentioned in the NaziSoviet Pact of 23 August 1939. The Romanian provinces were annexed by the Soviets in the aftermath of an
ultimatum issued on 26 June 1940, in accordance with the terms of the Molotov-Ribbentrop agreement.
Nicolae Ciachir, Marile Puteri si Romania, 1856-1947 [The Great Powers and Romania, 1856-1947],
Bucharest, Albatros, 1996, p. 301.
25
A. Simion, Dictatul de la Viena [The Diktat of Vienna], Bucharest, Albatros, 1996, p. 363.
26
The fact that all the territories had been seized without fight created an atmosphere of
discontent. The Iron Guard supported by Germany took the occasion to attack the main state institutions
leading to turmoil. By appointed a General as Prime Minister on 4 September, the King Carol II hoped to re-
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allies without wanting it. Britain declared war on Romania on 7 December, followed by the
United States on 12 December 1941.27
In 1944 Romanians found themselves again in an unfortunate situation. By now,
two thirds of the country had been lost. Although still fighting on the Eastern front and
taking part in all important battles, it was clear that Germany had lost the war. Negotiations
with the Western Powers for Romania’s exit from war commenced and continued through
the spring with no result.
While the Romanian Army was still engaged in war against the Soviet Union,
King Michael acted in a decisive way. On 23 August he arrested Marshal Antonescu and
announced the unilateral cessation of hostilities with the Soviets.28 Romania accepted the
armistice terms offered by the United Nations, and announced the change of direction in a
Royal proclamation.29
From this moment cease any battle and hostility actions against the Soviet Union,
as well as the state of war with Great Britain and the United States. Receive the
soldiers of these armies with trust. The United Nations had guaranteed our
independence and non-interference in our internal affairs. They admitted the
injustice of the Diktat of Vienna through which Transylvania had been captured
from us.
Except for the last statement, all the rest was aspiration.30
The ceasefire in the absence of a signed armistice had dramatic repercussions.
Claiming that they had not receive any order to stop hostilities, the Red Army advanced
from the Moldavian city, Iasi, where it had been held for four months taking prisoner large
numbers of Romanian soldiers who offered no resistance. During a single day, 24 August,
establish a climate of normality. The Guard’s pressure had however increased and General Antonescu asked
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6,000 officers, 6,000 non-commissioned officers and 15,000 soldiers were arrested,
interned in camps and sent over the Prut River in the territories reoccupied by the Soviet
Army.31 A total of 175,000 soldiers and officers were captured by the Soviets.32 The
depredations of the Soviet Army as it advanced into Romania seemed more an invasion
than liberation.33 Molotov’s assurances proved to be empty words.
The Romanian situation was most unfortunate. Romania faced the consequences
of an uncertain alliance with the Soviets, who advanced as into an enemy territory, and
with the Americans who continued to bomb strategic sites, especially the oilfields. The
Romanian Army, meanwhile, was soon engaged in battle with the Germans whose position
had been endangered by Romania’s betrayal.34 It became apparent that the Soviets were
taking advantage of the unclear situation of ‘no peace, no war’. Anxiously, the King urged
the Anglo-Americans to send envoys to Bucharest, accompanied by a token military force
and the Romanian Minister for Foreign Affairs submitted a formal protest to the Soviet
Ambassador at Ankara.35
Ceasefire in absence of a signed armistice convention was compared to a chariot
placed ahead of the horse. ‘What else should we have done?’ the King asked?. ‘Say that we
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withdraw from the Axis and, meanwhile, continue to fight?’36 The delay in concluding the
armistice had dramatic repercussions; it allowed the Red Army to infiltrate into the
Romania.37 Ultimately it was the Soviets who were accredited by the Anglo-Americans
with initiating and carrying forward negotiations with Romania. 38
The Romanian delegation sent to Moscow to negotiate the armistice convention
arrived to have their plane seized by the Soviets. Eventually reaching Moscow, they
complained to the British Ambassador that their country had been occupied by the Red
Army, the later replied that he would inform London. 39 The Romanians should not expect
help from Britain, but deal with the Russians. The American Ambassador replied in a quite
similar way. Neither was helpful during the negotiations. This prompted the leader of the
Romanian delegation, Lucretiu Patrascanu, to remark sadly that, as regards Romania at
least, the agreement between the Allies was ‘perfect’.40 Patrascanu might have hoped that,
as a Communist, he had the keys to the Russians’ heart and could negotiate lenient
conditions for his country.41 His hopes were in vain. He wondered what he was going to
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tell to his comrades when he would return home.42 He could not have known that the Allies
had already reached agreement concerning Romania. 43
In the spring of 1944 Churchill let the Soviets know his intentions regarding
Romania. While Romanian envoys were attempting to negotiate their country’s extraction
from war, Churchill sent a telegram to Molotov, reminding him that, as previously agreed,
he regarded the Soviet Union as ‘the predominating power’ on Romania. ‘We are relying
on you to take the lead about Romania,’ Churchill maintained in another telegram to
Molotov. On 16 April 1944 Churchill wished Molotov success in Romanian negotiations.
Two days later, in another telegram, Churchill assessed that he liked the firm tone of Lord
Moyne’s messages from Cairo to Marshal Antonescu and Monsieur Maniu.44
Although Churchill seemed eager to please Molotov, the later had reproached
Churchill for having established a link with Antonescu without informing him in advance.
Information about a secret operation named AUTONOMOUS leaked into press and
reached the Soviets. The mission composed of Lieutenant Colonel De Chastellain,
formerly Manager of ‘Unirea’ Oil Company, Major Porter and Captain Metianu was
parachuted by the SOE into Romania on 21 December 1943. They had apparently the
purpose of re-establishing contact with Iuliu Maniu, the pro-Western leader of the National
Peasant Party, and convincing him that ‘the only possible course for Romania was
unconditional surrender to the three principal Allies.’ Sabotage was another issue to be
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addressed.45 According to the Romanian press the officers carried with them a photostat
copy of a peace treaty which the Germans allegedly intended to propose to the Russians.
The operation conducted by SOE caused considerable resentment in Moscow.
Molotov’s message to Churchill of 29 April was ‘couched in offensive terms’ and although
the Russians were invited to participate in further SOE – OSS operations in Romania, the
Western Allies decided to suspend ‘for the time being’ other operations in Romania.’46
On 16 January 1944, three weeks after the failure of Operation AUTONOMOUS,
Churchill mentioned to Eden that the Russians might take possession of the territories
which lay on the western borders of the Soviet Union. Britain would not attempt to remove
the Russians from that area.47 Romania was ‘a Russian affair’ as Stalin desired, while
Britain would take care of Greece and continue to remain the leading Mediterranean
power.48
Although providing to fight in the West against Germany and its allies, none of
the articles of the armistice convention signed in Moscow on 12 September 1944 made
reference to the release of Romanian prisoners. The armistice just provided that Romania’s
military forces were put under the direction of the Soviets.49
While the bulk of the army was fighting outside the country, the Communists
became very active politically within what was now occupied Romania. Backed by
Marshal Rodion Y. Malinowski, the chairman of the Allied Control Commission [ACC]
set up with the purpose of supervising the implementation of the armistice agreement in
45
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Romania, the Communists and certain left-wing groups established the National
Democratic Bloc [NDB]. The organization was joined for a short time by the National
Peasant and National Liberal parties. At the beginning of October the Communists
unleashed a campaign of attacks against the government.50
As provided by the Armistice Agreement, the Soviet Union was entitled to
eradicate pro Axis influences and mobilize all available resources in the war against
Germany. The Soviet interference in Romania was not however confined to measures in
support of the common war effort. 51
The British had already decided not to oppose the ‘reasonable demands’ of the
Soviet Union where they did not conflict with their ‘vital strategic interest.’ In exchange,
the Soviets were supposed not to oppose their claims.52 An Eastern Europe dominated by
the Russians was preferable to a Western Europe dominated by Germany.53 The figures
agreed by Churchill and Stalin in Moscow in October were just a transcript of both sides’
interests. 90 per cent of Romania and 90 per cent of Greece were to be controlled by the
Soviets and the British respectively. In case of Yugoslavia and Hungary the percentages

50

Report no. 4456, “The Record of Soviet Interference in Rumanian Affairs,” 18 July 1947,
Department of State, Division of research for Europe, Office of Intelligence Research. Romania in
anticamera Conferintei de Pace de la Paris. Documente, Bucharest, Arhivele Nationale ale Romaniei, 1996,
p. 451.
51
In the draft of 23 August, the Soviets maintained that the ACC was to be called ‘Allied (Soviet)
High Command, acting on behalf of the Allied powers.’ Molotov stress in conversation with the American
Ambassador, Averell Harriman, that the Western allies could only have political contact with the Romanian
government through the Russians. Dennis Deletant, “British Policy Towards Romania: 23 August 1944 - 6
March 1945”, Dennis Deletant, Maurice Pearton, Romania Observed. Studies in Contemporary Romanian
History, Encyclopaedic Publishing House, Bucharest, 1998, p. 131.
52
Meeting between Anthony Eden and Fyodor T. Gusev, the Soviet ambassador to London, 18
May 1944, TNA, PRO, FO 371/ 43636. Martin Kitchen, British Policy towards the Soviet Union during the
Second World War, Macmillan, 1986, p. 206 and G. Ross, The Foreign Office and the Kremlin, Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press, 1984, p. 178.
53
The assertion belonged to Sir William Strang, Permanent Under-Secretary of the British Foreign
Office. A. Resis, “Spheres of influence in Soviet Wartime Diplomacy,” Journal of Modern History, 1981, v
53 (3), 435-7; G. Ross, The Foreign Office and the Kremlin, Cambridge, 1984, p. 107.
Referring to a Foreign Office memorandum on Anglo-Soviet relations, Eden pointed out on 3
April 1944 that the Soviet Union’s aims included the ‘domination of Eastern Europe and even the
Mediterranean, and the communizing of much the remains.’ Bennett, p. 196.

19

were 50-50; 75 per cent of Bulgaria under Soviet influence; the last one was changed by
Stalin to 90 per cent; everything was then approved by a tick of a pencil. 54
In November the Soviets made their 90 per cent political influence over Romania
felt. It was ‘recommended’ to King Michael that a change of Government was advisable.55
Meanwhile, a new municipal administration was installed in Constanta, an
important Black Sea port, with the support of the Soviets. The City became now an overt
Russian dependency.56 The local civil administration in Transylvania was handed over to
Communist representatives with Russian help.
When, at the end of November, the Vice Commissar for Foreign Affairs, A.
Vishinski, arrived in Bucharest, he obtained the replacement of the new Prime Minister,
General Sanatescu, by yet another General, Nicolae Radescu. It was 6 December, one
month and one day after the fall of the previous Cabinet.57 The Soviet interference in
Romania’s affairs was more than evident.
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Had Romania been abandoned to the Soviets? The question was addressed by
Maniu to the British representative in Bucharest, Le Rougetel.58 ‘Surely, we are not called
upon to make such admissions,’ wrote Churchill on the report received from Bucharest in
December 1944.59 Maniu asked the same question when meeting the chief of the American
political mission in Bucharest, Burton Berry. If the Americans intended to abandon
Romania, they ‘owe him the obligation of saying so and saying so at once, that he might
make the best possible terms with the Soviets for the Romanian people.’ Maniu reminded
the Anglo-Americans that he was a sincere supporter of the Western Allies during the war
and had involved himself in the negotiations for his country’s withdrawal from war. Berry
pointed out in his report to the Department of State that Romania was being re-organized
as something of a Soviet experiment. Unless the Americans persuaded the Soviets ‘to
desist in their efforts to communize Romania,’ they would be ‘too late and the experiment
being worked out in Romania would be repeated elsewhere in a more perfect form on a
larger scale’.60 The ‘arrangement’ concluded by Churchill and Stalin was however
approved by the American President, even against the State Department arguments.61
There was no question of spheres of influence, Churchill assured the Americans,
merely ‘practical politics’ and that the arrangement would last only for three months after
58
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which it would be subject of the Allies’ review.62 The percentage agreement was presented
as a ‘preliminary agreement’ in a letter to Roosevelt, and ‘an interim guide for the wartime
future’ in a memorandum to the War Cabinet.63
Besides the ‘pedantic interference of the United States,’64 something else
displeased Churchill even more: the stance adopted by the British representatives in
Bucharest. Ten percent should not have entitled them to behave ‘as if they were in
Greece.’65 To Eden ten percent meant something. In January 1945, when Orme Sargent,
the Deputy Under-Secretary, second in the hierarchy at the Foreign Office, underlined that
Britain could not prevent the Soviets from plundering the Romanian economy because
Romania had been conceded to the Soviet Union, Eden replied: ‘Not quite. We still have
ten percent.’66 In what ways the ten percent influence would have prevented the Soviet
from controlling Romania remained a mystery.
Ten percent certainly meant little for Churchill. His only concern was to make
sure that the 90 per cent of the Soviets would become reality.67 With this aim in mind he
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interfered frequently with the activity of the Foreign Office.68 Instead of building up an
anti-Soviet political front ‘without realising what is at stake in other fields,’69 Britain’s
representatives should have ‘encouraged’ the Romanians to co-operate ‘fully and frankly
with the Russians and not to look to us or the Americans for support.’70 Churchill was also
indignant that the British representatives made ‘such a fuss’ about the deportations of
about 70,000 Romanians of German origin to the Soviet Union.71
The Russians’ discourse concerning Romania had meanwhile changed. ‘Whereas
in November 1944, the Russians said their only interest in Romania was in seeing the
fulfilment of the terms of the Armistice,’ in the spring of 1945 the ‘theme song’ centred on
security and stability.72 In fact, the Soviets were directly assisting the Communists in
provoking agitation and inciting the peasants and workers to riot against the government.73
Then, accusing the Romanian authorities of being incapable of maintaining order and
securing the rear of the front, Vishinski demanded from the King the replacement of the
Prime Minister, Radescu, with Petru Groza, currently Vice Premier. Gheorghe Tatarescu
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was to become Vice Premier.74 Unless the King agreed with Vishinski’s designations, the
Soviets could not guarantee Romania’s independence.75 To prove the seriousness of this
statement, Marshal Rodion Malinowski came to Bucharest and Soviet troops patrolled the
streets.76 The police and the gendarmerie were disarmed. The guard division was sent to
the front, leaving the King with no defence to face the Communists supported by the
Soviets. 77
The situation inspired a request for action from Western envoys in Bucharest. The
American representative, Berry, telegraphed to Washington, requesting an immediate
examination of the situation in Romania at the highest level in the spirit of the Yalta
Declaration.78 The British representative, Air Vice-Marshal D. F. Stevenson, also sent a
note to London, requesting instructions. Once again Churchill asked Eden to temper the
British representatives in Bucharest. London warned Ian Le Rougetel, the head of the
newly re-established legation in Bucharest, not to get involved and not to provide any
advice or encouragement for the King or the opposition. They had to cope with Soviet
interference in Romania’s domestic affairs on their own. Although, when the American
State Department invoked the Yalta Declaration on free territories and called for
consultation over Romania, the British ambassador in Moscow, Archibald Clark Kerr, was
74
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instructed to back Harriman’s actions. If the Americans strongly believed that their reading
of the Yalta agreement should be implemented then the British would support them, it was
resolved. Clark Kerr should however not forget about the agreement which set up the
Soviet preponderance in Romania.79 Churchill had a ‘Gentlemen’s Agreement’ with Stalin
and pledged to observe it. The British should not therefore adopt too firm an attitude and
irritate the Soviets;80 otherwise Stalin could say ‘I did not interfere with your action in
Greece, why do you not give me the same latitude in Romania?’81
Admitting in a Cabinet meeting on 6 March – the day when Groza was appointed
Prime Minister - that the principles of Yalta had been disregarded in Romania, Churchill
stated that the British could go no further than inform Stalin about their distress. Admitting
that ‘the Russians had succeeded in establishing ‘the rule of a communist minority by force
and misrepresentation,’ he was hampered in protesting against these developments by the
fact that, ‘in order to have freedom to save Greece, Mr. Eden and I at Moscow in October
recognized that Russia should have largely preponderant voice in Romania and Bulgaria
while we took lead in Greece.’82 London authorized through the legation to offer protection
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to the former premier, General Radescu. The Legation guard detachment was ordered to
open fire if there would be attempts to extract Radescu from the location.83
Groza, whose appointment as a Prime Minister was aggressively demanded by the
Soviets, was a wealthy Transylvanian landowner, with limited administrative experience
who had served in minor Cabinet posts in the late Twenties and early Thirties. Although
not a Communist, he would gain the appellation the Red Bourgeois for accomplishing
whatever the Communists decided.84 The other Russian favourite, Tatarescu,85 was a
person ‘thoroughly compromised by his past record;’ Prime Minister in 1939 he
distinguished himself ‘by the alacrity with which he invited German troops into Romania,
cooperated with the Nazis in every possible way and ceded the northern provinces of
Bessarabia and Bukovina to the Soviet Union.’ He was saved from the fate of Marshal
Antonescu, condemned to death, ‘solely by the direct intervention of the Soviet Union.’86
Tatarescu’s flexibility may have made him the perfect candidate in any political
circumstance.
Beyond the appointment of these two, there was something else that made
Churchill admit that a Communist minority had been established by force: the Communists
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took hold of key posts in the Ministries of the Interior, Justice and Communications.87 ‘A
government of non-entities, with a notable exception, Tatarescu,’ the former King, Carol
II, noted in his diary. What was his former Prime-Minister doing ‘within this gang’
manoeuvred from Moscow?88 ‘Behind the scene, Ana Pauker, Stalin’s right hand in
Romania, leads every move. Groza is under Pauker’s influence and praises her to the
sky.’89
Under the façade of a coalition seemingly reuniting all democratic forces of the
country but excluding the major political parties, the National Peasant Party [NPP] and the
National Liberal Party [NLP], the new government started to limit the activity of the
opposition, removing political opponents and appointing loyalist elements in local
structures.90 Claiming that many newspapers served the Fascist cause, the government
restricted freedom of press and closed down many newspapers.91 People’s tribunals were
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established, overriding or ignoring legal procedures, to punish seemingly those identified
as war-criminals. 92
Whatever decision Groza adopted in domestic or foreign policy, it was taken
subsequent to obtaining Soviet consent, strictly limiting Romania’s sovereignty.93
Appointed on Soviet demand, Groza did whatever was required. Two months after his
appointment, he took measures to strengthen Romania’s ties with the Soviet Union to the
extent that the country’s economy was soon controlled by its neighbour. The first
capitulation of major importance was an agreement signed in Moscow on 8 May 1945 by
which Sovroms (Soviet-Romanian) joint companies were established.94 ‘It is probably the
Russian intention to prepare by the creation of these companies [Sovroms] for the
complete integration of the Romanian economy with that of the Soviet Union, from which
it is but a short step to the political incorporation of Romanian territory into the Union of
Socialist Soviet Republics,’ the British representative in Bucharest reported.95
Although it could not fool the people, the close collaboration with the Soviet
Union was presented as having the purpose of speeding up the country’s economic
recovery. Trade exchanges would be based on full equality, the prices being those of the
international market and the two parties would have equal share and equal rights within the
Sovroms, the propaganda claimed.96 In fact using these devices the Soviets controlled the
Romanian economy, while the commercial agreements prevented Romania from resuming
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its relations with countries which were not under the Soviet influence. ‘To this game Groza
had adhered without scruples.’97
In the meantime, as provided by the armistice convention, the Romanian army
had to fight under Soviet command, contributing to the capture of Budapest and to the
advance into Czechoslovakia. The role of the Romanian army was acknowledged by Eden.
He indicated in the House of Commons on 24 January 1945 that Romania had rendered
substantial support to the Allied cause by maintaining fourteen divisions on the antiHitlerite front.98
Romania contributed to the war against Germany and its allies with an army
which ranked fourth amongst the armies fighting the Third Reich. The casualties of the
Romanian army in the war against Germany and Hungary amounted to 169,822 men
(including dead, wounded and missing). Romania’s defection from the Axis was an
important factor in the collapse of the German Eastern front;99 it prevented the Germans
from making a stand at the Carpathians, thereby shortening the war.100
The Romanian troops were cited in orders of the day by Stalin.101 King Michael
was awarded the ‘Victory’ order for his ‘brave act of determinedly orientating the
Romanian policy towards rupture with Hitlerite Germany and siding with the United
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Nations at a moment when the German defeat could not yet be clearly foreseen.’102 The
King was also awarded the American Legion of Merit in degree of Chief Commander for
‘extraordinary fidelity and exceptionally meritorious conduct in the performance of
outstanding service to the cause of the Allied Nation in the struggle against Hitlerite
Germany.’103 The awards did not impede, however, Romania’s sovietisation or Michael’s
approaching downfall.
For many years thereafter, the government would point out that the Soviet Union
was ‘genuinely and disinterestedly concerned’ with the development of Romania. The
press periodically published articles to illustrate that fact. Normal economic exchanges
were presented as evidence of the invaluable economic assistance which the Soviet Union
[was] according Romania’104 and exports to Romania were announced as economic aid.105
The agreements concluded in 1949 led however to an increasing dependence of Romania
upon the Soviet Union. ‘It is probable that the Soviet Union counts for over one half of
Romania’s total foreign trade and the Russian orbit countries altogether for at least two
thirds. That the Soviet Union has, from her insignificant pre-war position in the pattern of
Romanian foreign trade, become by far the most important of this country’s customers and
suppliers are an undisputed fact.’ Mentioning that an economic agreement was signed by
Barladeanu, the Minister of Foreign Trade, Scanteia of the 5 March 1949 was ‘full of
eulogies’ of the Soviet Union, pointing also to the previous abuses of the ‘capitalist and
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imperialist Western countries’. That were ‘the normal ingredients of any speech or article,’
the British noted. Romania was to supply to the Soviet Union oil products, timber,
locomotives, wagons, chemical goods, meat, consumer goods etc, while the Soviet Union
would supply industrial equipment, motor cars, agricultural machinery, iron ore, coke,
cotton, seeds etc. 106
By the summer of 1948 the Romanian POWs were freed from Soviet labour
camps. Their return in a steady flow of about 1,000 a day was hailed by the press as one of
the many ways in which Romania was helped by her great Eastern neighbour. While it was
not explained why the POWs returned home three years after the end of the war, the
newspapers underlined that they were ‘unanimous’ in praising the ‘humane treatment’ they
had been accorded in captivity. Back home they were expected to take part in another
‘struggle,’ this time for the rehabilitation of the national economy. 107
While they were in the Soviet camps, the POW’s were told that it would be better
for their country to become a republic of the U.S.S.R. since Romania was just ‘a small and
a poor country.’108 Many Romanians began to fear that their country would be annexed by
the Soviets.109 That was not going to happen, Gheorghiu-Dej, the Communist leader,
believed. His confidence was based a simple reason: ‘the Soviet Union would have nothing
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to get from this.’110 He was right. The Soviets could not have gained more from a formal
annexation of the country than they had using all the methods and devices they used to
control Romania.
Even without incorporating Romania, the Soviets exerted a total domination over
the country’s economy and military, refashioning also education and culture. The
Constitution, the ‘Parliament,’ and the local councils were all remodelled on the Soviet
pattern.111 The Soviets also exerted an important political influence through the
Communists of non-Romanian origin; trained in the Soviet Union they arrived in Romania
along with the Soviet Army. Many of them had an unsavoury reputation as being
unscrupulous in accomplishing the Soviet objectives. Some of them such as Ana Pauker
were confident that the best option for Romania was to become a member state of the
Soviet Union.’112
From the very beginning, the Communist Party from Romania acted as Moscow’s
agent and its policy was but a reflection of the Soviet party line. Once the line was
established, it bound all party members and those that depended upon them. Although
proudly proclaiming ‘we made the revolution, we did nothing but play the roles prescribed
by Moscow in its script for Romania,’ the ideologue of the Communist Party, Silviu
Brucan, would later admit.’113
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A day after Groza’s appointment as Premier, on 7 March 1945, a Soviet
delegation led by Evgheni Suhalov went to Bucharest to transmit the new instructions for
the country’s communization. A three-year plan, followed by another two of five years
duration each, was to be implemented by the new government. The plans provide for a
land reform in which peasants were to be deprived of their land designed to pave the way
for their inclusion in the collectivist system and the further reorientation of population
from countryside to urban centres. Other measures included: the reorganization of the
army, including the creation of a popular militia of the NKVD type; the liquidation of the
banks owned by the National Liberal Party leaders; the King’s abdication and the royal
family’s expulsion from Romania; the gradual suppression of import-export companies
trading with the U.S. and Britain; the reorientation of the exports towards the Soviet
Union; and the exclusion of the traditional parties from political life. Not a single foreign
citizen, except from the countries under Soviet influence would be allowed to enter
Romania.114
By 1948 everything from the list seemed to have been accomplished. Industry was
nationalised, collectivisation had begun, private traders and artisans reorganised into
cooperatives, the Church had been subdued. Romania was virtually cut off from the nonCommunist world.
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To go to war for Romania?

I left Bucharest with a feeling of sadness, and
deeply thankful that I had not been born a Romanian.
(Archibald Clark Kerr)1

Once installed as Prime Minister Groza attempted by every possible manoeuvre to
associate himself with the very popular King Michael and establish the ‘unshakable
solidarity’ between the King and the Government.2 The ‘royal strike’, which followed
Groza’s refusal to resign, did not help in the maintenance of this charade. The King
refused to sign any documents sign from his rebellious Prime Minister and appealed the
Anglo-Americans representatives in the Allied Control Commission for support.
The Vice-Premier Tatarescu stated that the King’s strike was determined by foreign
pressure. He alluded in this way to the British’ and Americans’ declarations that they
would not recognize the Romanian government for it did not represent all political forces.
‘But how could they know what the real situation in Romania is?’ Tatarescu wondered.
‘How could the British, who were incapable of appreciating their own domestic situation,
pretend they could understand the politics of a far away country with which contact and the
possibility of information had been lost?’3
The summer of 1945 brought new British and American Governments, and a firmer
attitude toward their former War Ally. Both the Attlee and Truman administrations were
determined to challenge the supremacy of the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe. Clement
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Attlee, and the Foreign Minister, Ernest Bevin, began to call for a tough line against Soviet
ambitions in Eastern Europe and an end to the apparent drift in British policy.4 The British
ambassador in Moscow was instructed to tell the Soviets that the British ‘found themselves
unable to consider the governments [of Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary] as representative
or democratic within the meaning of the Potsdam decisions and complained that the
Soviets were acting in the ACC of these countries without consultation with the British and
American representatives.5
The new Truman administration also challenged the Soviets, pointing to Yalta
Conference at which it was agreed that ‘interim governmental authorities’ should be
broadly representative. Harry Truman rejected Stalin’s attempt to insert an amendment to
the American proposals at Potsdam on 21 July which would have involved the recognition
of the East European satellite governments. Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary and Romania
would only be recognized when they were established on a proper basis, not before. At
Potsdam, the Americans were firmly supported by the British delegation. Truman was
supported by Churchill and Attlee, while James Byrnes enjoyed backing from Anthony
Eden and Ernest Bevin at meetings with Molotov.6
Soon after the return of Stalin and Molotov from Potsdam, on 6 August, the
Soviet government communicated to their representatives in Bucharest, Colonel General
I.Z. Susaikov, the chief of the ACC, and A.P. Pavlov, the political adviser, the decision to
4
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restore diplomatic relations with Romania. The Romanian government was officially
recognized by the Soviets.7
Protesting against the way the Soviets undertook to implement the Yalta
Declaration the Americans called for free elections and proposed that a Council of Foreign
Ministers meet to discuss the issue.8 In his radio speech to the American nation on 9
August, President Harry Truman recalled that at Yalta it was agreed that
the three governments would assume a common responsibility in helping to reestablish in the liberated and satellite nations of Europe governments broadly
representative of democratic elements in the population. That responsibility still
stands. We all recognize it as a joint responsibility of the three governments. It
was reaffirmed in the Berlin Declarations on Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary.
These nations are not to be spheres of influence of any one power. They are now
governed by Allied control commissions composed of representatives of the three
governments which met at Yalta and Berlin.9
On 17 August Roy Melbourne, the American representative in Bucharest,
transmitted to the Romanian government a verbal note, reminding them of the Potsdam
communiqué of 3 August and President Truman’s speech addressed to the American nation
on 9 August.10 The United States could not re-establish diplomatic relations with Romania,
as it had been configured, as it was ruled by an unrepresentative government.
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We made known our attitude when Groza government came to power, and
anything of what the government had done since, do not justify a change of
attitude. It goes without saying that we cannot consider, in any case, this
government truly representative and therefore cannot initiate diplomatic relations
with him.11
Untroubled Groza told the King that he considered the American note null and
void.12 He had a similar opinion on the British Government’s note which the King showed
him on 19 August. Although shorter and more moderate than Melbourne’s communication,
it had a similar content: the Romanian government was not considered representative.
Groza was unmoved. Since the British note did not come through official channels it
should be disregarded, he maintained. ‘There is a government and there is a Foreign
Minister. A foreign power that directly contacts the King does not follow the official
channel.’ The Americans had submitted their note to the Foreign Minister, Groza admitted.
However, they were in error as well. Since Romania was under the Armistice convention,
the note should have been addressed to the ACC, particularly as the Americans did not
recognize the present government. Direct, official communication with the Foreign
Ministry and its subordinate bodies implied an implicit recognition, Groza assessed.
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Thus, both the Americans, who contacted the Foreign Minister instead of the ACC, and the
British, who submitted their note directly to the King and not to the government since they
did not recognize it, had failed to proceed correctly, in Groza’s view. Both
communications were ignored.
Encouraged by the Potsdam Communiqué and backed by all the party leaders who
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Communists -- the King determined to appoint a new Prime Minister.14 It was important to
install the new before the parade scheduled for 23 August since the Soviets could have
used the anniversary of the coup to demonstrate support for the Groza Government.15
During his conversation with the King, Groza himself maintained that his government was
stronger than ever, and assured King Michael that the Soviets would eventually ensure the
government’s recognition by the Anglo-Americans. He suggested that the King would do
well to maintain him in power.16 When King Michael asked for Groza’s resignation
anyway, the Prime Minister refused to comply. The following day, on 20 August, he again
met the King and, according to his account, attempted to clarify the situation.
“Your Majesty, I am an old man, so please help me to remember when did you
ask for my resignation?” His Majesty replied that he had not said that to me. I
insisted: the Marshal of the Court told Maniu about that. The King said that
neither the Marshal nor he could have said that. Mr. Maniu and the Marshal [of
the Court] shall resolve on this issue! . . . coming back again to the resignation, I
said, “Majesty, I don’t recall when exactly during our conversation I was asked to
resign.” “I asked you to help me.” “Was the word resignation pronounced the
previous day?” His Majesty said that it was not. “But I understood that you would
help me and let me establish another government which would be recognized.” I
said that I did not know that by giving help he meant to resign. It did not cross my
mind that His Majesty had this desire.’17
It was for the first time in Romanian history that a resignation was demanded by a
King and the government’s chief refused to resign.’ 18 King Michael requested assistance
in the establishment of a representative and democratic government. On 20 August the
King met Air Vice-Marshal Stevenson and General Schuyler. The following day Susaikov
reproached the King for ‘playing the British and American game.’ Had the King discussed
14
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the issue with him, he would have suggested a convenient solution.

19

Until Groza

resigned, the King decided, he would not sign any documents originating from the
government; nor would he participate in any public meeting that would have required the
presence of any member of the government.20
Faced with this challenge, Groza convened the Council of Ministers and reassured
them of continued and unconditional Soviet support, as reaffirmed by a recent note signed
by Molotov himself.21 On 23 August, the Soviet Deputy Chairman of the ACC made clear
that the Soviet government was against Groza’s removal. The Soviets claimed that Groza
government enjoyed the full support of the population and fulfilled its responsibilities and
obligations in a manner worthy of all praise.22
While Schuyler called Washington for immediate consultations concerning
Romania, the Air Vice-Marshal Stevenson seemed convinced that the Soviets would
eventually back off. Stevenson apparently behaved as instructed by London: keeping aloof
if events headed to a climax.23
Although the Romanians desired to resume ties with Britain and the United States,
‘the resumption of these relations should not distress and weaken our relations with the
other friends, vital to our country,’ the Vice-Premier Tatarescu maintained. Claiming that
he was the first politician in the country who had advocated for an alliance with the Soviet
Union, Tatarescu assessed that friendship with the great Eastern neighbour constituted the
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prerequisite of Romania’s development.24 Collaboration with the Soviet Union was ‘a vital
condition and, at the same time, a guarantee of our political, economic and social
consolidation.’ Therefore, those trying ‘sometimes accidentally, but most of the time
intentionally, to damage the Soviet-Romanian friendship’ or ‘to prevent the SovietRomanian collaboration’ were not serving Romania’s cause. Tatarescu had in fact accused
the opposition of trying to undermine the state since anyone challenging the validity of the
government worked, in his view, against Romania’s interests.25
Interestingly, these views came from a politician who was perceived even by the
Communists as an opportunist. A former dissident of the National Liberal Party, Tatarescu
established his own faction in the aftermath of the Second World War. Then, asserting that
his party had a left orientation, he accepted collaboration with the Communists. 26 For this
and many others of his gestures, Tatarescu was seen as being the ‘personification of
political immorality.’27 His appointment as Minister of Foreign Affairs, favoured by Ana
Pauker, who later replaced him, was opposed by Patrascanu, the Minister of Justice. It
would have been better to collaborate with the National Liberal Party instead of

24

Stelian Neagoe, Cazul Gheorghe Tatarescu. Plata si rasplata ‘tovarasilor de drum,’
[GeorgeTatarescu’s case. The Payment and the Reward of the Fellow Travellers], Bucharest, 2003, p. 152.
‘The friendship and collaboration with the Soviet Union constitutes the basis of the foreign policy
carried on by the Rumanian state which, likewise, aspires to friendship and collaboration with all Western
Democracies, with the United States and Great Britain and especially with France to whom we are bound by
so many traditions and affinities of race and culture, and last but not least, with our democratic neighbours.’
Gheorghe Tatarescu, “Two Great Problems of Rumania: the Peace Conference and the General Elections,”
Rumanian Review, no. 2, June 1946, p. 10.
25
RNA, CC of RCP, Department of Foreign Relations, Dossier 16/1946, ff. 8-9.
26
Members of Tatarescu’s faction seemed to have believed that the only chance to maintain their
high position in economy and finances was by cooperating with the Soviet installed government. They might
have also believed that they could slow down the communization of Romania. Schoenfeld’s report to the
Secretary of State, 17 November 1947. Romania. Viata politica in documente. 1947 [Romania. Political life.
Documents. 1947], Bucharest, 1994, pp. 269-271.
27
Tatarescu began his political career as a deputy of the National Liberal Party. He was appointed
Prime Minister in 1934 and held on to the premiership for three years. He then became Foreign Minister. A
close associate of former King Carol, he was one of the latter’s principal assistants in creating a royal
dictatorship and in the adoption of an authoritarian constitution in 1938. At this time, Tatarescu formed a new
political party with the resounding name of the ‘Front of the National Renaissance,’ an act that brought about
a complete break with the National Liberal Party. He regained the premiership in 1939. Schoenfeld to the
Secretary of State, Bucharest, November 17, 1947. National Archives of the United States, Washington D.C.,
Department of State, R.G. 59, Roll 9, Division of European Affairs, 1946-1949. Romania. Viata politica in
documente. 1947 [Romania. Political life. Documents. 1947], Bucharest, 1994, p. 267 and 269.

40

Tatarescu’s faction of ‘blackmailers and well-known bribers,’ Patrascanu assessed.28
However, Tatarescu remained loyal to Groza and refused to concur with the King’s request
for resignation. ‘Without asking time for reflection, I told the King’s envoy that I remain
faithful to my commitments to the Bloc and the King should not count on me as an
accomplice to the biggest mistake of his reign.’29
Tatarescu hinted to the Anglo-Americans as having influenced the King’s
decisions.30 The assertion that the King’s gesture was inspired by the Anglo-Americans
was however a recurrent theme. On 10 September 1945, the Romanian newspapers
reproduced an editorial from Izvestia, highly critical of the ‘political interference’ of the
United States and Britain in Romania. It was maintained that the King had nothing to
reproach to his government and in asking for Groza’s resignation, he was just following
the suggestion of the Anglo-Americans.31 ‘The clash between the Anglo-Saxons and Stalin
had begun,’ the former King Carol II noted in his diary, ‘but it is sad that it is taking place
at Romania’s and Michael’s expense . . . It had conceded too much to all the Soviet
requirements in the past, adopting the nefarious policy of spheres of influences, for anyone
to believe that England would fight today with any arm than that of intrigue.’32
The political crisis reached its climax on 8 November, the feast day of the
Archangels Michael and Gabriel, when people gathered peacefully in front of the Royal
Palace to celebrate and show their support for King Michael. The government’s reaction
was brutal. In the clash which followed eleven people were killed and 75 injured.33
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In mid-November the Americans sent an envoy to evaluate the situation. He met
members of the government and the leaders of the opposition. The first were optimistic
about finding a solution to the royal strike. Casting the blame upon the King’s entourage
the Minister of War, General Rascanu, maintained that the crisis could be resolved in a
very simple way. Groza should pretend that he would step down and the King refuse to
discharge him. This would save the King’s prestige.34 The Minister of Justice, Patrascanu,
also believed that the King should reconsider his position and make the first move,
summoning General Susaikov for a discussion and, subsequently, the American and British
representatives in ACC.35 Maniu called for a firmer Anglo-American attitude toward the
Soviets. ‘More than words were necessary if anything substantial was to be achieved’.
Threats would be more effective. The threat to leave the negotiations or even the threat of
war!36 Maniu’s advice suggests despair rather than hope.37 The Soviet puppet government
whose only aim was to subordinate Romanian interests to those of the Soviet Union had to
be overturned promptly, Maniu recommended.38 The leader of the National Liberal Party,
Bratianu, suggested that the Soviets be compelled to apply the principles of the Yalta and
Potsdam Conventions.39
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In his report, the American envoy concluded that Groza government was ‘in no
sense representative under the Yalta formula because the two political groups which had
the support of the vast majority of the Romanian people were excluded from the
Government, their leaders are being harassed, their local political chapter absorbed, the
newspapers entirely suppressed and all public meetings of the opposition barred.’ To the
difficulties arising from the repressive actions of the Government were added the presence
of a large Soviet garrison that was fed, clothed and paid largely at Romanian expense. The
American envoy advised firm action: ‘Unless we can take firm and effective action in
Romania it will soon be too late. We are jeopardizing the confidence of the Romanian
people in our intent and ability to carry out commitments we have made to the world.’40
The political situation in Romania was addressed at the Moscow conference of
Foreign Ministers held between 16 and 26 December 1945. The Soviets maintained that a
change of government in Romania would lead to turmoil. They would not allow this to
happen at the border of the Soviet Union. The Anglo-Americans agreed eventually to
recognize the Romanian government once it was broadened by the inclusion of two
Ministers, representing the two opposition parties. As well, free universal and secret
elections had to be held as soon as possible, and all democratic parties must have the right
to participate in the elections and nominate candidates. The Romanian government
meanwhile should work to protect the freedom of the press, free speech, freedom of
religion and of association. When these conditions were fulfilled, Britain and the United
States pledged to recognize the Groza government.41 Moscow agreed to these requests and
sent Vishinski to Bucharest to ensure the fulfilment of the resolution. He was joined by
Clark Kerr and Harriman.
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Although the two would be Ministers without Portfolios, Groza fought for the
rejection of the nominees of the opposition parties as if it was a matter of life or death. The
Liberal leader, Bratianu, was accused of being morally responsible for the bloodshed of 8
November while Mihalache, the vice-president of the Peasant Party, was blamed for ‘being
responsible for driving Romania into war and volunteering in the campaign against the
Soviet Union,’ actions which proved his ‘undemocratic and fascist views.’ 42 Although the
accusations brought against the two nominees were flimsy, Harriman and Clark Kerr gave
up at the end of one week of negotiations. Two other candidates were nominated by the
NLP and NPP.43 In fact they would be excluded from all important governmental debates
and decisions.
Leaving Bucharest, Vishinski declared that he had never left Romania with such a
light heart.44 He ensured that the Moscow resolution would be applied the way the Soviet
wanted not allowing any prominent political figure to be included in the cabinet.45
Although Britain’s and the United States’ envoys gave publicly formal assurances
that they guaranteed the application of the Moscow agreement, Harriman advised Maniu
privately that he should try to get closer to the Soviet Union since Romania was
inescapably under Soviet influence. Clark Kerr, the British Ambassador in Moscow, was
convinced that Groza would never acquiesce to Anglo-American demands, or comply with
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the agreement since he was just a docile performer of Stalin’s orders and governed
Romania as if it were a Russian province.
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On the basis of the formal and superficial

assurances assumed by Groza, often referenced later, Britain and the United States
officially recognized the Groza government on 6 February 1946. Prominent front page
articles were dedicated by Romanian newspapers to recognition. The Communist official
Scanteia printed the communiqué of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers,
announcing in the headline that the government was recognized, but ignoring in its
coverage the very essence of the British and American communications of 5 February
1946.47
Six months of crisis resolved in a minor political change that did not alter the
essence of the government. It remained Soviet in creation and communist in inspiration.
Such was the government that was expected to hold free elections and ensure democratic
rights. The attempt to implement the Potsdam Decision in Romania had actually been
thwarted by the Moscow Decision. The important positions of Justice and Interior
continued to be controlled by Communists and the government’s program remained that of
6 March with certain amendments. More than an attempt to solve a political crisis, the
Moscow agreement was an unhappy compromise. Britain and the United States agreed to
the Soviet point of view on resolving the Romanian political crisis by the enlargement of
the government with two members of the opposition appointed ministries without
portfolios.
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On the basis of Groza’s commitment to observe democratic liberties, Britain and
the United States recognized the government. The American Department of State was
however aware that although the Soviets continued to maintain the fiction of Romanian
independence, they ‘were pursuing independent aims in Romania, with the general purpose
of influencing Romanian political and economic developments in a direction favourable to
the U.S.S.R. without regard to the interests of the other Allies or of the Romanians.’48

In keeping with the agreement, an election followed, and during the summer
febrile election campaigning took place in Romania. Every political organization chose an
electoral emblem. That of the Bloc of the Democratic Parties, formed on 17 May 1946, an
umbrella for the Communist Party, was the sun.49 The Bloc’s slogan as weird as it
sounded, ‘vote the sun!’ was made visible on buildings, trams and train carriages, and even
printed on packs of matches. The Communists also initiated a campaign to discredit their
opponents. The peasants who were granted small holdings in the agrarian reform the year
before were advised to vote for the Bloc, otherwise the great landowners belonging to the
opposition would claim their land back. ‘You preserve your land by voting the Sun!’ read
the leaflets of the Bloc,50 while the opposition’s leaflets announced that ‘a vote for Groza is
a brick for a kolkhoz’ and urged the peasants vote for ‘Nation and the King.’ Otherwise,
after the elections the government would take back the peasants’ land by incorporating it
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into kolkhoz.51 The other theme besides collectivization was deportation to the Soviet
Union which should be expected if the Communists won.52
From the publication of the electoral law violations of the promised freedoms
increased day by day. Prominent members of the National Peasant and National Liberal
Party were attacked by armed bands, while the Government’s reaction was to accuse the
leaders of the opposition of subversive activities. Members of the leadership of the NPP
and NLP were arrested. Bratianu was placed under house arrest. People taking part in
meetings convened by the opposition were attacked by paramilitaries transported in official
vehicles.53
The massive scale of repression stood in contrast to the political freedom
proclaimed by Groza. The British and the Americans delivered notes of protest on 27 May
and 14 June respectively. Although the notes were released to the press, the censor forbade
their appearance. The government admitted that political violence ‘sometimes’ occurred
but it was the result of the campaign of ‘agitation and hatred’ undertaken by the opposition
parties against the government. The authorities had done nothing than ‘tempering these
manifestations and maintain the calm and public order.’54
The application of the principle of free elections was however incompatible with
what the Soviet Union conceived to be its security interests. As in Poland and East
Germany, the Soviet Union used its influence over Romania to compensate for the
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weakness of the local Communist party. There was an increased Soviet activity in military
field with an influx of military airplanes and troop movements in that period. 55
While the Romanian Government accused certain employees of the American
mission of taking part in ‘reactionary’ plots,56 the Soviets ousted journalists who reported
about Soviet intrusion in Romania’s political life. A correspondent for the Christian
Science Monitor, Reuben H. Markham, who wrote about the disturbances created by
Soviet soldiers at political meetings, was accused by the Soviet representative in ACC,
General Susaikov, of showing a ‘hostile attitude’ to the Red Army stationed in Romania
and ordered to leave the country.57 Although the chief of the American military
representation in the ACC, General Schuyler, protested the Soviets refused to rescind the
expulsion order against Markham.58 Every foreign news correspondent accredited to
Romania was obliged to be supportive of the Groza regime or remain silent.
In contravention of the facts and common sense, the government claimed that it
was following the recommendations of the Moscow conference. Political meetings were
‘held more and more frequently throughout the country’ and ‘all the political parties enjoy
freedom of [the] press as proved by the appearance of new dailies, the columns of which
display abundance of polemics.’59 It was in the interest of most Romanians that political
meetings be controlled since they proved to be just ‘occasions for clashes between
extremists,’ Groza maintained. He invoked the necessity of maintaining order as the main
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reason for the restrictions infringing the freedom of assembly. There was a difference
between the Anglo-American and the Russian views concerning the elections, Groza
admitted. The difference consisted in the fact that the first conceived them as they were
held in Britain or America, whereas Russians had in mind the Russian model. The role of
the Soviet Army was to ensure that the elections would be ‘free and unfettered.’60
While the State broadcasting service transmitted continuously the Government’s
propaganda, opposition publications were hampered by censorship.61 Admitting that
broadcasting facilities were available only to persons with official responsibilities in the
performance of their governmental or administrative duties, Groza referred to the necessity
of preserving public order and security. 62 These equivocations and outright lies caused the
frustrated American representative to the ACC, Burton Berry, to suggest to the Department
of State that the opposition should be given time on the Voice of America.63
Seeking to ensure some element of democratic practice, opposition leaders
requested that official observers be sent to Romania during the campaign and on the
election day. If the Communist won the elections by fraud, Romania’s political future
would be in danger. The new parliament would vote for the removal of the monarchy and
for the country’s inclusion within the Soviet Union, Maniu maintained. He was so much
concerned with the attacks upon his local party leaders and innocent people taking part in
political meetings that he was thinking of withdrawing from the electoral campaign.
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Berry urged the American government to adopt a prompt reaction to give ‘courage
and strength’ to the Romanian democratic leaders. Economic leverage might be employed
to extract political concessions. The American government should be just as hard as the
Soviet in commercial matters, refusing the Romanian government all loans, financial
inducements or commercial advantages until the government functioned in a
representative, democratic and independent manner.66 Letting down the opposition leaders,
‘our friends in Eastern Europe’ would be like giving the ‘coat of whitewash to [the] Groza
façade of the Communist Party’. If, on the other hand, we are going to insist on free and
unfettered elections for Romania, according to our interpretation of those words, it is
important to confirm now to the Romanian representatives in Paris that such is our
intention.’67
Although Romania was of low priority for Britain, as the British Minister, Adrian
Holman told Maniu,68 the British continued to join the Americans in sending protests to the
Romanian government, reminding it of assurances given by Groza in January 1946. On 28
October, for example, the British and the Americans protested against the irregularities that
were occurring in connection with the election preparation and the severe restriction on
freedom of expression imposed. They invited the Government to change its attitude and to
precedent, the leaders of the National Peasant Party believed. They inferred that the abstention of the
opposition parties would not affect the outcome of the future elections in Romania.
Signs of disapproval with Maniu’s policy of resistance at any price and his attachment towards the
Anglo-Americans appeared within National Peasant Party. The Vice-President, Mihalache, and his supporters
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show by its future actions the sincerity of the promises given in January.69 ‘All democratic
parties should have the same possibility to participate in political activities leading up to
elections without discrimination,’ the British note chided.70
Continuing to maintain that the fulfilment of the obligations assumed remained
the constant purpose of the Romanian government, the Foreign Minister Tatarescu replied
to the Anglo-Americans that the Moscow decision was an agreement between the three
Allies and pointed out that any act controlling its implementation could not belong to one
signatory government.71 The Romanian government could not therefore accept any
‘imposition dictated’ by a single foreign power, either British or American. Any
comments, criticism and recommendations would be understood as attempts to infringe
Romania’s sovereignty by interfering in the country’s internal affairs.72
It was evident that the British and American governments could not influence the
trend of events in Romania unless joined by the Soviet government although diplomatic
protests could not be considered as an infringement of Romanian sovereignty or
interference in a matter of domestic jurisdiction. The British continued to press the
Government to tolerate freedom of speech, of press and the right of association in the note
submitted by Holman to Tatarescu on 16 November 1946.73
The Groza Government continued to respond that the two opposition parties were
to blame for the situation. The upcoming election was ‘the first electoral battle for a truly
democratic political regime. . . . There had been no true democracy in Romania before, not
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even in the strictly formal meaning of the law, and even less with regard to the political
morals and practice in everyday life.’

74

The elections to be held on 19 November 1946

would be different from the previous, Groza asserted. They would be a consultation of the
popular will and the electorate would not be misled ‘in order to obtain the greatest possible
number of votes or to steal them from the ballot boxes or buy them.’75 So Groza promised.
In fact, a theft is what transpired.
On 19 November 1946 terror reigned. The opposition voters were denied access
to the polls in twelve polling stations in Bucharest. When the ballot boxes in some
provincial cities were opened, fighting erupted, and casualties were reported. The
techniques used for falsifying the election included depriving about a half of the people
eligible to vote of voting cards, permitting multiple voting by government supporters, not
allowing scrutinizers from the opposition to be present at the count, and stuffing the ballot
boxes before Opposition observers arrived. 76
Although admitting that certain ‘incidents’ happened in connection with the
elections, the government blamed them on the Opposition parties.77 A communiqué issued
by the Ministry of Interior shortly after election indicated that violence resulted from
attacks on polling stations by opposition supporters.’78 The Minister of the Interior,
Teohari Georgescu, confirmed ‘fair voting’, as did ‘some fifty foreign journalists from
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every European country’ who came to Romania to cover the elections.79 Indeed, forty-six
journalists from various European capitals signed a statement claiming that no intimidation
(physical or moral) took place during the elections, that there were no complaints regarding
the procedure of voting and that the entire process took place in an atmosphere of calm.80
However, more than 10,000 complaints and protests were submitted to the American and
British Missions the day after the elections. A list containing the names of 60,000 citizens
who were not allowed to vote was also submitted.81
Were the elections an efficient and sufficient tool for establishing democracy?82
Certainly, the Declaration of Liberated Territories approved at Yalta by the ‘Big Three’
guaranteed free elections in Eastern Europe. And undoubtedly, no such elections had been
held in Romania. Yet all the protests submitted before the elections did not lead to any
change in the practice of the Romanian government. What result could the protests
submitted after election possibly have?

79

During his visits to London and Paris in July 1946, the Propaganda Minister arranged for a
group of journalists to visit Romania during the election period. Burton Y. Berry, Romanian Diaries, 19441947, 2000, p. 453. Amongst the journalists that reported free elections was Emil Burre, editor of the French
newspaper L’Ordre. Ivor Montagu of the Daily Worker, London, made a similar statement. Apparently, there
were foreign journalists that concluded that ‘no physical or moral pressure was brought to bear upon the
voters. The ballot was perfectly secret.’ Romanian News, 1 December, 1946, no. 3, pp. 3-4.
80
Statement of the press correspondents on the election, published by Universul, 21 November
1946, Ioan Scurtu (ed.), Romania, Viata politica in documente, 1946, pp. 488-9.
81
The Americans staff received contradictory instructions from Berry and Schuyler. At noon,
Berry ordered his staff to discontinue receiving complaints and protests, while Schuyler directed them to
continue receiving the complaints, assessing that he was responsible for monitoring rigorously the elections
as the government’s representative in the ACC. Telegram of the Soviet Ambassador, Kavtaradze to the
Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, 21 November 1946, Ioan Scurtu, Romania, Viata
politica in documente, 1946[Romania. The Political Life in Documents. 1946], pp. 490-1.
82
Analysing the case of the elections in Costa Rica, where the government was recognized by the
United States despite the fact that the opposition was not permitted to secure more than 25 percent of the
votes, the editor of La Nacion, Sergio Carbalo, argued that not seek to create a precedent. Romania would not
become a first-rate diplomatic dilemma for the United States, concluded the author. “The Romanian
Problem” La Nacion, 26 November 1946, in Romania in anticamera Conferintei de Pace de la Paris.
Documente [Romania in the antechamber of the Peace Conference of Paris. Documents], Bucharest, 1996,
pp. 336-337.

53

The Communist dominated Bloc of ‘democratic parties’ won about eighty percent
of the vote, obtaining 347 seats in a 414 seat Parliament.83 The democratic parties all
together hand only taken seven per cent of the seats in parliament, a fact signalled in the
British note of protest which followed.84
After its electoral victory, the Government intensified its repression of the
opposition. About 2,000 politicians were arrested in March 1947. The opposition did what
it could do, which was little. Maniu protested against the abuses of the Government in a
memorandum addressed to the Ministry of Interior.85 The Independent Social Democratic
Party addressed a petition to all socialist parties and democratic nations, pleading the cause
of hundreds of Socialists arrested for their political views.86 The leader of the National
Liberal Party, Bratianu, seeking relief, submitted a memorandum to the King asking him to
cease collaboration with the government in protest. While during Antonescu’s dictatorship,
the Dictator signed all decrees, the laws issued by Groza government bore the King’s
signature. The King should appeal once again to the Three Signatory powers, Bratianu
suggested. He might have believed that this time the King would succeed since the country
was to become sovereign once again. The Peace Treaty, concluded in Paris on 10 February
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1947, which officially ended the Armistice period, waited only for Parliamentary
ratification to consecrate the sovereignty of the state.87
The conclusion of the Peace treaty did not confer the signatory states the right to
intervene in Romania’s internal affairs as the Romanian government pointed out in the
reply to the British who delivered a note of protest for the massive scale of repression.88
The government also accused the leaders of the opposition of heinous crimes, including
acting as an ‘apple of discord’ between the Great Powers.89
Why was Romania abandoned while Greece and Turkey were assisted? Not long
after Truman’s speech on 11 March 1947, Maniu reproached Berry that the Americans
were doing little to defend democratic values in Romania.90 He likewise reproached
Holman and Porter at other meetings. Holman exploded: ‘What do you want from us, Mr.
Maniu, to go to war for Romania?’ Porter intervened, evoking the heroic deeds of the antiCommunist Greeks. Maniu should follow in their footsteps and resist firmly, ‘the great
endeavours being won by fight, not by lamentations.’ Had Porter been aware of the danger
threatening Maniu and the NPP leadership, he might not have rebuked him so
unsympathetically for ‘expecting the Western powers to fight for the Romanian
opposition.’91
At the end of July the National Peasant Party was outlawed after the so-called
‘Tamadau affair,’ when the vice-president of the party, Mihalache, together with other
leading members were arrested while waiting for a plane to flee the country. Thousands of
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arrests followed.92 Maniu’s hope for support from the Anglo-Americans even if trouble
with the Soviets resulted was utopian.93 Other of his predictions about the political
evolution in Romania proved to be very astute.
Although the Groza Government had assumed certain obligations in order to
obtain recognition from the other Great Powers, all the previous pledges were disregarded.
King Michael’s attempt to force a change with his ‘royal strike’ failed. All appeals of the
opposition leaders to the West for help did not change the situation. The notes sent by the
British and American governments to the Romanian government stated the obvious but had
no effect. Once recognition was conceded, further representations were dismissed as
interference in Romania’s internal affairs.
Although determined to challenge the supremacy of the Soviet Union in Eastern
Europe, the Attlee and Truman administrations were eventually forced to accept the Soviet
predominance over Romania and recognize the Groza government installed with the
support of the Soviets. The recognition of the Romanian government on 6 February 1946
and the Peace Treaty signed with Romania on 10 February 1947 consecrated the new
regime in Bucharest. Although the Groza government was not representative or democratic
within the meaning of the Potsdam decisions, the Council of Foreign Ministers which met
in Moscow in December 1945 did not change the substance of the government, Communist
in inspiration and subordinate to Soviet interests.
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Supporting the Communist Regime?

Some people said that the golden dream of the
humankind was Communism and that the dream was almost
tangible in Eastern Europe. But they did not want to ask
themselves why thousand and thousand people were running
away from this dream and why the exodus does not take the
other way too. (King Michael) 94

While the political situation worsened and the Romanian judiciary system focused
through a series of political trials on eliminating the leaders of the opposition, a few
members of the British Parliament reiterated their favourable views on Romania’s
democratic regime. The Labour MP Leslie J. Solley and the Communist Phil Piratin
seemed impressed by the ‘complete freedom of speech and action for all democrats’ in
Romania and pointed out that only carrying on fascist propaganda or indulging in antiSemitic activities were prohibited.95 Ironically the accusation of carrying on fascist
propaganda was one the most commonly one used by the regime against political
opponents. As Le Rougetel, the British political representative in Bucharest, noted, it was a
simply process ‘of calling black white’. That way ‘a legend is being built up which unless
challenged will soon be accepted as epitaph of an independent Romania.’ Who was
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supposed to challenge the regime since Eden believed that the British had ‘more important
fish to try. And what would be the result of challenging it? Nil.’96
The label ‘fascist reactionaries’ was applied to the opponents of the Communist
Party and anyone who opposed the policies of the government and was extended to the
outside ‘enemy’.97 One of the many misrepresentations spread by the government was that
the opposition parties were compromised for having accepted as members former members
of the Iron Guard.98 Recent accounts disclosed that it was the Communist Party who
collaborated with former Iron Guard members and even accepted them as members to
increase their very low membership.99 The Left represented by the Social Democrats was
also accused of not adhering to the Communist ideals and not encouraging close relation
with the Soviet Union.
By declaring that the ‘counter-revolutionary forces’, assisted by foreign countries
had conspired against the Romanian government, Solley, clearly followed the Communist
propaganda of the time. Solley and Piratin were not, however, the first supporters of the
Communist regime to visit Bucharest, exchanging favourable press for comradely
hospitality. A year before, in 1946, John Mack, a Labour MP, had visited Romania
following the invitation of Groza government. Assessing that ‘very little is known in
England about Groza government’s politics,’ Mack was apparently eager to convey ‘a just
and objective idea’ about Romania. For this purpose, he accepted the invitation to visit,
which proved to be an ‘exhilarating experience’. Welcomed as a distinguished envoy from
Britain, Mack was invited to speak at a meeting organized in his honour in Bucharest. He
then spent Easter in the company of the Prime Minister, at the latter’s private residence in
Deva. He had repeatedly been told about how ‘gloomy’ Romania’s past had been. Until
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1946, it seemed, the country had lacked a strong and stable government. This might have
encouraged Mack to construct a glamorous image of the present.100 Confident that the
Romanians had ‘a strong desire to throw away forever the legacies of the past’ and rebuild
the country ‘on a modern base in harmony with the great democracies of the West,’ he was
persuaded that the Groza Government would ensure a wide representation for all political
forces. In his view, the government was also ‘animated by a sincere desire for friendship
with Britain and the Soviet Union.’101 After the November elections, Mack suggested in
the House of Commons that the Romanian government be congratulated for its victory.
Any such fraternal message, he was informed, was unlikely since the elections had been
‘neither fair, nor free. They had not contributed to the British-Romanian friendship and,
consequently, there was no need to congratulate the Romanian government.’ 102

Just before the Romanian elections, another Labour MP had visited Romania. For
John Platt-Mills ‘the best criterion for judging whether or not a regime is good’ was to find
out how ‘the respective people, its workers, peasants, intellectuals and employees, respond
to this regime.’ Although less effusive than Mack in praising the regime, Platt-Mills was
certain that ‘the progressive people’ in Britain would view with sympathy the struggle of
the Romanian democracy to achieve better living conditions for common people. He took
the opportunity to voice an opinion on the reparation issue, discussed at the Paris Peace
Conference. The British government conveyed indemnity claims on behalf of the ‘big
industrialists’ who invested in Romania. Romania was requested to make compensation for
damages caused to property of the Allied countries and to their citizens during the war, the
100
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sum of the compensation being established later.103 A distinction had to be made between
the damages caused by Romania to invaded territories and the damages which were caused
to Romania, Platt-Mills assessed. As far as he knew, Romania ‘never bombed London or
New York’. Platt-Mills pinned much importance in his statement on commercial relations
between the two countries. ‘To Great Britain it is of great importance to find a market for
her manufactured goods and I am quite sure that your ploughmen want our machinery. In a
like manner, Great Britain requires the food and timber which has always been found in
Romania in plenty.’ 104

In the autumn of 1947, an official parliamentary delegation led by Hubert
Beaumont, a Labour MP, and including two other Labour MPs, Somerville Hastings and
Ernest Popplewell, two Conservatives - Sir Walter Smiles and Colonel Clifton Brown, and
a Liberal, Emery Roberts – arrived in Romania at the invitation of the Romanian
government.105 Once the visit was confirmed and the composition of the delegation known,
the Romanians decided that other MPs should be invited to Romania ‘so that they may be
able to respond to criticism made by the delegation upon their return’. 106
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During the summer, the Romanians had unsuccessfully attempted to manoeuvre
for the inclusion in the delegation of certain MPs known for their pro-Communist
sympathies. The delegation’s composition had been decided by Parliament proportional to
its membership, they were told. The remaining option was to invite the desired MPs as
private guests of the government. On the Romanian list stood Leslie Solley, Phil Piratin,
Denis Pritt, John Platt-Mills, Konni Zilliacus, Richard Crossman, and Kingsley Martin, the
editor of the left-wing magazine New Statesman and Nation.107 They should support the
regime and neutralize a presumptive negative evaluation made by the official
delegation.’108
Of these, ‘the most suitable person to rely on’ was believed to be Pritt who, as a
lawyer, defended the Soviets brought to Court in Canada for espionage.109 Although an
independent MP after a contention with Bevin, he worked ‘hand in hand’ with Zilliacus
and Platt-Mills. While the Romanian government put much hope in Pritt, he declined the
invitation. It was not because he was reluctant to endorse the Romanian regime but
because at that time he was in Prague supporting that Communist regime under
construction there.110 Solley, a cunning person who had previously rendered services to the
Romanian government ‘with all kinds of information’ was also on the list.
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on the same day as the official delegation and accompanied it everywhere.112 Hubert
Beaumont, the chief of the delegation, expressed, upon his return to Britain, his anger at
the discourtesy of the Romanian government that had simply attached the two
unrepresentative MPs to the delegation.113
The additions earned whatever hospitality might have been shown them.
Accompanying the official delegation, Solley proved to be, as he was in the House of
Commons, ‘talkative and even quarrelsome,’ arguing frequently with the members of the
delegation and even accusing them of insulting Romania. Although he was told that the
delegation was not interested in his opinion since he was not an accredited member, he
replied that as a member of the British Parliament, he could declare whatever he wanted.114
Piratin went even further in his criticisms, accusing the British Government of not
spending a penny to help Romania although it had assisted Germany, Austria and
Greece.115
As the Romanian government expected, the two did not just work to hamstring the
official delegation but also made favourable remarks on the regime on their return and
created that way a distorted image for British public opinion of what was actually
happening in Romania. Their attitude prompted the Conservative Clifton Brown to assess
that the Soviet Union represented not only a huge military potential, but also an ‘altar of
social beliefs’ having its ‘fanatic agents’ in the House of all capitalist states.’116 King
Michael was of the same opinion. ‘Stalin had admirers among people with influence on
public opinion in the West,’ he assessed. ‘Philosophers, journalists, poets… while
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applauding the communist experiment they took [for themselves] the best of [what]
capitalism’ could provide.117 Without knowing how Soviet propaganda could be restrained,
Brown was at least certain that the British public was beginning to wake up from the
‘illusion that the Left stands for a valid political option. Had the elections been held’, by
the time the visit occurred, ‘the Conservatives would [have] take[n] power.’118
Travelling throughout the country, the delegation had the opportunity of seeing to
what extent the Communists had succeeded in establishing control over Romanian society.
Criticizing certain measures initiated by the regime such as the financial stabilization
implemented in August 1947, Brown assessed that this measure had the purpose of
undermining the capitalist basis of the society.119 His colleague, Smiles, criticized the
procedure of appointing rather than electing local officials. These would, however, prove
to be faithful to the regime which had appointed them.
While visiting Sibiu, a city with a significant German population, Brown, Smiles,
and Roberts ‘began the attack,’ asking how many enterprises had been taken from the
Germans and for what reason. The Communist appointed Mayor mentioned that there was
a law which decided on the confiscation. That made Smiles retort that the Communist
regime had adopted certain measures, it seemed, only to uproot the German population
irrespective of its war record.120 “Was there any political organization in which Romanians
could freely express their political beliefs?” Popplewell asked, approaching Anton
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Alexandrescu, a former colleague of Maniu, by then a collaborationist of the regime.
Alexandrescu was by then Minister of Cooperation.

121

Why had Alexandrescu agreed to

adhere to the Communists and leave the National Peasant Party after twenty years? And
what kind of democracy was that in which state officials were forced to resign just because
they held a different political view from the official line?122 Achile Saraga, an MP
accompanying the British delegation, was also a former member of the National Peasant
Party.123 The day the Assembly of deputies voted for the exclusion of the NPP from
political life, Saraga paid a veritable homage to the Minister of Interior “that discovered
the plot orchestrated by the NPP”. 124
Constantly challenging the officials they met, the British MPs warned them ‘how
wrong they were in walking on this line of totalitarian policy.’ Mentioning the story of a
naïve girl, unaware of the danger of riding a tiger who ended by being eaten, Smiles
pointed to the danger of the misalliance between the Social Democrats and the
Communists the result of which could only be the end of the social democracy in
Romania.125
However emphatic it might have been in some of its criticism, the British
parliamentary delegation could do nothing more than condemn certain measures adopted
by the Communist regime. They could not even be present at Maniu’s trial, since, as was
the case with all the other political trials, the judgement took place behind closed doors.
Maniu was tried and sentenced to life imprisonment on 11 November for ‘plotting against
121
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the government’. By then he was 76 and the sentence was the equivalent to death.126
Several months before, on 29 July 1947 the National Peasant Party was banned from
political life on the ground that it was a ‘reactionary and fascist’ party.127 Smiles was too
optimistic in believing that the authorities would not refuse entry to the court building
because ‘if refused, everyone would realize what kind of freedom is that promoted by the
Romanian justice.’128
The critics displeased Romanian officials who worked to limit the damage. A
scheduled visit to Constanta, the major Romanian port on the Black Sea, was cancelled due
to ‘some changes in the train schedule.’ It was more likely, the Britons commented, to keep
them away from seeing the numerous Soviet ships loading Romanian goods for the Soviet
Union.129 Soon after, while the delegation waited to be led to a visit with the Minister of
the Interior,130 they were told that the audience was cancelled because they had showed a
consistently unfriendly attitude towards the Romanian Government during their visit. The
brutal tone used by the functionary tasked with conveying this announcement and the
gesture itself left the British speechless. The only response, it seemed, was to leave the
hotel in which they were staying and ask for refuge in the British Legation for the
remaining days. The visit was seemingly leading to a diplomatic incident. Only after long
explanations and supplications would the British return to the hotel. The Romanian
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parliament could not be made responsible for the government’s attitude, the British were
told.131
Overall the visit proved to be a great disappointment for the British delegation
which concluded that the only ones with power in Romania were the Communists. The
Romanian regime and the Soviet one were similar. ‘Being in essence a communist one, the
Romanian regime suffers of the same weakness as the Soviet communist regime: mistrust,
suspicion and extreme sensitivity.’132 Beaumont, the chief of the delegation, who at the
beginning of the visit expressed his hope that the visit would contribute to the
improvement of relations between Britain and Romania, noted sadly at its end that none of
the democratic values such as the freedom of speech, freedom of thinking and of
movement were observed in Romania.133
The regime did not react well to even mute criticism. A few weeks after the visit
of the British delegation, the Foreign Minister Tatarescu was dismissed for his negligence.
An intensive press and radio campaign was launched in the first days of November,
demanding an investigation at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It was ‘the solemn
obligation of the Government’ to the people to eliminate the ‘nest of reactionaries and
traitors’ from the Ministry. The press had insinuated that Tatarescu might have acquiesced
with the ‘traitorous activities of his subordinates’. On subsequent days the attack was
directed against Tatarescu’s party.

131
132

134

On 3 November, the Parliament’s committee for

RNA, CC of RCP, Department of Foreign Relations, Dossier 9/1947, f. 5 and ff. 26-27.
Popplewell’s assessment. RNA, CC of RCP, Department of Foreign Relations, Dossier 9/1947,

f. 27.
133

At the reception offered by the Romanian Inter-Parliamentary Union on 2 October, Beaumont
emphasized that ‘freedom is indestructible’ and cannot be constrained, urging the Romanians to remove the
obstacles that impeded people’s free movement and trade. RNA, CC of RCP, Department of Foreign
Relations, Dossier 9/1947, ff. 7-10.
134
‘The rapidity and precision with which the foregoing steps were carried out clearly indicates
that the procedure had been carefully planned in advance.’ On November 2 a press attack was launched,
indirectly, against Tatarescu; few days after, he was charged with criminal negligence. The stage was set for
his removal from office. Poporul [The People] of 5 November, a government paper, referred to Tatarescu’s
responsibility for the ‘nefarious activity of certain officials of the Ministry’ and claimed that the public
demanded remedial actions by the government. A lengthy editorial was published in Semnalul [The Signal]

66

foreign affairs adopted a motion of non-confidence. Two days later the Assembly of
Deputies convened in an extraordinary session and voted a motion of non-confidence
concerning the Minister of Foreign Affairs. On 6 November 1947 all ministers belonging
to Tatarescu’s Liberal party were dismissed.135 Tatarescu himself was replaced by the
Communist Ana Pauker. He had been closely watched during the visit of the British MPs
and criticised for being too courteous to the chief of the delegation, Beaumont. The private
conversation between the two remained an irksome enigma for the Communists.136
As revealed later, a plot against Tatarescu had been concocted during the
investigation of the NPP’s leaders, when it was alleged that high officials from the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs had been supplying secret information to members of the
British and American Legations.137 Did Tatarescu expect his dismissal since his name was
mentioned during the trial?138 Did he talk about his fears to Beaumont? We may never
know.
Although not a Communist, Tatarescu helped the Communist Party to carry out
the electoral fraud in November 1946. Apparently he had given instructions that the staff
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs should vote for the government, warning that sanctions
would follow for anyone that did not comply.139 Able but unscrupulous, Tatarescu
managed to keep on friendly official terms with both the Soviet and the Western powers
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and ‘clearly endeavoured to give the impression to the latter that he was working to resist
the designs of the Communists.’ In his dealings with diplomats representing countries
outside the Soviet orbit, Tatarescu was usually ‘quite frank in stating the reasons (Soviet
opposition) behind his inability to meet their demands in his capacity as Foreign Minister
and quite bland in assurances that were he, a free agent, he would satisfy them
immediately’.140
Meanwhile, Tatarescu did not hesitate to criticize publicly the British and the
Americans for protesting against the government’s policies. Seemingly to prove his
independence he issued his own critique of the government not very much later. In April
1947 when his Party had reached the point of abstaining to vote for the reorganization of
the Ministry of National Economy, Tatarescu told the British Representative that he would
have a serious talk with the Communists and was prepared to quit the government on this
issue. Although he seemed firm, Tatarescu continued to walk the Communist line, the
American representative judged, ‘for he knows full well he cannot withdraw from
government, continue to be active in politics and remain free man in Romania.’141
Nonetheless, one month later, in May, Tatarescu underlined the motives that made the
government unpopular in an extensive memorandum.142
‘Innocent people have been arrested for reasons which had nothing to do with
public order’ creating an atmosphere of growing dissatisfaction and even hatred against the
government, Tatarescu assessed in his memorandum, pointing out that ‘mass arrests were
never and are not even today a barrier against subversive currents. Mass arrests actually led
to the recruitment of new elements in the service of turmoil and disorder.’ Although Groza
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promised before the general election to grant amnesty for political offences,143 a
resurgence of repression followed triggered by the tendency to view ‘any unwanted
behaviour as a crime, any crime as a political act and any political crime as treason.’ The
atmosphere of panic, distrust and insecurity paralyzed everything. Uncertainty, preventive
arrests, requisitions and abuses created a climate of mistrust, so that no one invested any
more in Romania. A growing dissatisfaction was shared by the military, magistracy,
professors, peasants and priesthood. 144
The ministers should contemplate the country’s image abroad. After the peace
treaty ratification, they would request admission into the United Nations, to ‘resume the
country’s place among the free countries of the world and enjoy all the rights and benefits
given by the member status of the international organization.’ However, Romania’s
admission depended on the vote of the General Assembly, then composed of fifty five
states. ‘Would these states vote for Romania’s acceptance?’145
Tatarescu reminded his colleagues that although Romania benefited ‘from the
unconditional support of the Soviet Union and their friends,’ those votes would not
represent the majority. The British and the Americans would invoke the observance of the
provisions of the peace treaty, particularly Article Three referring to the obligation to grant
all the citizens the free exercise of fundamental liberties.146 A list of fifteen measures was
proposed by Tatarescu to improve the operation of the government. Ministers had to revise
the country’s administration. Those in leading local institutions had to be persons entrusted
by the population. Economically, besides stimulating private initiative and limiting state
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intervention, the government should implement a policy of economic parsimony. Monetary
stabilization had to be carefully prepared. And the list continued.147
Seemingly Tatarescu did not have the intention of making the memorandum
public. ‘It was not my intention to shake the government’s stability through a public and
passionate discussion of governmental decisions,’ Tatarescu would later state from prison,
pledging that he would refrain from any further action that ‘could make the game of the
government’s opponents’ and giving assurances that the memorandum would not affect the
collaboration of his team within the government. By putting forward ‘certain suggestions,’
he had in mind the consolidation of the administration through the ‘review and correction
of certain errors, unavoidable errors in any government.’148
Some thought that Tatarescu was lured by the Soviets into a trap. Before
submitting it to his cabinet colleagues, Tatarescu had showed his memorandum to the
Soviet Ambassador Kavtaradze and possibly to the ACC Chairman, General Susaikov.
Having the Soviet Ambassador’s approval, Tatarescu distributed the memo to the
Government.149 That was a mistake. The Memorandum constituted his resignation. He had
barely resigned before the press was unleashed with accusations of hypocrisy and betrayal,
speaking of him as 'the one of the biggest scoundrel of the Romanian political life.’ By
collaborating with the Communists, Tatarescu had attracted nothing but contempt.
Defamatory articles also appeared against his Foreign Ministry team; a ‘ministry of traitors
in the service of the Anglo-American imperialists.’150
The precision with which his resignation was secured, the rapidity of the purge of
his adherents from Government office, and the uniformity of the press attacks on
147
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Mr. Tatarescu all show clearly that this demarche was prepared long in advance
and was put into action when a favourable moment arose. The purge of Dissident
Liberals from all phases of public life is still continuing and extends down to the
most petty office holders in the provincial, municipal, and central governments.
The press for November 16 announced the dismissal of all Dissident Liberal
deputies from offices in parliamentary committees although the ultimate fate of
the deputies themselves is still unknown.151
Displaced from the leadership of the Foreign Ministry on 6 November 1947,152
Tatarescu was arrested three years later, on the night of 5/6 May 1950, together with other
politicians, and held in the notorious Sighet gaol until 1955.153 A few days after
Tatarescu’s downfall, Maniu and Mihalache, the president and vice-president of the party,
were sentenced to forced labour for life (subsequently, to life imprisonment), deprivation
of civil rights and confiscation of all possessions. They were charged with organizing and
heading a plot with the aim of forcible overthrowing the government with the support of
Anglo-Americans. The trial provided “overwhelming proofs to what had been pursued by
the warmongers in maintaining in these parts of the world a vast network of espionage”; it
was alleged that Grigore Niculescu-Buzesti and Constantin Visoianu, former Foreign
ministers, who succeeded in escaping the country in 1946, organized abroad an espionage
network guided by ‘the Imperialists’ while the leaders of the NPP carried on ‘a feverish
activity towards overthrowing the democratic regime.’ Former high officials from the
Foreign Ministry, Alexandru Cretzianu and Niculescu-Buzesti were sentenced to forced
151
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labour for life, Grigore Gafencu to twenty years of forced labour, and Visoianu, to fifteen
years forced labour.154
The King and the Queen Mother left Bucharest on 12 November to attend the
wedding of Princess Elizabeth and Philip Mountbatten.155 In London, the King had many
conversations with high officials. What did they intend to do to help him? Bevin, the
Foreign Minister, did not give King Michael any encouragement but advice: not to return
to Romania.156 It was also what the Communists expected.157 By now they should have had
Stalin’s agreement for the removal of the monarchy.
The King’s reputation was affected by incidents that had taken place during the
three years of his reign. While during his ‘royal strike’, Stalin remarked that ‘Kings can be
originals, [which is] an extremely rare feature’ he was also determined not to act directly
against the King and the monarchy.158 The King was however not just original. By
deciding in August 1945 not to sign any of the government’s decrees unless Groza
resigned, the King made himself the symbol of Romanian national resistance. Even the
Communists recognized that. ‘The King is now the symbol of the nation and its resistance
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to Communist policies,’ Sraer, the Secretary General in the Ministry of the Interior, adding
that the Communists did not act without the full assent of the Soviets.159
To what extent the prolonged royal crisis eroded the King’s position is difficult to
assess. An event which took place several months after Carol’s strike produced
considerable public confusion. The day the Anglo-Americans submitted their notes of
protest against the Government’s abuses, on 27 May 1946, by an unhappy coincidence, the
King, at an elaborate ceremony in Constanta, awarded his defiant Prime Minister the Order
of ‘Faithful Service.’ The King had seemingly concurred with granting the award to
appease the Soviets, at this juncture angry about a previous manifestation of people’s
solidarity with him, on 10 May. According to the American representative, Berry, the King
committed a political mistake by decorating Groza since his action could to be used for
Government electoral purposes since the election was then in progress.160
After the result of the election was announced, protocol dictated that the King
open the parliamentary session. On 1 December 1946 he declared that he was ‘happy to be
amongst the country’s representatives convened together for the first time after a long
adjournment of parliamentary life.’ The government had actively participated in the
consolidation of international peace, pursuing the development of political, economic and
cultural relations with Great Britain, the United States, France and all the other peaceloving countries, he maintained. The stress was put however on developing collaboration
with the Soviet Union.161
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Although Maniu hoped that the King would not proceed with the opening of the
Assembly of Deputies before the ratification of the elections by all the three signatories of
the Moscow agreement,162 the King had obviously decided to do what was necessary to
survive, and hope for the best thereafter. Considerable dismay was inevitable. Opposition
leaders warned that he had made a grave error. ‘This Parliament whose session you open,
will eventually vote for a Republic,’ Maniu warned.163 It did not take too long for the
prediction to come true.
The King’s options were previously debated by his councillors. There was no
chance that the British and the Americans could influence the political situation, the King’s
personal adviser maintained, recalling that eight notes asking for the fulfilment of the
January guarantees had been sent to the Romanian government to no result. The
acceptance of the fraudulent election would however affect the King’s popularity. It would
destroy the last vestiges of the King’s ties with his subjects and, ultimately, his reason for
being. The King could not be a traitor to himself: he should refuse the result of the
elections. Such a firm stance would probably bring the King into open conflict with the
Government and the Soviets, and, eventually result in his abdication. But who could
guarantee that if the King accepted the results of the election, he would continue to be
tolerated by the Soviets? He might be removed anyway as he would lose popular support,
the King’s Private Secretary maintained, pointing out that by refusing to accept the result
of the fraudulent election the King would act in agreement with the will of his people. The
Marshal of the Court disagreed with the rest of councillors.
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Americans could not bring about an alteration of the political situation, the King should
accept the Government-Soviets’ report on the election, he suggested. The King would
subsequently have the chance, although a slight one, of re-establishing his popularity; this
chance depended, however, on his survival during the Soviet occupation. All of the King’s
advisers concurred that the acceptance of the fraudulent elections would erode much more
the King’s popularity and undermine his prestige. 165
The King seemed resigned to accept, as well, the necessary re-orientation of
Romania’s foreign policy towards its great Eastern neighbour. In a later speech opening a
new session of the Assembly, in October 1947, after mentioning the government’s
endeavours to reorganize the economy and raise the life standard of the working masses,
the King mentioned that Romania’s foreign policy was based on friendship with the Soviet
Union, ‘the defender of peace, democracy and peoples’ independence’.166 The new
direction was approved by the Communist Party. In November 1947 the newly appointed
Foreign Minister, Ana Pauker delivered a speech in which she referred to Romania’s
‘previous vassalage to Imperialistic quarters and the interests of foreign Big Finance’ and
underlined that Romania’s foreign policy would not be as in the past ‘the exclusive
appendage of a close cast and a book with seven seals’ for the common people. 167
The end of the year was approaching when Groza called the Palace for an
appointment with the King for the following day, 30 December. He mentioned ‘a family
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issue.’168 The King had told his Prime Minister about his intention to marry Ana, princess
of Bourbon-Parma whom he had met in London at his cousin’s wedding. As provided by
the Constitution, the King needed the approval of the government for the marriage. ‘A
family matter’ should mean that Groza would bring up the issue during their meeting, the
King assumed.169 The appointment turned, however, into something else.
Accompanied by Gheorghiu-Dej, the First Secretary of Communist Party, Groza
entered the Palace at noon.170 Gheorghiu-Dej’s unannounced appearance displeased the
King.171 His discontent turned immediately into astonishment with Groza’s first words:
‘We came to talk about an amicable divorce.’ After this abrupt beginning, Groza stuttered
disparate phrases about the country’s severe situation, the Great Powers that ‘could wait no
longer’ and the monarchy itself which was no longer a necessity for Romania since it
impeded the country’s ‘democratization’. Then he handed the King a paper, and asked him
to sign it right away. Realizing what the paper was, the King protested vociferously.172
Before such a grave step was taken, it was first necessary to consult the people, he said.
There was no time for such subtleties, Groza replied.173 He should have a few days respite
to consider before signing an Act of Abdication, the King insisted; or, at least one day . . .
just a few hours . . . only a few minutes. ‘I do not have a mandate to give you days,’
Gheorghiu-Dej intervened, ‘I have only two hours available. If you sign, you will be
remembered in history as having understood the situation, if not, tell me!’ In the end, he
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allowed the King a short break. ‘Why, the heck, not give him a few minutes since it will be
the same anyway,’ he thought and told the King, ‘talk to your advisers!’”174
The King left the room. The Marshal of the Court and the King’s personal
secretary, Mircea Ioanitiu, informed him that the Palace links with the exterior had been
cut off, the phone connections broken,175 and the Guard disarmed and replaced by people
in the service of the Communists.176 What was going to happen to her son? the Queen
Mother inquired. ‘Nothing is going to happen to him’, Gheorghiu-Dej maintained
placatory. However, she should be aware that the King’s fate also depended on her; she
should advise him to sign the Act of Abdication. That was ‘the only reasonable attitude
under the present circumstances.’
The King continued to hesitate. ‘How can I admit this without any struggle?
People would think that I was a coward because I abdicated without a fight, I surrendered
the throne without a fight.’ ‘But whom do you want to fight with?’ Gheorghiu-Dej
asked.177 Groza intervened and said that any delay would just complicate the matter.
People could realize that something unusual was happening at the Palace.178 Eventually,
the King yielded. ‘He signed it,’ Gheorghiu-Dej later commented, ‘as one sign a voucher

174

Gheorghiu-Dej on the King’s abdication. RNA, CC of RCP, Chancellery, Dossier 16/1964, ff.

96-97.
175

The King later told a press conference in London, that the Royal Palace had been surrounded
by armed detachments, and that Groza and Gheorghiu-Dej informed him that in case he did not resign within
the time-limit, the armed communists would follow the instructions already issued by them.. The Times, 5
March 1948.
176
Seemingly, it was the new Minister of National Defence, Emil Bodnaras, who acted decisively
for the King’s removal. A Moscow’s agent, involved in the arrest of Marshal Antonescu’s, Bodnaras was
appointed Minister of National Defence on 24 December 1947. The decree for his appointment was signed
by the King himself. TNA, PRO, FO 371/78614.
177
RNA, CC of RCP, Chancellery, Dossier 16/1964, ff. 96-97.
178
During his interview with Mircea Ciobanu, the King maintained that Groza told him that they
were determined to execute over a thousand students from among those that had been arrested during the
year. Groza also added that he was in possession of some private dossiers about the King and, if needed, he
would disclose them to the public. Mircea Ciobanu, Convorbiri cu Mihai I al Romaniei, Bucharest, 1991, p.
59.

77

to the cafeteria. I took it, blew it dry, folded it and put it into my pocket… It was a peaceful
way to take the power.’179

Smiling, Groza approached the King, asking him to touch the pocket of his coat.
He had a pistol inside and he wanted the King to know it. Then he turned to the Queen
Mother who had not taken her eyes from her son, and said, ‘this is to prevent from
happening to me what had happened to Antonescu,’ implying that he would have reacted if
the King had tried to arrest him.180

What were the King’s intentions? Would he remain, or leave the country? The
King, of course, could hardly remain a citizen in the new People’s Republic. ‘Remaining in
Romania would have been like consenting to be their prisoner,’ the King believed.181
The Council of Ministers convened immediately after the King’s abdication.182
All the Ministers approved the decision of the Communist Party.183 The proclamation
issued immediately pointed out that the Romanians had now the liberty of choosing the
form of state they wanted. The Assembly of the Deputies opted of course for a Republic.184
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At the end of January, the royal family’s immunity was removed,185 their properties
confiscated and their citizenship withdrawn.186
Thereafter, all civil servants were required to take a new oath of allegiance to the
Republic.187 The army was given the utmost attention. Those on leave, and therefore not in
garrison to take the oath, had to go to the nearest gendarme’s office and take the oath by,
the latest, the following day, 31st of December at 12.00 PM. The military Guards of all
Royal residences had been displaced and hundreds of career officers were quickly sacked.
‘The only ones who remain in the army are the cowards and the fools. I don’t know to
which group to attach myself,’ a captain of the School of artillery noted.188
A secret protocol of the Treaty of Friendship and Alliance signed with the Soviets
in January 1948 aimed at the transformation of the Romanian army into an apparatus to
serve Soviet interests.189 The Romanian army had to become ‘a school for communism’
and ‘a mass organization for the better dissemination of Marxist doctrine’, continuing the
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political education started in the youth organization and continued after the return of
conscripts to civil life in the trade unions. 190
‘The removal of the monarchy constituted an act of violence in the process of the
country’s enslavement,’ the King maintained in a press conference held in London. ‘The
Romanian government installed and maintained in power by a foreign country . . . utterly
unrepresentative . . . violated all the international pledges, falsified the elections, and
annihilated the democratic political leaders who enjoyed the people’s confidence.’191 It was
however too late for such a declaration to produce any consequence.
Meanwhile, in Romania, an intense campaign began to discredit the fallen
dynasty. It focused on presenting the Hohenzollern dynasty as having pursued a foreign
policy based on dynastic relations which conflicted with the national interests of the
country. The King was portrayed as the country’s biggest capitalist and the royal family as
having been involved in ‘scandalous affairs.’

192

Romanians would forget about the

monarchy, Groza told the King on 30 December. An order emanating from the Ministry of
the Interior ordered the renaming of streets and other public places bearing name of the
King or of other Royal family members.193 ‘Linked at home with the reactionary and
abroad with the imperialistic quarters, the monarchy had collapsed like a castle of playing
cards. The Romanian Popular Republic was proclaimed to the satisfaction and joy of the
whole people.’194 Or, at least to the satisfaction of the Communists who had conquered
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‘rampart to rampart’ and won ‘the battle with the reactionary forces’.195 The monarchy
represented for the Communists an obstacle on the path of building the ‘popular
democracy’ while increasingly becoming the focus of popular opposition to the emerging
regime.
All of Romania’s neighbours had already fallen under overt Communist
domination.196 Regardless the extent to which the Groza government was pro-Soviet and
dominated by Communists it would have been difficult for everyone to assert that the
country was genuinely Communist while the King remained in place, even with reduced
powers.197
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Spies everywhere

‘It was the policy of the Romanian Government
to make life difficult and unpleasant for our
representatives in Bucharest.’1

Despite the sharp frost, on 30 December 1948, people were treated to a military
parade. A demonstration of ‘working masses’ also passed through Victory Square in
Bucharest where the large portraits of the leaders of the Communist Party and the
Presidium of Grand Assembly were visible from afar.2 The festivities were occasioned by
the first anniversary of the People’s Republic. In the evening a reception was offered by
the Minister of Foreign Affairs to all the diplomats.
The British seemed to have forgotten the previous allegations of espionage aired by
the Romanian government that autumn and misinterpreted as the end of the ‘studied
revolutionary discourtesy’ the fact that they were seated together with senior members of
the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and separately from the Soviet diplomats.

3

True, they were not the only ones targeted. Similar accusations had been launched against
the American and Turkish diplomats. In September the American minister Rudolf E.
Schoenfeld was handed a note in which it was mentioned that four of his staff ‘had used
their position and the immunity they enjoyed in order to carry out espionage against
Romania;’ their presence was therefore no longer desirable. The note delivered by the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs referred to events in Giurgiu on 6 September 1948. Allegedly,
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‘the authorities and civilians’ of the city observed a group of four persons in the
neighbourhood of the harbour taking pictures from a car of various installations and sites
of which photos must not be taken.’ Arrested, the four persons were released only after
their identity was confirmed by Schoenfeld.4 The Turkish diplomats were also blamed for
‘systematically carrying on an unlawful activity’ against Romania. It was alleged that the
Turkish diplomats fostered the departure of Romanian law offenders to Turkey and utilized
them in ‘a slanderous campaign’ against the People’s Republic of Romania.5
From the summer of 1948 the Romanians intensified their ‘campaign of
vilification against Britain and Ernest Bevin to a point at which it can be properly called
planned political warfare,’ the British minister in Bucharest reported. Both the press and
the radio conveyed unfavourable comments culled from authentic sources, ‘indulging in
misquotation, removal from context and deliberate falsification. Statements like ‘68% of
the British population desire co-operation with the USSR’,6 or headlines such as ‘London
police openly support Fascists’ and ‘London police praised for protecting Fascist meetings’
appeared in various Romanian newspapers.7
The BBC proved to be ineffective in this ‘campaign of lies,’8 although a Foreign
Office department was formed, at Christopher Paget Mayhew’s initiative, specifically
designed to counteract this offensive propaganda.9 Attacks on life in Britain supplemented
broad political articles and radio reports while cartoons ridiculing Bevin and other Western
4
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leaders were regularly printed in the press. ‘Some of the sources which feed this campaign
may lie within the Romanian Legation in London in the shape of a press reading staff
which is specially briefed to supply ammunition for Bucharest propagandists.’ On 9 July,
Viata Sindicala stated that in Britain, ‘Lords, Barons and Counts own immense estates
covering thousands of hectares while the workers are being treated as slaves. This tradition
is being faithfully respected under the ‘Labour’ Government.’ 10 A virulent press campaign
was carried out in the autumn against the first councillor of the Legation, Charles
Robinson, the Commercial Attaché, William Watson, and Colonel William Young. Two
members of the American Legation, Henri P. Leverich, first counsellor and Colonel John
R. Lowell, the Military Attaché were also targeted as playing a part in a plot against the
government.11
In October and November 1948, twelve Romanian high officials were tried in
Bucharest and the press announced emphatically that the court had elucidated the part
played by the espionage services of certain imperialistic powers in their attempt to
overthrow the government by force. The twelve were found guilty of high treason,
espionage and economic sabotage by the Bucharest Military Tribunal.12 The first
indictment was pronounced against Alexandru Popp, formerly director general at Uzinele
de Fier ReşiŃa [The Resita Iron Works]. He was accused of industrial sabotage, part of a
vast plan aiming at ‘disorganising production, impeding improvement of the economic
situation and the consolidation of the democratic regime’. ‘Due to a combination of actions
attributable to the director general, Popp, a catastrophic decline in production’ of ‘a third of
10
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the achievements of the previous years’ was registered at Resita. Also cited were
explosions that had taken place at the foundry, sub-standard production and delays in
paying wages. Popp and ‘his band’ tried to blame the hold-ups in production at Resita on
‘accidents.’13
Allegedly, Popp together with the former minister of Industry and Trade, Ioan
Bujoi, and the other defendants led a network of agents created with the purpose of
collecting state secrets. The network included prominent officials such as the former
governor of the National Bank, top personnel from the Ministry of Finance and the
Ministry of Mines and Petroleum, the Director General of the oil company ‘Astra,’ a
former Naval Undersecretary of State, the former General Secretary of the Air Ministry,
and a few attorneys and lawyers.14 The network was organized deliberately by Max
Auschnitt, it was claimed, the owner of many enterprises and banks, among them The
Resita Iron Works, one of the biggest corporations in Romania, and ‘his overseas masters,
in accordance with directives received from Roy Melbourne, Henri P. Leverich, Charles
Robinson, Robert Shea, and other agents of the Imperialists.’15
Secret military, economic and political information, it was pointed out, was
conveyed to the British and Americans. Robinson, Watson and Colonel Young were
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mentioned repeatedly during the trial. The number of Americans involved was even larger
than Britons. Besides Leverich, the First Councillor, and Lowell, the Military Attaché, both
declared subsequently persona non grata, Roy Melbourne, Robert Shea, Thomas R. Hall,
James C. Hamilton, Burton Berry and Donald Dunham were indicated.16 The information
conveyed to the Anglo-Americans was said to be of great variety and consequence: data
referring to Romania’s military potential including organization, manoeuvres and changes
in the garrisons’ effective strength, weapons and equipment, aerodromes and buildings,
instruction, training camps, special schools for officers and non-commissioned officers,
means of locomotion, metallurgical plants and weapon production at ‘Astra’; facts and
figures on Romania’s industrial production (especially petrochemical production but also
tractor fabrication), mining and agriculture (income, expenses, taxes, production). Details
of the Convention recently concluded with Czechoslovakia were also conveyed. The
defendants confessed that they had also submitted, at Melbourne’s request, reports on oil
production, the requirement for oil equipment, a study on inflation, a report on timber
exports, and an assessment of agricultural equipment based on statistical data before and
after the agricultural reform.17
Melbourne’s departure from Romania at the end of 1947 did not suspend
communication. Leverich who replaced him, continued to maintain contact with the
‘conspirators.’ Although the vigilant Colonel Lowell was careful to avoid any risks and to
maintain secrecy, he continued to request and received data about the Navy, the port Sulina
and about prominent political figures. The Americans disposed of two sources who offered
regular information about the Soviet operations in Romania: eight sources in the Special
Service of the Romanian police, two in the Chief of Staff of the Army and two in the
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Siguranta [Romanian police]. Hall and Hamilton led the operation of collecting the
information, while Charles Hostler was in charge of counter-information.18
In exchange for the information provided, as agreed by Melbourne and Leverich,
the Americans agreed to provide the plotters with armament and technical equipment.
These were to be parachuted in certain areas at a convenient date. The plotters also
requested financial support. Loans were to be repaid after the removal of the regime. The
Romanians pledged to attack weapon depots, bridges and tunnels and occupy public
institutions. According to the defendants, the Americans were motivated primarily by the
desire to preserve Romania as a market, and to protect their investments. The British were
also implicated. Information on the structure and the number of the people involved in the
subversive organisations was requested by the British representatives Watson, Young and
Robinson.19 It is impossible to be certain to what extent the British and the Americans
involved themselves in the ‘conspiracy’ but secret organisations evolved throughout the
country; they were coordinated by the former General Aurel Aldea and Admiral Horia
Macelariu. It is likely that the leaders of the opposition hoped for a support from the
Anglo-Americans. People fighting in the mountains were convinced that the ‘Americans
would come’ and waited for their intervention against the Soviet occupation and later
against the Communist regime.20
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In his summation the Prosecutor stressed the connection between the Romanian
plotters and members of the British and American Legations.21 In view of the ‘disclosures,’
the presence of Robinson and Watson was ‘no longer desired’ and their early recall was
requested.22
On 14 December 1948 the British Legation replied to the Romanian Ministry of
Foreign Affairs indicating that, although in accordance with international practice, the
British government acceded to the request they ‘must categorically reject the grounds on
which the recall had been requested’. 23 ‘The allegations in this trial were most flimsy, the
Foreign Office considered; moreover, the documents received by Robinson and Watson
had been given to them ‘voluntarily and without payment in the normal course of their
duty, some during the Armistice period when we had every right to be fully informed on
what was happening in Romania and some later during the Peace Treaty regime, during
which Romania has given no evidence whatsoever that it is implementing any of its Treaty
obligations.’ Trouble arose from the Romanian government’s practice of not drawing any
distinction between ‘the normal diplomatic practice of collecting information and
espionage since it considered all information secret.’24
After recalling Robinson and Watson, the British did not take any retaliatory
diplomatic actions. In contrast, the Americans, receiving the note in regard to Henri P.
Leverich, First counsellor and Colonel John R. Lowell, the Military Attaché, requested
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immediately that two Romanian representatives, Preoteasa and Lazareanu, be recalled from
Washington.25
A man’s life was behind the decision to not react to the expulsion of the
diplomats. His rescue from Romania was ‘far more important than the empty satisfaction
of retaliation.’26 And although there was a strong pressure in Parliament for reprisal, any
action had been deferred to avoid prejudicing Alexander Evans’s chances of leaving
Romania.27 Manager of one of recently expropriated British Petroleum companies, ‘Steaua
Romana’ [Romanian Star], Evans disappeared soon after returning from London where he
was called for consultation.28 Reaching the Romanian frontier on 8 June 1948, he was
detained and taken to an unknown destination.29 Strong representations to the Romanian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs were met with evasive replies and the British consul was
denied visitation until the end of police enquiry.30
The delay in proceedings produced anxiety in London. There was no precedent
for a refusal to produce a charge against a British subject and for denying access to him by
25

The US Government retaliated by informing the Romanian Legation at Washington that the
presence of two of its members, both with rank of rank of Counsellor and one a special protégé of Ana
Pauker, the Romanian Foreign Minister, ‘was no longer required.’
26
TNA, PRO, FO 371/78608, R 2213/1051/37. The Secretary of State decided on 14 December
that the British should take retaliatory action but the request for the recall of two Romanian diplomats was
postponed until Alexander Evans could be extricated from Romania. The hope that Evans’s petition for
pardon might be granted before Christmas, proved vain. FO 371/78608, R 136/1051/37 G, FO MINUTE.
27
TNA, PRO, FO 371/78608, R 136/1051/37 G. Telegram of ‘particular secrecy’ to be retained by
the authorised recipient and not passed on. Departmental distribution from FO to Bucharest, no 24, 17
January 1949.
The Earl Howe’s question referring to the grounds for the request of the Romanian government
intended to be addressed in the House of Lords on 18 January was postponed for 25 January. ‘In the event of
HMG not concurring in it, whether they will take similar action to that reported to have been decided upon by
the US Government in a similar case.’ FO 371/78608, R 825/1051/37.
TNA, PRO, FO 371/78608, R 604/1462/37, Bucharest telegram no. 47 announced that Evans’s
projected escape may drag on indefinitely. FO Minute, 20 January 1949. The draft note to the Romanian
Minister was to be despatched on January 25 at the latest and the reply to Lord Howe should consist simply
of an announcement of the despatch of the Note.
Lord Vansittart’s Motion on Romania was postponed until 15 February. Lord Howe’s suggestion
was put also off to round about that time. W.R. Cox, Private Secretary, to Henderson, 22 January 1949.
28
Evans’s call to London might have been in connection with the nationalization decided by the
Romanian government and publicized on 11 June 1948.
29
British Information Office, News and London Press Comment, no. 526. 17 June 1948, p.3.
NCSSA, Documentary Fond, Dossier 121, vol. 2, f. 178.
30
Note of the British Legation to the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. RDA, Foreign
Diplomats, Dossier 4/Repr. R 9, William Charles Robinson.

89

the British consul, Bevin asserted in the House of Commons. The Romanian authorities
‘must be pressed to give Evans the opportunity of clearing himself. The British consul
should continue to insist to see Evans immediately.’ 31 When the news about the trial of
‘Steaua Romania’s managers was made public, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirmed
that Evans was arrested.32 The Romanians refused however to admit that they should have
notified the British on the charge against Evans.
Brought to court and found guilty of fraud -- on a charge of mal-administering the
company’s funds -- Evans was sentenced to three years imprisonment.33 He was placed in
Vacaresti Prison in a common cell together with seventy other prisoners. ‘No contact with
the outside world was permitted; parcels of food, medicine, and clothing only on the rarest
exception reached the person for whom intended; questioning proceeded twenty-four hours
a day with the prisoners awakened repeatedly during the night for further grilling, and
those detained were subject to the crudest forms of torture and were left entirely without
adequate food or medical attention.’

34

The cell was so crowded that there was barely

enough floor space for each to lie down and, when on Legation insistence, a mattress was
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provided for him, Evans was compelled to refuse it since the width of the mattress would
have deprived two prisoners of the space to lie down.35
At the end of January 1949 Evans was released on bail, and eventually left the
country with the connivance of the Romanian Government.36 One week after Evans’s
arrival in Britain, the British government requested the recall of two Romanian
diplomats.37 It was the Romanians’ turn to declare their astonishment on receiving the
British note.38 The Romanian Minister called the Foreign Office for an appointment,
requesting explanation for the ‘arbitrary measure’.39 Two members of Parliament,
Langford-Holt and Denis Pritt, also required explanations for the expulsion.40 The
Romanian representatives also reacted angrily to an article published by The People which
underlined Evans’s innocence and his maltreatment by the Romanian authorities.41
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The recall of two members of the Romanian legation in London produced surprise
and embarrassment to the Romanian Minister since there was no motive provided. It would
therefore be very difficult for him to explain the situation to Bucharest.42 Although
reminded of the expulsion of two British diplomats from Bucharest, he refused to draw any
parallel between the two cases ‘since in Bucharest an open trial had taken place, the
evidence had been published, and the public knew exactly the reasons for the recall of
Robinson and Watson.’ In contrast, the British Government had arrived at the conclusion
that the trial was ‘a trumped up affair entirely lacking in bien fonde. The action taken by
the Romanian Government was only one of a series designed to make life difficult and
unpleasant for the members of the British Mission in Bucharest.’ The British had therefore
retaliated against the ‘intolerable situation’ in the only way open to them.43
Meeting upon the request the British Secretary of State, the Romanian Minister in
London insisted that ‘nothing that he or his Legation had done had provoked any such
course.’ Once again he was reminded of the recall of the two British officers which ‘could
not be justified by what had been produced in Court.’ The charges against Robinson and
Watson were ‘flimsy and the evidence produced most uncertain.’ The British could also
have made out a valid case for their request, but they ‘did not think this called for any such
action.’ To the complaint that the treatment accorded to the Romanian Legation was
unfriendly the Secretary of State replied that the whole behaviour of the Romanian
Government towards Britain and its representatives could not be called friendly.44 The
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Romanians continued to protest the expulsion of the diplomats as being ‘an entirely
arbitrary measure.’45 ‘It seems that the Romanian Government is bent on having this issue
clearly stated before the public,’ the British concluded.46
In August 1949 another member of the Romanian Legation was considered a
candidate for expulsion in reprisal for the expulsion of other British diplomats.47 Two
members of the British legation in Bucharest, R.F.G. Sarell48 and H.S. Marchant,49 were
involved in an incident in July. Sarell was about to leave Romania, waiting for the entry
visa to be granted to his successor, when he was arrested by the Romanian police.50
There are two versions on what happened during the night of 25 July. The British
referred to the fact that Sarell, by then Charge d’ Affaires, was seized by armed men and
forcibly abducted to the Bucharest Prefecture of Police. Only on arrival did the men reveal
their identity as police officers. In spite of the production of relevant identity documents,
the police refused to recognise Sarell’s diplomatic status until the arrival of a person from
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the Protocol Department of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The later
apologised courteously and caused the police authorities to do likewise. The British
Legation protested ‘at the high handed and violent action of the Bucharest police.’51 The
Romanian version was to some extent different. It claimed that ‘a band of blackmarketeers
and smugglers’ was caught by the police. At their identification, one of them declared that
he was a diplomat. Subsequent to verification of the latter’s identity with the help of a
representative of the Protocol Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the British
diplomat was released. Nevertheless, the actions he had engaged in were ‘contrary to the
diplomatic usages and duties which members of a legation have to fulfil in the country
where they are accredited,’ the Romanians maintained.
The ‘intolerable activity’ of Sarell consisted in fact in offering assistance to
certain Romanian citizens in their attempt to flee the country. The persons arrested
recognized that they aimed at illegally crossing the frontier, their destination being Vienna.
The British diplomat allegedly organised their clandestine departure and agreed to keep
their jewellery and works of art at the British legation. For this action, the Romanians
asked for Sarell’s immediate recall.52 Marchant’s name was also mentioned during the
police enquiry and in the note of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He was implicated in
depositing certain valuables at the British Legation.53 The British government rejected the
ground on which the Romanian recall was advanced, denying the allegation that Sarell was
involved in the activities of a ‘band of blackmarketeers and smugglers.’54
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The Romanians’ great ‘discovery’ was something they certainly knew from the
beginning since the legation was watched closely: that the trumpeted ‘blackmarketeers and
smugglers’ were actually employees of the British and American Information Offices.
Since they could not obtain passports they attempted to depart secretly the country.55 The
group consisted of Constantin Mugur, the chief of the Romanian staff at the British library,
Eleonora Bunea of the British Press Office, Nora Samuelli from the American Press
Office, Annie, her sister, from the British Press Office, and Liviu Nasta, a Romanian
journalist, correspondent of the New York Times. All of them had been arrested, accused of
espionage and detained for trial the following year. During the trial, Sarell, Ramsden,
Francis Bennet, Ivor Porter, John Bennet and Marchant were ‘unmasked’ as spies.56
With the arrest of the Romanian staff the existence of the Information Centre in
Bucharest became uncertain; ‘its sphere of interest, already small, must inevitably become
yet smaller.’57 Compared to the Soviet staff of 500 people, the British Information Office
had 35 employees; the French 27 and the United States Information Service [USIS] 15
employees and 8 auxiliaries.58
In the autumn of 1949 the British Consulate and the Information Office were
brought under one roof. The position of the First Secretary (Information) filled until then
by Marchant was cancelled. The Consul assumed the Information Officer’s responsibilities
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except those concerned with press reading, political reporting and the BBC which were to
be carried by Chancery.’59 Sarell and Marchant left Romania, the first recalled, the second
transferred to another post in November 1949.60 Although recalled, Sarell had to wait for
more than one month to obtain not just an exit visa but also an approval for the inventory
of his household effects.61 Comments on the strained relations with Romania appeared in
British newspapers. For the Romanian representatives in London the publicity around
Sarell’s recall had but one single purpose, to justify the forthcoming retaliation.62
In the meantime, the exchange of notes between British and Romanian Foreign
Offices continued; the British protesting against the attitude of the Romanian authorities,
the Romanians emphasizing that Sarell’s involvement in the band of ‘blackmarkeeters and
smugglers’ was confirmed by the testimonies of those arrested and questioned. It was
proved that Eleonora Bunea, who worked for the British Information Office, deposited her
valuables at the British Legation.63 ‘Certainly not’, replied the British, denying that Bunea
had delivered any valuables to Marchant, Sarell or any other member of the staff. The
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in answer, submitted to the British legation a letter signed by
Bunea together with the Prosecutor’s request for the valuables belonging to Bunea and a
note of protest against the activities contrary to Romanian laws undertaken by certain
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British diplomats.

64

Rejecting the charge of illegal activity, the British stated that they

could not accept as a true statement the letter of Bunea enclosed in the Romanian
Ministry’s note, since it was dated after her disappearance and bore ‘every sign of having
been extorted from her under pressure.’ The British note concluded that ‘the sole aim of
the police authorities was to attempt to discredit this legation.’65
As expected, reprisal came soon. Two members of the Romanian Legation were
requested to leave London. Drafts for notes of protest to be presented by the Romanian
Legation to the Foreign Office were prepared by the Romanian Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, referring to the ‘arbitrary measure of reprisal’ and pointing out again that Sarell
was involved in an illegal incident, which was not the case with the Romanian diplomats in
London.66 Many reams of paper were squandered to justify, deny, protest and posture.
The recall of the British diplomats and the arrests of the British legation’s
employees affected the image of the Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Pauker, the
more so since she had previously agreed with the British Minister to inform him whenever
a member of the Legation staff would be questioned by the police.67 Following a article
critical of Pauker published by the Sunday Express, the Romanian Minister in London
requested an explanation from the Foreign Office. 68 He was reminded that the press was
free in Britain. Although relations between the two governments were strained, the Foreign
Office denied responsibility for Pauker’s negative image in the British press.
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After two years of harassment and vexation, the closure of the British and
American Information Offices did not come unexpectedly. At the beginning of March
1950, Donald Dunham, the chief of the American Office of Information, received a note
from the Romanian government demanding the closure of the Press Office and the library.
The British were delivered a similar notification on 3 March 1950.69 There was nothing
they could do, contended the British minister, Walter Roberts, sceptical about the impact
which a minute drawn up by the Foreign Office could have on the Romanian government’s
decision.70 An important number of files, among them those relating to local staff, were
destroyed.71 The same happened at the American legation where the Associated Press
representative in Bucharest found the United States Information Service [USIS] ‘upside
down’ while ‘packing was in full progress.’
A table had been set in the hall for the farewell buffet and in the yard outside
smoke was rising from the burning fires. Although not containing secret matter,
there was always the fear that if one moved, a case of files might be stolen on the
way and if it contained any names of Roumanian nationals, these would be in for
needless trouble. In the afternoon when the USIS staff left, the majority were
arrested by the Security. The same thing happened at the British library. The
remaining few correspondents representing the Western Press, were now waiting
anxiously to see what the future held.72
In reprisal, the British requested the cessation of Rumanian News, a daily bulletin
edited by the Romanian Legation in London.73 While British anger was inevitable, and
reprisal could have been safely predicted, official rancour was muted by the fact that the
closure of the Information Centre in Bucharest had been considered by London the
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previous autumn for financial reasons.74 The small budget covering the wages of the few
local employees in the English Library and some other expenses for concerts, film and
shows slated for cancellation starting on 1 April 1950. London decided that there was no
reason to maintain ‘even our present slight degree of activity in Bucharest’ in present
circumstances.75
The Information Office was however closed sooner than the British themselves
intended, following the demand of the Romanian government. Budget cuts were thereby
‘complete instead of partial.’76 The closure endangered the Romanian employees. By
being in British service they had incurred the hostility of the Romanian authorities and
lived under the constant shadow of arrest.77 Two persons were mentioned: Ion Has and
Vasile Nicolau, as being recruited in November 1947, who rendered ‘able service to the
Information Officer . . .They would probably find it very difficult to get other employment,
and indeed in present circumstances this might be the least of their difficulties if we
discharge them.’78

Official paranoia continued to grow. ‘Routine practices in the free world became
capital offences under the new regime. Statistics usually published in company reports or

74

Apparently, the devaluation of the sterling and the need for economies led the Foreign Office to
decide to significantly cut the expenditures of the British legations.
75
TNA, PRO, BW 53/10, Despatch from the British Legation, Bucharest, to the Information
Policy Department, FO, 18 October 1949; K.R. Johnston to J.P.G. Finch, Cultural Relations Department, FO,
10 November 1949.
76
TNA, PRO, BW 53/10, Letter addressed by the Assistant Director of the East European
Department of the British Council, E. N. Gummer, to the Information Officer in Bucharest, 23 February
1950; TNA, PRO, BW 53/10, Despatch from the Consular Section, British legation, Bucharest, 10 March
1950.
77
‘It would be most unfortunate if, in a crisis of this sort, we would have to differentiate between
British Council and Foreign Office employees.’ TNA, PRO, BW 53/10, J.S.A. Selwyn, British Legation,
Consular Section, Bucharest, to E. N. Gummer, Assistant Director, East Europe Department, British Council,
London.
78
When the East Europe Information Department of the British Council proposed large cuts in
Bucharest, the two remained in the service of the Legation (within Marchant’s department). TNA, PRO, BW
53/10, K.R. Johnston to J.P.G. Finch, Cultural Relations Department, FO, 10 November 1949; BW 53/10,
RU/680/1, on locally-appointed clerks; BW 53/10, E. N. Gummer, Assistant Director, East Europe
Department, British Council, London, to the Information Officer, the British Legation, Bucharest, 23
February 1950; BW 53/10, 4 April 1950.

99

newspapers, and the movement of government and Party personalities were top secret
overnight and their disclosure punishable. ‘The tempo of arrests, trials, confiscation
decrees and death sentences intensified.’79 Individuals who frequented the British and
American libraries were arrested after being closely monitored by the Securitate.80
Romanian employees of Western press agencies were continually shadowed and advised
on the ‘correctness of a public recantation’. ‘Recantation’ would involve denunciation of
Western press agencies for ‘spying against the working class and wrecking their
happiness’.81
Accusations of espionage continued to be lodged against British diplomats. In July
1950, the First Secretary, R. A. King, was charged with espionage after receiving,
according to Romanians authorities, an envelope containing secret papers. He was taken
into custody and then asked to leave the country.82 During the trial of a ‘group of spies and
traitors in the service of British Intelligence’ King was denounced together with the former
British representative, Adrian Holman, the former executives of the petrochemical
company ‘Unirea,’ E. Bowden and W. Wilson, and the director of ‘Astra,’ M. Fitzgerald.
While all of them had left Romania before the trial, the Romanian defendants were
sentenced to death for high treason. Mihai Romanescu, aviation commander, allegedly
recruited as agent in 1946 by E. Bowden, was accused of providing him military
information. A shareholder at various companies, Gheorghe Polizu Micsunesti was
apparently recruited as spy by a British officer, Tom Hogg, and reactivated by Bowden in
1946. Alexandru Liciu, President of the Court of Appeal, was also accused of espionage.
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He was supposedly recruited in 1949 by Gipson, the head of representatives of foreign
press in Romania.83
Twenty four alleged ‘spies and saboteurs’ working in the petrochemical industry
were accused of transmitting military information to the British and Americans. During the
trial which took place in the oil centre of Ploiesti between 9 and 13 February 1953, Colonel
Forster, the Chief of the Economic Department of the British Mission and an engineer at
‘Astra company,’ Lieutenant Colonel Masterson, from ‘Unirea’ and Lieutenant Colonel
Galpin, from ‘Steaua Romana’ were ‘unmasked as spies’. Enjoying diplomatic immunity
as members of the military mission, they had left the country before the trial.84 The
Romanians indicted were accused of espionage and high treason.85 By the time of the trial,
Constantin Capsa, Mihail Ciupagea, Constantin Matasaru from ‘Steaua Romana’ and Aurel
Bente had already spent three to four years in prison.86 After the nationalization of the oil
industry, Capsa, the Chief of Staff at ‘Astra-Romana,’ and Bente, a technician at the same
company, had allegedly organized a network of espionage under Anglo-American
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supervision. Alexandru, the former Minister of Finance and Atanasie Christodulo from
‘Romano-Americana’ company were also indicted.87
Another series of trials ‘unmasked’ other networks of espionage under British
supervision. James Gibson, Commercial Attaché at the British legation, was mentioned in
1953 in connection with a group of ‘spies and traitors in the service of British intelligence.’
This group led by Petre Gheorghiu, engineer, was allegedly constituted with the purpose of
overthrowing the regime by force, with the help of the ‘Imperialists.’ Gheorghiu was
sentenced to life for high treason.88 Another team recruiting leader, Ion Bodea, did not
benefit from the Court clemency and was sentenced to death for treason. Bodea was
allegedly recruited by British Intelligence and trained in Turkey between 1950 and 1953,
when he returned illegally to Romania and recruited people for espionage activities until
April 1954 when he was caught.89
In 1954 the trial of ‘the group of spies’ led by the former Minister of Justice,
Patrascanu, commenced. Accused of being an agent of the former ‘bourgeois’ police and
the British Intelligence, Patrascanu was alleged to have attempted to destroy the
Communist Party from the inside. He was also accused of crimes against peace for
‘paralyzing’ party action against the Imperialists and for having supported Marshall
Antonescu in the anti-Soviet war, an absurd accusation. Patrascanu led allegedly a group of
conspirators that, with the help of the Anglo-American Intelligence, prepared for the
violent overthrow of the regime. He was said to have provided the British and American
Intelligence organizations secret information concerning state security. Other Communists
87
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were also accused of crimes against peace for having served as agents of the British and of
high treason for providing secret information concerning state security to the British
Intelligence and the CIA.90
According to Eduard Mark, the American agents Louis E. Madison, Henry L.
Roberts and Thomas were briefed between 1944 and 1946 on Soviet policies in Romania
by Belu Zilber and Patrascanu. 91 The American Secret Intelligence reports and a letter sent
by Edward G. Boxhall, colonel in British Intelligence, reveal the existence of a trend of
national communism in Romania. At the beginning of 1946, certain Romanian
communists, aware of the danger represented by Soviet economic directives began talking
about the establishment of a national Communist party to carry out Romania’s interests.
These attempts would not be accomplished, Boxhall believed, as long as Ana Pauker was
the leader of the Communist party and Bodnaras the chief of the secret police.92 Although
Zilber and Patrascanu, members of the delegation to the Peace Conference, foresaw the
disastrous consequences of the Soviet domination for Romania, they were disappointed
with the Western policies as well. Seemingly Patrascanu considered the possibility of
becoming a political refugee in the United States, but abandoned the idea because ‘the
Americans are nuts. They give up to the Russians more than the later demanded and
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expected. Reaching the United States, the Americans might deliver me to the Russians. I
prefer returning at home.’93
It is a fact that the West generally, and Anglo-Americans particularly, had not
entirely given up hopes of a regime change and worked with pre-war and wartime contacts,
and with irreconcilable anti-Communists to facilitate the change. British Intelligence was
involved in supporting an active Romanian anti-communist resistance that persisted until
the end of the 1950s. In July 1953, for example, thirteen British and American trained
agents were parachuted into Romania to support the resistance groups. Nonetheless, by
1954 certain members of the intelligence began seriously questioning the wisdom of
supporting resistance activities behind the Iron Curtain.94 Innocent Romanians were
sometimes caught up in the search for very real spies and saboteurs.
The Bucharest regime, if it detected these contacts, had been given a new cause
for suspicion and in potential a new slate of enemies. The trials generated fear of any
connection with the British, genuine or imputed. In its frantic hunting of spies, Romanian
authorities seem to have been actually convinced that those working for the British or
Americans in any capacity were part of a large network of secret agents.95 A reading of the
proceedings would lead one to believe that the whole of MI6 worked in Bucharest.96 This
was not far from what the Romanian leadership believed. In 1951 Gheorghiu-Dej accused
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the Western states of transforming their diplomatic missions ‘into teams of spies and
conspirators,’ pointing particularly to British and American missions.97
In asking for the recall of Western diplomats and accusing them of espionage, the
Romanian regime was, however, not original. It just followed what Moscow did in the
period.98 Seeing foreign agents everywhere, the Romanian government required help from
the Soviets in 1949. Despite the presence in Romania of a significant number of NKVD
agents, more agents were expected to come and destroy the ‘network of Foreign
Intelligence.’99 The Soviets did not wait long to oblige. In 1963, the Soviet agents were
still there while the Romanian leadership, paranoia abating now worked to send them
home.
‘We have an Agency,’ Khrushchev admitted in 1962 during his visit to Romania.
‘Had we not, we would not have known how you comply with CMEA decisions.’100 What
was annoying for the Romanian leadership was that the Soviet Intelligence recruited
Romanian citizens.101 The chief of the Soviet network in Romania was, according to
Nicolae Ceausescu, Pauker. Until being purged in 1952, she was the ‘brain’ of the
communist administration.102 In inviting the Soviets in to help, the Romanian Government,
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inadvertently, accentuated Soviet penetration. In fighting Western spies they increased
their vulnerability to a real threat, Soviet espionage.
Officially resumed in October 1947, after the ratification of the Peace Treaty,
British-Romanian relations saw an involution. Diplomacy was largely reduced to a never
ending round of tit for tat expulsions, slander and vilification. Except for the notes of
protests effective relations disappeared almost altogether.

state funds for supporting the Zionist movement and the Jewish migration to Israel. This had led to Pauker’s
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The Romanian Thaw

‘The Kremlin must indeed be glad to
have so amenable a Satellite.’
(Allen Dudley, British Embassy, Bucharest)1

On 9 May 1956, for the first time since the Second World War an impressive
ceremony was held at the British cemetery in Bucharest, on the anniversary of Victory in
Europe Day. The ceremony was attended by a detachment of officers and troops as well as
representatives of trade unions. The British Minister, D.F. MacDermot, the Military
Attaché, Colonel J.A. Mars, the Air Attaché, Group Captain Joseph S. Kennedy and other
members of the British legation took part in the service.2 Besides them, were two MPs who
had accompanied the Rugby Football team ‘Harlequins’ invited to play two matches in
Bucharest.3 One of them, Wavell Wakefield, was also the president of the ‘Harlequins’
Rugby Club, while the other was a former Harlequin player, J.P. Mallalieu. Both enjoyed
an ‘unbounded hospitality’. Although as official guests of the government, the two could
expect ‘the thickest red-carpet treatment,’ the fact that they were to be accommodated at
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the government guest house was ‘an honour unheard of for anybody except high Soviet
officials.’4
The British guests were also offered the opportunity of visiting ‘whatever they
wanted’ in Romania.5 Invited to the mountain resort Sinaia, Wakefield found himself
involved in a ‘full-scale conference on Anglo-Romanian relations’ with the Minister of
Foreign Affairs, several of his deputies, the Ministers responsible for Foreign Trade and
Sport and other senior officials. The Romanians underlined the importance of bringing the
trade discussions then underway in London to a successful conclusion and held out
glowing prospects if a trade agreement were concluded.6 The government was ready for
exchanges of any kind, would consider renewing payment on the legacy national debt and
welcomed a British trade delegation to Romania.7
The overall friendly attitude enchanted Wakefield to the extent that, although he
did not have an official mandate, he expressed his desire to see members of the Romanian
government in Britain.8 Since Grigore Preoteasa, the Minister for Foreign Affairs,
happened to be also the president of the Romanian Rugby Football Federation, he could be
invited to London in the later capacity, Wakefield suggested to Foreign Office. This way,
British ministers could meet him informally and discuss Romanian debt service. ‘What an
ingenious Foreign Minister!’ remarked the Foreign Office staff, reading Wakefield’s
report. Although contemplating with amusement the likelihood of seeing Preoteasa in
4
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Britain ‘either in football boots or in striped pants,’ their suspicion that the invitation to the
‘Harlequins’ was a gambit to gain political entry to Britain was confirmed.9 The British
were, however, reluctant to countenance Preoteasa’s visit to London. The Romanian
government ‘would do all to give the visit a political character’, which the British wanted
to avoid it.10
Another initiative was even more astonishing since the regime’s repression of
Clerics other than those belonging to the Orthodox denomination was widely known.
Claiming that the theology of the Orthodox Church was similar to Anglicanism, the
Romanians invited Anglican Church representatives to Romania. Wakefield’s response to
this proposal produced displeasure at the Foreign Office, in large measure because he was in
fact supposed to raise the question of detained intelligence operatives. Wakefield decided to
leave this sensitive issue to be raised by the clergy ‘that would certainly visit Romania’.11
The Romanians were ‘so pleasant and hospitable,’ that he found it inappropriate to disturb
the atmosphere of cordiality ‘by raising such a disagreeable subject.’12 Wakefield may have
been unaware that the former Minister in Bucharest, Sir Walter Sullivan, had condemned
strongly the Orthodox Clergy for collaborating with the Communist regime and for the
forcible incorporation of the Uniate Catholic Church. Thus the Romanian Orthodox Church
was ‘hardly a more desirable candidate for hospitality than the state to which it was
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notoriously subservient.’13 Proclaiming that they were interested in visits by religious
dignitaries, the Romanian government were hoping ‘to give an air of respectability to the
regime and foster the impression that there was complete religious freedom’ in Romania,
the British representative believed. MacDermot was of the opinion that a visit by Church of
England clergy should not be encouraged since it would be fully utilised for propaganda
purposes. ‘The time was not ripe for the opening of relations with the Romanian Orthodox
Church’, he concluded.14 A visit of the Archbishop of Canterbury to Romania would take
place almost ten years later, in June 1965.15 By then, most of political detainees, including
intelligence operatives, had been released from prisons and many of the later were allowed
to leave Romania for Britain.
The Communist regime had already adopted a strategy, determined to impress the
official guests invited to Romania by offering them a generous welcome and a VIP
‘ritual’.16 While offering conducted tours Romanian officials gave visitors the impression
that they were seeing everything they wished.17 Although, according to Soviet directives, no
foreign citizen from countries outside the Soviet influence was allowed to enter Romania
except the diplomats, certain Western visitors were welcomed even before Khrushchev’s
proclamation of ‘peaceful coexistence’. Because it was a ‘real democracy,’ Romania
believed itself to be attractive to ‘honest people, eager to get informed on the regime’s
achievements and ‘the new life of the working masses.’ Moscow was content that the
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Romanians showcase their achievements since, in doing so, the myth that Romania
remained independent was encouraged. ‘Outstanding personalities’ came to Romania in
1953 for the Third World Youth Congress.18 Of course ‘outstanding personality’ should be
taken to mean ‘actual communist’ or ‘useful dupe’. Monica Felton from Britain, a laureate
of the International Stalin Prize for promoting peace, chaired the reunion of the ‘Young
Women’ at the Pioneers’ palace.19 Dr. Hewlett Johnson, Dean of Canterbury and vicepresident of the British-Soviet Society was invited by the Romanian government in
September 1948 and left impressed by the diffusion of the ideas of ‘social justice and
planned production, the basis of an organized society, originating from the Soviet Union.’
While ideas were diffused, Soviets were invisible. Johnson ‘had hardly seen any Soviet
soldiers,’ although they were there until 1958.20 Johnson might have implied that the
Romanian government was carrying an independent policy out of any Soviet interference.
Seemingly, there were visitors prepared to appreciate the Communist regime and
disregard its more negative aspects. Others, such as Wakefield, arriving less gullible and
pre-disposed to celebrate the accomplishments presented to him, could not resist the
hospitality offered. The two MPs who visited Romania in May 1956 were impressed with a
lavish hospitality, including a visit to the luxurious Sinaia resort, the former summer
residence of the Royal family, and the offer of free holiday at the Black Sea at the expense
of the Romanian government. Wakefield was invited to return to Romania later in the
summer to spend a holiday as a guest of the government ‘and is, I believe, seriously
considering doing so’, Mac Dermot noted. ‘The Romanians are experts at this sort of
18
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thing,’ the British Minister in Bucharest, admitted.21 Several years later Wakefield would
become chairman of the British-Romanian parliamentary committee.22

There were two classes of visitors the Romanians would particularly welcome –
journalists and Members of Parliament - the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Preoteasa, had
told MacDermot in February 1956. ‘In the present post-Congress atmosphere of having
nothing to conceal and much to be proud of, a visiting British journalist would be given
fairly wide (though obviously not complete) freedom of movement and of making
contacts’, Mac Dermot believed. 23
Expanding on his favourite theme of misrepresentation by the capitalist press and
radio of the facts of life in Eastern Europe, Preoteasa, expressed the hope that there would
be an increase in the number of visits to Romania from Britain by persons concerned with
the formation of public opinion. ‘I asked him whether journalists would not have
difficulties about visas and he said absolutely none. As I looked a bit dubious, he repeated
this with emphasis.’ MacDermot reported this change of attitude to the Foreign Office,
suggesting that this be brought to the knowledge of ‘the more responsible newspapers’.
The British representative indicated to his superiors that he would welcome a visit by a
well qualified journalists – ‘ideally someone like Gordon Shepherd – who would be able to
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(which, I think, include prospects for some of his companies in which he himself is interested) and will
certainly press for the early conclusion of a trade agreement.’ He ‘felt that the Romanians were so pleasant,
that there was a sporting chance of converting them to free enterprise. On the other hand, Mr. Mallalieu was,
I think, also impressed, but particularly by the economic planning aspect.’ TNA, PRO, FO 371/122750,
1801/14, MacDermot, British Embassy Bucharest to Hohler, FO, May 17, 1956.
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The set up of the committee was suggested in 1956 by the Labour MP, John Baird, to the
Romanian representatives in London. The committee was established on 30 March 1960. Vice-chairman the
Labour MP Marcus Lipton. Treasurer was the Labour MP, W. Wilkins, and secretary the Conservative B.
Drayson. Romanian legation in London, 5 March 1956. RNA, CC of RCP, Department of Foreign Relations,
Dossier 54/1956, f. 6.
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Hohler, CMG, Foreign Office, 29 February 1956.
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obtain information ‘beyond the scope of the Legation’, information which ‘should be of
great assistance to our appreciation of the Romanian scene’.24
‘The Romanians would take great pains to obtain mainly favourable impressions
but an astute observer should be able to penetrate the red carpet without difficulty,’
MacDermot believed.25 As seen, the MPs who travelled to Romania two months after Mac
Dermot’s conversation with Preoteasa did not succeed in penetrating the façade built by
the Romanian regime.
On receiving the credentials of the new British Minister accredited in Bucharest,
Allen Dudley, the president of the State Council, Chivu Stoica, 26 also maintained that the
Romanians were happy to receive scientists, artists and writers as well as tourists. The
exchange of scientists was brought up by the Romanians during Wakefield’s visit. The
Foreign Office did not see however any advantage in this, either politically or scientifically
since ‘officially sponsored exchanges would contribute to the prestige of this fraudulent
regime and involve us in unnecessary expenditure.’ 27
The British invited to Romania ‘would be free to travel throughout the country,
visit anything they wished and talk with anyone they met’, Stoica told Dudley.

24

Although The Times, Daily Mail and Daily Telegraph seemed disposed to take advantage of the
opportunity, as indicated by MacDermot in his report, I did not find any evidence in the archives
concerning any visit by British journalists to Romania that year. TNA, PRO, FO 371/122740, NR 1631/2.
Mac Dermot, British Legation Bucharest to H.A.F. Hohler, CMG, Foreign Office, 29 February 1956.
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TNA, PRO, FO 371/122740, NR 1631/2. Mac Dermot, British Legation Bucharest to H.A.F.
Hohler, CMG, Foreign Office, 29 February 1956.
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Chivu Stoica, a railway-worker like Gheorghiu Dej, joined the illegal Communist Party in the
1930s and was imprisoned for taking part in the Grivita Rail Yards strike. Released after 23 August 1944,
Stoica was elected in the Central Committee of the RCP. He achieved prominence in the state rather the party
hierarchy. Stoica was propelled upwards by the political considerations of the moment and by his friendship
with Gheorghiu-Dej. When Gheorghiu-Dej became Minister of Communications, Stoica was appointed
general manager of the Railway administration and then he held the position of Minister of Railways. In
1948, Stoica became Minister of Industry and deputy premier in March 1950.
In April 1954, Gheorghiu-Dej handed over the position of first secretary to Gheorghe Apostol to
resume it the following year; in 1955 he felt compelled to give up the premiership. This is how Stoica got it.
During the big government reshuffle of March 1961, Stoica lost his premiership to Ion Gheorghe Maurer.
Open Society Archives Budapest, 300/60/657, Romanian Unit, in Arhivele Totalitarismului, no. 3-4/2003,
pp. 182-183.
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Though, the FO did not stand in the way of exchanges of scientists arranged privately. TNA,
PRO, FO 371/122750, N R 1801/15, FO Minute, H.A.F. Hohler to T.G. Ward, 24 May 1956.
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Notwithstanding these assurances, he did not appear credible to Dudley. Good intentions
and pleasant declarations meant little without removing obstacles impeding good relations.
Exchanges of all sorts would be more valuable, Dudley assessed, if the Government would
not interfere by controlling British subjects already residing in Romania. Restrictions on
travel hampered British diplomats in performing their duties. The fact that Romanians
might suffer the consequences of their friendship with the British subjects was also a
matter of concern.28
Stoica denied any intention to put the British under observation, claiming that the
surveillance department was ‘new and inexperienced.’ (It was actually seven years old).
The Romanian government was just concerned about offering protection to all diplomatic
missions from ‘lawless elements which, unfortunately, still existed even in a socialist
country.’ Surveillance had been necessary in the past because of ‘the incursion of foreign
parachutists’ and the instigation of ‘certain foreign broadcasts,’ Stoica assessed, adding
that the British staff should not to worry for their Romanian friends.29

However laudable the initiative for resuming ties with the West might have been
it was neither genuine nor independent. Peaceful co-existence proclaimed by Khrushchev
was presumably behind the efforts towards the normalization of relations with the Western
countries. ‘Romania has so little independence in matters of foreign affairs,’ the British

28

‘The chances the Romanian PM knew nothing about it [surveillance] were sufficient to make it
worthwhile to let him know our feelings on the general subject.’ TNA, PRO, FO 371/122709, 1052/4, Alan
Dudley to Selwyn Lloyd, 12 September 1956.
29
Stoica may have alluded to the incident which took place in July 1953, when thirteen British and
American trained agents were parachuted into Romania to support the anti-Communist resistance. The
Romanian authorities conducted a publicized trial and used it as evidence of Western espionage for
propaganda purpose.
The following year the Intelligence began questioning the wisdom of supporting resistance
activities behind the Iron Curtain. Elizabeth W. Hazard, Cold War crucible: United States foreign policy and
the conflict in Romania, 1943-1953, p. 232.
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Minister in Bucharest remarked in May 1956.30 There were enough proofs to confirm this
assertion.
The Soviet leaders’ visit to Britain in April 1956 revealed the degree of
Romania’s subservience to Moscow. The visit of N.A. Bulganin, the president of the
Council of Ministers, and N.S. Khrushchev, member of the Presidium, was given full
coverage by the party newspaper, Scanteia, which detailed the movements of the Soviet
leaders in great length, and every day. From the correspondence transmitted by Scanteia’s
reporter in London, the reader might have got the impression that the future fate of Britain
was dependent upon the outcome of the visit. 31 More than simply providing details of the
visit, Scanteia paid homage to the visitors. Praise was so effusive that one feels
embarrassed reading it. Even the weather conspired to produce the correct tone for such a
momentous occasion. After a gloomy morning, the moment the Soviet leaders arrived at
Victoria station, ‘the sun, triumphing against the clouds, came into sight,’ a sign indicating
that the visit would start ‘under good auspices.’32 The readers were reminded that the
Soviets had already taken important steps to brighten the international situation. It was as if
the sunny day was designed for a visit of such importance. ‘A human channel’ had been
waiting for the arrival of the Soviet leaders on both sides of the street leading to Claridge
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TNA, PRO, FO 371/122750, NR 1801/13, MacDermot, British Legation, Bucharest to Selwyn
Lloyd, 17 May 1956.
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The new Prime Minister, Anthony Eden, hoped to increase his prestige as a result of the Soviet
leaders’ visit. The fact that he failed in obtaining the Americans’ approval for British-Sino cooperation made
his maintenance at power vulnerable, John Baird, a Labour MP, told a Romanian diplomat. Certain British
MPs talked even about Eden stepping down. The fact that Butler and Macmillan who might have taken
Eden’s place, did not get along, made possible Eden’s maintenance at power. RNA, CC of RCP, Department
of Foreign Relations, Dossier 54/1956, ff. 11-12.
Scanteia no. 3571, 15 April 1956, p. 1.
32
The Soviets reached London after a four-day trip. The visit took place between 18 and 28 April
1956. They were received by the PM Anthony Eden and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Selwyn Lloyd, at
Victoria station.
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hotel where the Soviet guests were to be accommodated and some Londoners could be
seen carrying short English-Russian conversation guides edited by the Daily Express. 33
The visit went apparently smoothly. The Soviets had extensive meetings with the
Premier and were received by Queen Elizabeth at Windsor Castle.34 A Joint Statement on
the development of commercial and cultural relations was signed. The Soviets expressed
interests in importing from Britain up to two hundred billion rubbles annually. Britain
could not, however, export certain goods, restricted due their strategic importance.
Cultural, scientific and technical exchanges were also expected to develop.35
In contrast to the enthusiasm displayed by the press, there was despair in
Romania’s prisons. And more than despair, ‘resentment appeared against all that was
British.
When the word went round that the Russians had gone to London and billiondollar contracts were in the making, people said: „Hypocritical Albion and nation
of shopkeepers. Here they go again betraying the whole world.”36
One incident had though disturbed the visit. Scanteia disclosed it to its Romanian
readership two weeks later. At a luncheon offered by the Labour Party, the Soviet leaders
had to face a ‘slander’ when a list of two hundred forty five Social-Democrats imprisoned
in the Soviet Union and the satellites’ prisons was handed over and the prisoners’ release
was requested. The origin of the ‘horrible elicitation’ was traced, Scanteia announced. The
list had been ‘concocted’ by a group of American journalists led by the Editor in Chief of
the New Leader (a New York newspaper), Sol Levitas, and then sent to the British MPs,
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According to an official statement the Soviet Union was ready to collaborate with the United
Nations in maintain peace in the Middle East. Scanteia, no. 3574/ 19 April 1956, p. 1.
Scanteia, no. 3573/18 April 1956, p. 3.
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Scanteia, no. 3575/ 20 April 1956, p. 4 and Scanteia no. 3578/ 23 April 1956, p 4.
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Scanteia, no. 3581/ 28 April 1956, pp. 1-4, Scanteia, no. 3583/ 30 April 1956, p. 4.
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Prisoners’ resentment towards duplicitous British foreign policy was expressed in an original
way, by ceasing learning English. Learning foreign languages was one of the activities which, although not
allowed by the guardians, was widespread among political detainees. ‘Everyone started learning French,
Spanish, Italian and Portuguese, anything but English. But of course there was still Uncle Sam and his bag of
dollars so English classes began again in order to speak American.’ Leonard Kirschen, Prisoner of Red
Justice. An account of Ten Years’ Captivity in Communist Romania, Barker, London, 1963, p. 167.
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among them Labour leader Hugh Gaitskell. The ‘calumniators’ of the New Leader aimed at
‘poisoning the international climate, hindering detente and preventing Anglo-Soviet
friendship’.37
From within the Labour Party, some MPs, with communist affinities, were almost
as critical as were the Romanians. A member of the Executive Committee of the Labour
Party, Edith Summerskill, praised Communism as a society directed to ensuring working
class well-being and maintained in a speech to the Labour students at the University of
Liverpool that Soviet domestic policy should not have been an issue of the Labour leaders’
concern.38 Konni Zilliacus also admonished the Labour Party leadership. The Soviet
leaders should not be made responsible for the internal affairs of other countries, Zilliacus
maintained in a letter to the weekly New Statesmen and Nation. He pointed to one of the
‘instigators,’ Morgan Philips, who, Zilliacus claimed, was in the habit of insulting Eastern
European countries. Zilliacus reminded Philips that East Bloc nations were members of the
United Nations. Philips refused to admit that the Baltic countries had become ‘many years
ago’ Soviet republics. Was Philips in favour of peaceful coexistence and the United
Nations Charter or was he on the side of John Foster Dulles and some disgruntled
immigrants? 39 Tom Driberg imagined a hypothetic situation in an article published by the
Reynold's News. What if Dulles and Stassen were invited to Moscow and their hosts said,
37

“Cand joci cum iti canta altii”[Dancing on songs played by others] Scanteia, no. 3587, 5 May
1956, p 4, article first published by Pravda no. 125 (13.788).
38
Since she had advocated passionately the benefits of Communism, Summerskill accepted to visit
Romania the following year at the invitation of the government. Upon her return to Britain, Summerskill
agreed to be interviewed on her impression of Romania. The interview was supposed to take place on Radio
Free Europe. The first thing she asked for was to convey a message to the Romanian Minister in London, a
request which astonished Ion Ratiu, the chair of the Association of Romanian exiles. ‘Don’t you realize that
this is an anti-Communist transmitter?’ ‘You mean that you want me to attack Romania?’ Summerskill
replied, panicked and confused.. While Ratiu indicated that he would permit her to proceed, while reserving
the right to challenge objectionable statements, Summerskill refused to listen and left the studio in such a
hurry that she forgot her gloves there. “With and without gloves,” Free Rumanian Press, no. 46 (II), 4
December 1957. The incident was also described by Daily Mail, 5 November 1957. Scanteia devoted a long
and spirited defence of Summerskill on 5 November 1957 for refusing to attack ‘a government in power’ and
uttered accusations against Ratiu, ‘paid by Henry Ford’.
39
Zilliacus’s letter to the New Statesmen and Nation. “Distinguished Labours condemn Labour
Party leaders’ reactionary behaviour” - news passed by Moscow through Agerpress on 9 May – with
reference to an article edited by Pravda and republished by Scanteia no. 3591, 10 May 1956, p. 3.
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‘We have lists of our communists imprisoned by Britons in Cyprus, Malaya and British
Guyana. Please release them!’ John Baird, a Labour MP, also criticized the Labour leaders’
action, while Emmanuel Shinwell, a former Minister in Attlee’s government, asked the
party to apologize. Although Socialists and Communists had different opinions concerning
the means to fight Capitalism the Social Democrats had to reach an agreement with the
Communists, the Labour Party ideologue, G.D.H. Coll, resolved.40
Any attempt to examine publicly the topics dealt with during the Soviet leaders’
visit would not lead to the desired results, the British Prime Minister stated in the House of
Commons on 3 May 1956. Nevertheless, the intervention of the Labour leaders was not in
vain.

41

The Romanian Social-Democrats were released under the Decree no. 206 of 24

April 1956.’42 They attributed their release to Gaitskell’s representation to Bulganin and
Khrushchev.43
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Scanteia no. 3591, 10 May 1956, p. 3.
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Another amnesty took place the previous year, in September 1955, one month
before Romania’s admission to the United Nations. 44 The amnesty had been however very
selective and shattered utterly the morale of those who continued to be imprisoned:
....[t]he Roumanian amnesty in September which released all the war criminals
and those with sentences up to five years, as well as groups of other small
offenders. There was still no hope in sight for us with heavy sentences . . . It was
awful to see foreigners being released and those who had been locked up on the
merest suspicion of having had dealings with them, still being kept in prison.
Nothing seemed to make sense, absolutely nothing.45
Most political prisoners hoped that Romania would not be received into the United
Nations, until, among other points, they had been granted freedom. ‘We felt deeply
deceived and hope in the Western Allies began to fade.’ 46 In article 4 of the Peace Treaty
signed in 1947, Romania accepted the obligation to set free all persons held in
confinement on account on their activities in favour of the United Nations, and not to take
any future measures incompatible with this purpose. Although Britain had previously
protested against the Romanian Government’s disregard of articles of the Peace Treaty
guaranteeing for instance freedom of political opinion, it was by then ‘not clear to the
HMG that it would be helpful to the persons concerned to raise this matter in the United
Nations’.47

Romanians and British envisioned the resumption of bilateral relations quite
differently in 1956. While the Romanians were adamant about initiating cultural contacts
and trade, the British referred to the failure of the Romanian government to bring up the
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issue of the outstanding financial debt.48 Without having the issue of the debt service
resolved, it would be difficult for the British government to give any encouragement to
cultural exchanges.49
British claims against Romania had been the subject of negotiation with the
Romanian Government since the Second World War. The British authorities refused to
unlock the Romanian funds located in Britain until an agreement on debt service could be
reached. They intended to use the blocked funds, worth about 10 million pounds, to cover
existing Romanian loans then unserviced. Debt service was also understood to include
money owed to Britons following the nationalisation of what had been private companies.
An important part of the Romanian funds was used to compensate the British shareholders
through the nationalization of their assets in Romania.50 Some explanation is required.
At the end of 1947, the Romanian government had appointed administrators to
take charge of two large British-owned oil companies ‘Astra Romana’ and ‘Unirea.’ The
action was launched under the pretext that the two companies had not met the production
quotas accorded to them in the Romanian four years plan, although the quotas being set at
an impossibly high figure, the companies protested against that imposition. 51
Shortly thereafter, in June 1948, a sweeping decree completed the nationalization
of all enterprises, including the foreign-owned oil companies, metallurgical establishments,
mines, banks, and insurance companies. The situation in the Romanian oil industry
48

Nicolae Korcinski, the new Minister in London, described the first duty of his mission as being
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deteriorated in the years that followed. Despite boasts in the local press regarding the
successful introduction of ‘socialist competitions’ in the oil industry and the surpassing of
targets, production was maintained at round 11,800 tons per day, running behind the
programme. “Sovrompetrol” enjoyed a privileged position occupied like the other Sovrom
companies.52 According to a press article published by Scanteia on 4 November 1949,
Sovrompetrol has an enormous role to play in reclaiming and developing our oil
industry which suffered so much from the sabotage of the Anglo-American
companies. Sovrompetrol brings from the Soviet Union the necessary technical
equipment for drilling and production –draw works, drill pipe, pipelines, tractors
etc; it has introduced and continuing to introduce into our oil industry advanced
working methods – the movement of a drilling rig in two days instead of 30; it has
put into application a perfect system of organization of work. At the beginning of
the month of October Sovrompetrol had fulfilled the drilling plan by 125% and
the production plan by 101%. 53

The claims on behalf of British oil companies for oil supplied to Russia as
reparations at the end of the war had been rejected by the Romanian government. In 1951
the British were considering invoking a special disputes procedure within the framework of
the United Nations. Article thirty-three of the Romanian Peace Treaty
laid down that if agreement cannot be reached with the Romanian government the
claims shall be referred to the three heads of mission in Bucharest. If the Soviet
minister refused to co-operate, we could, under the Treaty, invite the SecretaryGeneral of the UN to appoint an arbitrator and would probably obtain a
favourable judgement. But without Soviet cooperation we should receive no
satisfaction, whatever the UN arbitrator might decide.54
This mechanism, therefore, did not seem likely to work. Reprisal remained an option.
In reprisal, therefore, Romanian assets in Britain were seized in accordance with
Article twenty-seven of the Peace Treaty with Romania concluded in 1947 and were
52
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distributed to certain British claimants between 1955 and 1957. The total amount
distributed came to 7.6 million pounds.55
When Anglo-Rumanian negotiations opened in February 1955, the British claims
presented to the Romanians were for 180 million pounds, of which 112 million pounds
represented the nationalisation and Peace Treaty claims of the British oil companies, and
thirty-seven million represented bonded debt. The British agreed to accept two million
pounds in respect of the miscellaneous claims worth thirty million pounds, to leave bonded
debts to the side, and defer settlement of the oil companies’ claims until the two million
pounds had been paid. Negotiations were adjourned because the Romanian Government
insisted that the oil companies’ Peace Treaty claims should be covered by the global
settlement of two million pounds, and that nationalisation claims should not be raised for
twenty years. 56
The date set for resumption of talks on the critical financial issues was set for 16
April 1956.57 A Romanian delegation left Bucharest in the morning of 14 April with the
purpose of concluding a commercial agreement and solving financial problems.58 The
Romanian position was that the debt issue could be settled within the scope of an overallall trade agreement. Essentially, Romania would pay off its debt in kind, and in oil. The
British intention was to assess compensation on a monetary basis and not in the form of oil
delivered over a period of years.
British intransigence probably owed something to the discovery that the
Romanians were also coquetting with the Americans. London was not simply shocked, but
angry. ‘We might surely have expected that the Americans would have informed us of this
55
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when we consulted them about our own negotiation. We should be glad to learn what line
the Americans intend to take.’59 The American Legation admitted that the Romanians put
forward a proposal on 7 March in a note from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the State
Department: the discussion on Romanian assets in the United States, the claims on
Romania and possible means of improving trade relations were mentioned. Although
suggesting discussion in Bucharest on outstanding financial and economic questions
including trade, debts and oil and other claims,60 the Romanian note of 7 March was very
guarded, in that it stated that Romania was prepared to discuss ‘some American claims,’
without being more specific. There was no specific reference to the claims of the United
States oil companies on Romania.61 The State Department was ‘very sympathetic’ with
efforts to work out a trade agreement, which included a settlement of oil claims and hoped
that an agreement could be reached ‘on a reasonable monetary value’ to be placed on
expropriated property.62 About half of the US claims estimated at 88,000,000 American
dollars had been filled by Standard Oil of New Jersey and other American companies that
had large stakes in the Ploiesti oilfields.63 Although inclined to reply favourably, the
American Government opposed payment of the claims in oil since such payment may have
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offered encouragement to other countries contemplating nationalization of oil industries.’64
The fact that ‘not a single word’ of this impending negotiation had been mentioned to them
made the British indignant. 65 They considered
. . . whether to make a shindy with the State Department and we did in fact, see
them again today. They were red-faced and apologetic but it transpired, in
discussion, that there is really nothing in the latest US/Romanian exchange which
affects the oil debts position... now that we have the full story, it is clear that
nothing has been done which would prejudice our current negotiations and, more
especially, the oil aspect. The State Department, in an endeavour to dispose of
public misapprehension, will be issuing a press statement probably tonight or
tomorrow, summarising the terms of the US reply to the Romanians. 66
The United States had not entered into trade agreements for exchange of specific
commodities as the European nations frequently did, the Americans maintained. Normal
commercial exchanges were freely carried out by American commercial interests without
government intervention. ‘This was really put in more as a piece of propaganda than
anything else,’ the British Ambassador to Washington commented. 67
The State Department informed the Petroleum Attaché that no Government
official was planning any trip to Bucharest and they ‘would certainly not do so without
consulting the State Department’.68 The British and the American oil companies ‘did not
see eye to eye in that the amounts at stake were different. Shell’s interest in the acquisition
of crude was greater than Jersey’s and the latter had already written off most of their
Romanian assets.’69
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When negotiations with the Romanians were resumed on April 18, 1956, the
British miscellaneous claims had risen to about thirty-five million pounds, as a result of the
completion by the Foreign Compensation Commission of their registration; a figure of
eight million pounds was placed on the non-oil nationalisation claims and a figure of 4.2
million pounds on the non-oil Peace treaty claims.70 The FO list of nationalisation claims
included private shareholdings in Romanian oil companies and outstanding oil royalties
amounting to about one million pounds.71
While the Romanian delegation was dissatisfied with the pace of the negotiations,
the British view was that the Romanians were not prepared for a settlement of debts,
especially for compensation for the nationalisation of the oil industry. ‘No progress was
made in the trade negotiations because the Romanians mainly wanted to sell us oil and the
oil companies would not buy it without some agreement about compensation for
nationalisation.’ 72
Negotiations were adjourned in August 1956 without any offer made by the
Romanian delegation.73 Failure arose also from British insistence that any trade
arrangement was contingent on a satisfactory settlement of the debts.74
Failure of economic negotiations, notwithstanding, the British admitted that the
Romanians had been ‘less disagreeable in the past two years in their treatment of the
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British Legation at Bucharest’.75 As well, a number of ‘minor but unprecedented civilities’
such as the celebration of the anniversary of William Shakespeare, the laying of wreaths at
the British Cemetery at Snagov and the extremely friendly reception given to the two
British MPs accompanying the ‘Harlequins’ Rugby Team attested to the change in
attitude.76 The thaw ceased however towards the end of the year.
During the opening phase of the Hungarian uprising the Romanian press
attempted to ignore what was going on in the neighbouring country. When events had
developed to the point that it could no longer be ignored, the Romanian press and radio
reproduced Soviet contentions about the ‘reactionary’ Hungarian movement and the
‘Imperialists spies’ parachuted into Hungary. 77 The Government’s messages and speeches
also took the Soviet line that a movement by Hungarian workers had been exploited by
‘fascist reactionary elements encouraged by Western Powers’.78
Concerned about the effect of Western broadcasts, both in revealing inconvenient
facts about the internal situation and in telling the Romanians the truth about the events in
Hungary, the Romanian authorities condemned Western ‘slanders.’79 Statements reported
by Radio Free Europe and other broadcasts were extracted and protested. Romanian
protests, however, served mainly to confirm accounts of significant unrest. ‘By protesting
so much and so elaborately the Romanian authorities had in effect helped to confirm the
stories of unrest amongst students and others. It was also clear that arrests of students have
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been taking place, and that the whole repressive machinery of the State is being turned
upon them.’80
In Timisoara, a city close to the Hungarian border, students succeeded in
organizing a meeting during which a list of requests similar to that of the Hungarian
students was read.81 Romanian authorities arrested the students taking part in the meeting.
The following day, students gathered in the centre of the city, asking for the release of their
colleagues. The demonstration was brutally repressed: the students were loaded into trucks
and taken to unused military barracks. There they were required to sign ‘declarations of
desolidarisation’ to be allowed to continue their studies.82
At this juncture, Romanian counter-propaganda revived all the old catch phrases
and allegations of the early Cold-War period. The slight thaw vanished as the Romanian
media relapsed into the previous familiar routine.83 Western press and radio, particularly
‘the hated Radio Free Europe, ’ were reviled as ‘the agents of the Imperialists and fascist
warmongers, responsible for inciting reactionary elements in Hungary to commit excesses
against the true sons of the people and for attempting to divert attention from Western
aggression in the Middle East.’ The disproportion between the news published by the
Western newspapers or broadcast by Western radio stations, and the offence taken by the
Romanians was remarkable.84 The authorities organized meetings by students, workers and
intellectuals during which, speeches and resolutions condemned the ‘slanders of the
80
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Western press and radio’ and expressed their support to the Hungarian Government and the
Soviets in suppressing the ‘counter-revolutionary’ forces.85 The on-going debacle of the
Suez intervention provided an opportunity to attempt to deflect criticism.
Taken aback by the virulence of the Romanian reaction, the BBC assured British
diplomats in Bucharest of the accuracy of its reports and instanced its reputation for
integrity. It was not its intention to provoke the Romanian regime or encourage the
Romanians ‘into a revolt we cannot support.’ In commenting on Romania, they had tried to
give as honest a picture as they could, without encouraging wild optimism. At the same
time, it was not the BBC’s intention to suggest that nothing in the Communist world could
ever change. The BBC felt it better to stress ‘the concessions or expedients forced upon the
Communist rulers by their subjects’ than to paint a picture of ‘Communist regimes
ruthlessly efficient and masters of every possible situation.’ 86
Meanwhile, while it protested, the Romanian authorities were also vigorous in
taking steps to ensure that what had happened in Hungary was not repeated in Romania.
Guards were established on public buildings and policemen patrolled the streets.
Opposition to the regime continued to be dealt with in the usual way by arrests and internal
deportations. A new wave of imprisonments followed the uprisings at the end of October
when students from major universities were involved in actions which challenged the
Communist regime.87 There were also disturbances among peasants but no coordination
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between the various social strata so the authorities succeeded in repressing quickly all
unrests. As well, the government took steps to meet the most pressing popular economic
grievances. To appease the population a series of decrees increasing wages and pensions
were published. 88
What is very striking about this passage is that the British representatives in
Bucharest tended to disbelieve the Western press reports, BBC assurances notwithstanding.
This was just another proof of how isolated they had become, without reliable contacts and
with limited ability to travel within the country. ‘Inaccurate or unconvincing news’, they
suggested, was ‘liable to discourage those Romanians who were relying on Western
broadcasts to keep them in touch with world events and to maintain their hope for the
future.’89 The British Minister, Dudley, doubted reports that the Army was ‘on the verge of
revolt.’ The reports, of course, were accurate. He cannot be blamed for his ignorance, since
he encountered difficulties getting answers from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs even to
the simplest questions and had no other means of ascertaining what was going on. Dudley
himself observed that it was no coincidence that the institutions and cities where official
meetings had been organised to protest against the ‘hostile broadcasts’ had for the most
part been those where unrest had been reported. Most of them took place in the region
adjoining the Hungarian border, where the local population was most aware of, and
inspired by, the Hungarian example.90
British diplomats also tended to regard anti-Communist risings behind the Iron
Curtain as futile. The process of detente and of the ‘liberalisation’ of the Soviet bloc were
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considered to be mutually supporting, and ‘the long-term result would be the erosion of the
Communist dogma and the relaxation of Cold War tensions’.91
The thaw was most surely over. ‘Whatever the far-reaching political implications
of the Hungarian coup, our immediate reaction was an unbearable bitter-sweetness,’ the
correspondent of the Associated Press, by then a detainee for seven years, recalled.
‘Hearing of Suez and that Hungary was an open issue at UNO we joyfully assumed that a
hypocritical compromise between East and West would not be possible. But this could
only mean more tension and for us directly, a further decrease of our already remote
chance of freedom. Undoubtedly, all of this was related to our catastrophic re-isolation.’92
Hopes for more extensive contacts were, for the moment, placed on hold.

Travel

relaxations ended and all applications made by Western diplomats for travel were now
turned down. Even ordinary representations on consular matters were now received in a
very cool and non-committal way. 93 The nadir was reached as the Egyptian crisis unfolded
and as Soviet troops moved to crush what was now the Hungarian revolution.94 Romania’s
rulers did not permit anything to happen ‘which might embarrass their Soviet masters’.95
‘Circumstances had become abnormal again in all the Satellites,’ the Foreign Office noted,
and ‘whatever turn political events may take now and whatever may be the solution of the
Egyptian crisis,’ the brief relaxation of tension was over and there was nothing the British
91

The PUSD Planning Staff believed that ‘any weakening of the Soviet hold over the Satellites...
will come about through evolution rather than revolution.’ SC(61)25, ‘United Kingdom policy towards the
satellites’, 27 June 1961, emphasis added, and C. Tickell (Planning Staff) note, 24 Jan.1964, PLA 13/1;
SC(64)1; ‘Policy towards the East European satellites’, 27 Jan.1964, PLA13/2, FO 371/177821. Geraint
Hughes, Harold Wilson’s Cold War. The Labour Government and East-West Politics, 1964-1970, The Royal
Historical Society, The Boydell Press, 2009, p. 43.
92
Leonard Kirschen, Prisoner of Red Justice. An account of Ten Years’ Captivity in Communist
Romania, Barker, London, 1963, pp. 174.
93
The tightening of restrictions on the movements of foreign diplomats in Romania was a
temporary measure due to events in Hungary, the British were told. FO 371/122756, R 1903/10 FO Minute,
D.P. Reilly, 23 November 1956.
94
TNA, PRO, FO 371/122709, NR 1052/5. Allen Dudley, Bucharest, to Thomas Brimelow, FO, 7
November 1956.
In the aftermath of the Hungarian Revolution and the Suez crisis, the Americans announced their
intention to place nuclear weapons in Turkey, Iran, Japan, and West Germany.
95
TNA, PRO, FO 371/122696, N R 1016/21 Allen Dudley, Bucharest, to Thomas Brimelow, FO,
15 November 1956.

130

could do about.96 Romania continued to remain ‘as amenable a Soviet satellite as ever and .
. . there is very little risk of serious opposition to the regime developing.’97
For the remainder of the decade, relations remained uncomfortably frigid.
Surveillance of diplomatic missions continued. The visit of the British Minister, Scott Fox
to Transylvania was ‘facilitated’ by a clerk of the Ministry of Interior who accompanied
him at all times, pretending to be a representative of the People’s Council.98 Occasional or
cultural contacts were, once again, almost unknown, and Romania seemed once more a
strange, hostile and unknown land. ‘How is the weather like in Sofia?’ a Romanian student
was asked during his visit in Britain in 1957. Stefan Barlea, a student representing the
Romanian students’ association, took the question first as a premeditated offence. He then
realized ‘how little the British knew about Romania.’ 99
Very few Westerners ventured to travel to Romania. Why should they? Getting a
visa to enter the country was an adventure itself. In 1959, a Canadian businessman
complained that he was subjected to a ‘long and exhausting interrogation’ at the Romanian
legation in London before being granted a Romanian visa. He was lucky to have obtained
one. Many journalists who wished to travel to Romania for tasks related to their profession
were refused. The Canadian succeed only because he was a businessman with high
connections and experience in dealing with Communists.100
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After many years of embargoes and other political barriers to trade, British
businessmen as well as travellers only gradually began to rediscover Romania. Some few
western firms were given leave to open offices in Romania.101 Travel to Romania,
however, remained unusual. The principal impediment was probably not just the difficulty
in obtaining permission, but the fact that in its communist configuration Romania had lost
whatever attractiveness it might have once enjoyed. Arriving in Bucharest in the summer
of 1967, A British writer noted enchanted that Britain had no bad association for
Romanians. ‘It had very few associations at all.’102 Two decades of isolation did not leave
their mark: they erased whatever mark there might have once been.
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Divergent aims: detainees’ release versus cultural exchanges

‘It is impossible to bring to Mr. Bulganin’s notice every
unfortunate victim of Communism who had previously deserved
well of the Allied cause’. (T. G. Ward, Permanent Undersecretary at
the Foreign Office).

103

‘This business of the detainees in Romania is simply
becoming a ritual of question and answer between the Legation
and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Meanwhile, we go ahead with
encouragement to the Roumanian authorities to take up
scholarships and otherwise engage in cultural relations.’104

Although the Romanians’ insistence on cultural contacts with the West appeared to

the British as being ‘a manifestation of the policy crystallised at the 20th Party Congress in
Moscow,’

105

the Soviets had in fact advised the Romanians ‘not to go too far’ in their

relations with the West for this could provoke damage to the entire Socialist camp. The
opening of reading rooms in Bucharest would only serve French and American interests,
‘especially if they are going to be served by American and French personnel.’ Perceived
enemies would take advantage of the entry to place their agents there. The Americans were
interested in propagating ‘the American way of life in order to win public opinion,’ the
Soviets warned.106
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The Romanian regime combined openness with caution. From the time of his
installation, on 7 March 1956, the new Romanian Minister in London, N. Korcinschi, was
very active in contacting the local authorities. At his insistence the Lord Mayors of
Birmingham and Leeds and the Mayor of Kensington visited Romania. He advocated
fervently cultural exchanges and promoted ‘major cultural manifestations’ and exchanges
of delegations but the moment the British mentioned re-opening of the British Council
Office in Bucharest, he adopted a ‘completely Molotov-like attitude’.107
A British Council Institute functioned in Bucharest before the Second World War
for a short period; opened in 1938, it closed down in the autumn of 1939 when the Council
staff was ordered to leave the country.
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New political circumstances after the Second

World War made the reopening uncertain; although the Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Pauker, did not object in the first instance to the opening of a British Council in Bucharest,
her reply was evasive and non-committal’.109 Britain, however, pushed the resumption of
Council activity, and a Representative, T. E. Morray, was sent to Bucharest in October
1947. He began to hire local staff. A single thing had yet to be obtained: the Romanian
authorities’ agreement. Negotiations for the establishment of the Council in Bucharest
seemed to be prolonged indefinitely. London advised Morray to ‘restrain his impatience at
the absence of any evidence of his mission being successful,’ stay on in Romania ‘as long
as he is tolerated’ and do ‘what useful work he can in patience.’ If it became necessary
under pressure from the Romanian Government to withdraw him, ‘then we should come
out altogether, as in Russia’.110
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When the blunt answer denying permission came in December 1947, 111 Morray
suggested that he commence cultural work under diplomatic cover as an adjunct to the
Information Office of the Legation.112 Another option was to work through a Professor
appointed to the University of Bucharest.113 The search for ‘a suitable incumbent’ for the
Chair of English began

114

but soon the Romanian Ministry of Education informed the

Embassy that the vacancy at the University was suspended making any search for a
Professor futile. 115
Morray’s proposal for handing the Council affairs over to the Information Office
or to other part of the Legation was initially deprecated, and for good reason.116 ‘We
maintain in our relations with all the Soviet-dominated countries that we are a separate
entity from the Embassy.’117 However, after Morray’s recall on 23 February 1948, his
functions were transferred to the Information Officer, John Bennet, ‘prepared to act as our
agent.’118 This decision was based on the fact that ‘the Division attached great importance
to keeping one foot in Romania so that we can move in there as soon as there is the
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slightest opportunity to do so.’119 The fact that Pauker stated in March that ‘the possibility
of a British Council Centre being set up was not definitely excluded for all time,’ may have
also contributed to this compromise. 120
When the appointment of a British lecturer at the University of Bucharest was
broached, the Romanian Foreign Minister replied that the Government was reconsidering
the whole educational system. Romania needed ‘technical professors,’ lecturers on
engineering, agriculture, medicine, not ‘experts in philosophy’.121 However, when the
Council’s proposed the visit by an expert on malariology to Bucharest and offered to pay
for the expenses for a member of the Cantacuzino Institute to visit Britain during the
summer of 1948, the Romanian government refused them both. The refusal closed the door
on any sort of cultural or scientific exchanges or visits between Britain and Romania.122
In 1956 while the Romanians were enthusiastic about resuming cultural relations,
the British reminded them of a barrier to the establishment of friendlier relations: their
former employees, who had worked to facilitate cultural exchange, were still
imprisoned.123 Although the Foreign Office could not use any leverage to obtain the release
of these unfortunates, it was not just that the Romanians showed little interest in any

119

The Information Officer may be in a position to take full advantage of whatever opportunities
offer for prosecuting our work there’ and meet the wages bill for the two local appointees. TNA, PRO, BW
53/10, Despatch from Deputy Controller, Overseas ‘C’, 9 April 1948. Deputy Controller, Overseas ‘C’,
Johnstone.
120
TNA, PRO, BW 53/10, File Ref CF/RU/680/1, 21 February 1957.
121
TNA, PRO, BW 53/10, Extract from Holman’s Despatch no. 87, 10 March 1948, interview
with the Romanian Foreign Minister.
122
TNA, PRO, BW 53/10, File Ref CF/RU/680/1. First Secretary (Information), British Legation
Bucharest, on British Council activities in Romania, 21 February 1957.
123
‘We have two main grievances against the Romanian Government. The first is that of British
women who are either in prison or unable to leave Romania. Mrs. Placa is in prison for, in effect, being an
employee of the American Legation while Mrs. Sarry wishes to leave Romania, but is unable to obtain an
exit permit. TNA, PRO, FO 371/122756, N R 1903/3, FO Minute (Hohler to Lord John Hope), 9 February
1956; FO 371/122694, NR 1015/8, Draft reply to PQ Lord Pakenham, 23 April 1956.
The former employees of the Information Section of the British Legation at Bucharest were still in
prison. TNA, PRO, FO 371/122756, NR 1903/9- Submission of Thomas Brimelow, October 25, 1956. The
Permanent Undersecretary, T.G. Ward, raised two cases during the Romanian Minister’s farewell call at the
Foreign Office.

136

agreement, the Treasury and the Board of Trade opposed any attempt to use commercial
and financial discussions as a lever to obtain concessions in certain cases.124
The announcement of the Soviet leaders’ visit to London, at the height of the
thaw, generated an avalanche of letters addressed to the Foreign Office, asking for
intervention on behalf of certain individuals; among them, one from Karl Viktor of Wied,
indicating the situation of his sister, Eleonora Bunea. She had worked in the Press Office
of the British Legation for four years. When she realized that she could not legally leave
Romania, Bunea attempted, together with her husband and other colleagues, to flee. The
group was caught immediately and its members were probably the victims of a trap.
Arrested in July 1949, Bunea was tried the following year together with the group and
found guilty of high treason and espionage. She received one of the most severe sentences:
fifteen years imprisonment.
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At the time Viktor’s letter was received by the Foreign

Office, therefore, Bunea had spent over seven years in gaol and was ill with tuberculosis.
Her brother asked for her release on humanitarian grounds.126 Her name was included in
the list handed by Sir William Hayter, the British Ambassador to Moscow, to Andrei
Gromyko,127 and the case was brought to the notice of Bulganin and Khrushchev. Princess
Alice, countess of Athlone, also appealed to the Foreign Office for Bunea’s release.
Eleonore was a princess herself, related to the Romanian Royal family through her father,

124

TNA, PRO, FO 371/122694. NR 1051/1, 16 March 1956.
The trial took place between 26 and 29 April 1950. NCSSA, Documentary Fond, Dossier
13.434, vol. 7, f. 138.
126
TNA, PRO, FO 371/122694, NR 1015/3, J. S. Somers Cocks, British Consulate Munich, to
Selwyn Lloyd, April 18, 1956, transmitting the letter of Karl Viktor Prince of Wied. Eleonore of Wied
married Ion Bunea in February 1949 and took his surname.
127
TNA, PRO, FO 371/122694, 1015/5. Letter of Princess Alice, Countess of Athlone, to the
Foreign Secretary, Selwyn Lloyd, 19 April 1956; Minute signed by G.G. Brown, 24 April 1956: ‘We are not
at present at liberty to disclose this fact to Princess Alice,’ the reply to the princess was to be written in
‘general terms.’; FO to Princess Alice, Countess of Athlone, 26 April 1956.
125

137

Prince Wilhelm of Wied, the former King of Albania. All the endeavours for her release
were in vain: ill, Eleonore died in prison in 1957 when she was only 47 years old.128
Another member of the group was a journalist, Liviu Nasta, correspondent of the
New York Times.129 Nasta was also accused of espionage, and figured in a list of agents and
traitors as the main collaborator of the British in Romania in the early days of the war,130 a
circumstance which brought him a harsh sentence: 25 years imprisonment. His health got
worse in prison. ‘[H]e suffered intense pain from an untreated stomach ulcer and in the
filthy, crowded conditions his resistance was slowly ground away. Six months before he
died in a state of utter exhaustion, he would wake and tell everyone in the cell: “You know,
Churchill has asked for me, I shall be freed in a day or two.” In the end he could neither
walk nor keep his food down nor recognize the people around him. 131
Churchill had indeed written a letter to Gheorghiu-Dej asking for Nasta’s release
on humanitarian grounds. Nasta’s daughter was married in Britain to William Deakin,
Warden at Oxford College, and a former counsellor to Churchill. The family tried other
channels to encourage clemency, including the Red Cross132 and Tito whom GheorghiuDej visited in October 1956.133 For several months, despatches from London to the British
128
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Legation in Bucharest and further to the Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs routinely
enquired about the chance of Nasta’s amnesty. None of the interventions spurred any
reaction from the Romanian authorities, except for the information that Churchill’s letter
had been received and read by Gheorghiu-Dej.134
Such occurrences made the British question the ‘false bonhomie’ of the Romanian
officials. There was little chance that Britain would respond positively to proposals for
cultural exchanges no matter how eagerly advocated by Romanian officials, while previous
employees remained in prison. Although a ‘somewhat different line’ had been adopted
towards the Soviet Union, there was no reason for letting the Romanians ‘have what they
want on their own terms.’135
In 1959 the Romanian Institute for Cultural Affairs with Foreign Countries
[IRRCS]136 submitted to the British Council a request for collaboration, following an
invitation coming from the British Minister in Bucharest.137 The Romanians formerly
working for the British Council were still in gaol. ‘Since they can have worked for the
Council only for a few weeks in 1948 the disproportionate nature of the punishment is only
too clear.’138
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‘This introduces a new major factor in our relations with the Satellites’, J.
Graham, Director of the East Europe Department of the British Council maintained. He
suggested that the British Council should send ‘an interim reply stating that the problems
raised by their letter are being studied. We should at the same time inform the Foreign
Office of our difficulty.’...139
For quite apart from moral aspects, there are clear public relations implications –
the public, the press and Parliament would be incensed if it were known that in
our eagerness to obtain a cultural foothold in Satellite countries we were prepared
to ignore all reference to present victimization of ex employees whose only fault
was that they had served us well for a few weeks nearly eleven years ago.140

Why was the Romanian regime adamant about development of cultural contacts?
Was it because the leadership wanted to obtain even ‘minimum possible dividend’ from
any superficial cultural exchanges? Did they suppose that they would gain ‘additional
respectability’ both in the eyes of the Romanians and foreigners? 141
While the French concluded in 1959 a cultural agreement with the Romanians, the
British were not interested in signing Cultural Conventions with any of the Soviet Bloc
countries. London considered such agreements to be ‘a sort of meaningless windowdressing that appeals to Communist regimes’.142 ‘We see no reason to indulge them in this
respect unless we get some worthwhile quid-pro-quo,’ it was resolved within the Cultural
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Relations Department of the Foreign Office.143 The Legation was instructed to take the line
that any such things were premature. ‘Our present view is that, quite apart from the serious
practical and financial difficulties, this is better left over until the Romanians have begun
to show greater goodwill in cultural matters.’144
Although insisting at every opportunity on improved cultural relations, the
Romanians failed to put forward suggestions for cultural exchanges. ‘[R]unning true to
form by taking their cue from the Russians’ on wider contacts with the Western countries,’
they did not translate this aspiration ‘into something more tangible, particularly in cultural
and economic matters’.145 They may have been inhibited by the dusty answer to their
proposals for the resumption of trade and financial negotiations. Romanian inertia made
the Foreign Office decide to take the initiative in discussing the general question of cultural
relations ‘before the atmosphere deteriorated further’.146 While the British Council resolved
that it was unable to collaborate with an agency of the Romanian Government while exemployees were still incarcerated, the Foreign Office tended to view this argument as
irrelevant. 147 Apparently, ‘Foreign Office policy considerations’ were allowed to override
the British Council arguments.148
According to the British Council, establishing relations without overt reference to
imprisoned ex-employees was like proclaiming to the Romanians ‘that we are prepared to
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swallow anything.’ Two factors prohibited any direct cultural contacts between the British
Council and the Romanian Institute for Cultural Affairs: ‘the nature of our expulsion from
Romania in 1949’ and the fact that Romanians working for the British Council were still in
gaol after nearly ten years.149 While agreeing to indirect cultural exchanges which were
subject to changes, the British Council asked the British Minister in Bucharest to underline
for the Romanians the importance it ascribed to the release of its ex-employees. 150
When Ambassador Scott Fox raised the issue, he was assured that the Romanian
Ministry of the Interior would be reviewing the cases in which the British were interested.
Although the amnesty decreed on 23 August 1959 did not apply to the sort of offences with
which the British Council’s former employees were charged, he might consider releases on
other grounds such as individual good behaviour. ‘This may or may not lead to the release
of one or two of the Council’s former employees; but, however it goes, I shall keep up the
pressure here for a clean sweep of all these cases,’ Scott Fox reported.151 Clemency for the
detainees who had worked for the British and Americans was mentioned in a note of the
Ministry of the Interior as likely to encourage an ‘atmosphere propitious for the
improvement of relations with the Capitalist countries’. 152
One hundred and nineteen persons indicted for their connection with Britain
remained imprisoned in 1959, according to Romanian statistics.153 Some of them had been
released in 1955 just to be re-incarcerated shortly thereafter for spreading prohibited
149
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publications or carrying on clandestine trade.154 Such was the case of Rose Frances
Sussman. Arrested in February 1954 and condemned for espionage, she was released in
October 1955 -- probably during the amnesty preceding Romania’s admission into the
United Nations – and was re-arrested three years later for having sold items on the blackmarket..155 Gheorghe Balica and Anna Borbath were also condemned in 1958 for
clandestine trade.156 Commonly, the new indictment was related to selling personal goods
to survive. These individuals were caught up during a wave of persecution directed against
the former bourgeoisie. By prohibiting the sale of any items on the so-called ‘black
market’, the authorities denied any means of survival to the members of the bourgeoisie
not already imprisoned.157 One victim of the regime later recalled: ‘[o]ur class of people
was never forgiven and any releases were only temporary. They were inevitably hauled
back even though years after. During that twenty-two months in my first cell eight hundred
people went home and about half of these returned again.158
Until the end of 1954 and the signing of the Vienna State Treaty, terror continued
inside the prisons as outside them. Kirschen, the Associated Press correspondent recalled:
There was a distinct revolutionary period which differed from the blood bath of
the Russian revolution only in the methods of extermination . . . We were
encouraged to die of our own free will although we were not allowed to commit
suicide or die from hunger-striking . . . the order had been to kill us off as quickly
as possible but without marks of physical cruelty. Starving or working to death
was the general directive. The inhumanity in Roumanian prisons and working
colonies reached extremes in the winters of 1951 to 1952 and 1952 to 1953 . . .
The warders were told that we were bandits, the dregs of society and that we had
been trying to steal those good things from them which the new regime was now
providing. They were told to shout at us, to swear at us, to use the stick whenever
154
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possible and to give us days of solitary confinement for nothing whatever, in order
to enforce discipline and prevent any possibility of our gaining courage.159

In November 1959 the British Minister reported that the Romanians were about to
approach the British Council for a settlement of past differences.160 Though, there was no
clear answer coming from the Romanians on the issue of detainees. In March 1960 the
British Council resolved that the time had come for an approach on the detainee problem
considerably more explicit than previously.161 They were determined not go further in their
modest programme for Romania until an explicit request was made by the Legation on
their behalf.162 The issue of the former employees detained had become just ‘a ritual of
question and answer between the Legation and the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs’,
whereas it remained an issue of great importance for the British Council.
Either we must take this controversy seriously or we must realistically call it a day
and decide to proceed with the development of cultural relations as if this obstacle
did not exist. . . . If the Foreign Office think that we are making too much fuss and
wish us to get on with cultural relations they must tell us so, and we must consider
whether or not we are going to adopt their view. . . .163
The view of the Foreign Office remained that ‘immediate ends are more important
than the misfortunes of ex British Council staff. In a way they are right in the same way
that a general should not be turned from an important objective by the thought of the
hardship to be borne by the troops taking part.’ What made the British Council indignant
however was its conviction that the position of its former staff was treated ‘as a routine
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hoary representation that has from time to time to be made by the Legation, but without
any real conviction behind it’.164
In March 1960 the correspondent of the Associated Press Agency, Leonard
Kirschen, and a Romanian citizen of British nationality, Valentin Sarry were released.
Sarry had been arrested in 1949 for espionage and condemned to fifteen years
imprisonment.165 Kirschen was accused by the Romanian authorities of espionage. He had
been allegedly recruited by Colonel Harold Gibson and was accused of having provided
military and economic information to Robinson from the British legation and of having
recommended individuals to be recruited as agents. The accusations brought him a harsh
sentence: twenty five years imprisonment.166 The Foreign Office and the Associated Press
Agency intervened repeatedly for Kirschen’s release. The latter refused to appoint a new
correspondent in Bucharest or make public any news concerning Romania until he was
released.167 Kirschen’s uncle appealed to the Great Men of the days, Eisenhower and
Churchill. Learning about the Soviet leaders’ visit in Britain in 1956, he lobbied the
Foreign Office on the assumption that the Romanians would act on the Soviet leaders’
orders whose intervention the British would be able to obtain.168 After being released both
men left Romania for Britain immediately.169
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Although it represented a ‘stumbling-block’ to a limited resumption of cultural
relations with Romania, the new Director of the East Europe Department was not sure that
locally-employed Council staffs were arrested and still in prison. She was determined to
establish whether that ‘oral tradition’ was based ‘on fact or fantasy’. 170 Since many files
had been destroyed when the Information Section was removed from Bucharest nobody
could provide a full list of former employees.171

The British Minister in Bucharest announced on 2 December 1960 the release of
‘a considerable number of political detainees’ meanwhile indicating that the Romanian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs was on the point of submitting proposals for increasing cultural
exchanges. Reports of recent releases ‘might portend some good news for the detainees in
whom we had a special interest,’ the British Ambassador told to a Romanian official. The
latter replied however that he not heard anything about a special measure of clemency,
although, the Ministry of Interior was authorised to examine individual cases and to remit
sentences where appropriate. ‘He promised to enquire again how matters were progressing
and to inform me on the result of his enquiries in due course. I have since heard a rumour
which I shall endeavour to confirm that two sisters formerly employed by the United States
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legation and ourselves are among those who have now been released.’172 This was however
just a rumour.
Although the British Council postponed the offer of scholarships for which
provision had already been made in the budget, the British Ambassador continued to make
efforts to persuade the Romanians to agree to cooperate in arranging short visits and to
allow one or two people to take up the offer of scholarships. He recommended to London
that a similar provision be included in the future.173 For 1961, the British Council allocated
a budget of 1,300 pounds to Romania. Of this, 580 pounds was set aside for two
scholarships; the remaining amount remained unallocated. Expenditure depended to a large
extent ‘on whether the problem of the alleged imprisonment of Council local staff could be
solved in the near future’.174
In February 1961, the Foreign Office decided to step up cultural contacts with all
the Soviet Satellites as ‘one of the few ways in which we can make our influence felt’.
We no longer insist on linking a cultural exchange programme with the cessation
of jamming since it is clear that that would be an effective bar to progress. Nor do
we consider it in our best interests to postpone further developments with
Romania until all the former British employees are again at liberty. 175
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The fact that some people had been released was considered enough for ‘making a
start’. Accordingly, the British Ambassador submitted to the Romanian Foreign Ministry
an unofficial note of British Council undertakings for 1961/2 and invited the Romanians to
submit to him a note of their own proposals for cultural exchanges. The British Council
had at their disposal 20,000 pounds for all four Satellites in 1961. Hungary and
Czechoslovakia came first on the list, followed by Bulgaria, ‘where the authorities have
proved unexpectedly cooperative’. The Romanians came last.
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The programme of

cultural exchanges included two scholarships offered to post-graduate students, summer
courses and visits of specialists. The British Council was still reluctant to admit a regular
cultural agreement in treaty form or through an exchange of letters. 177
Until we are able to develop cultural exchanges on a wider scale, we are not
prepared to conclude such agreements with any of the Satellites. Nor can we
accept an exchange programme on a basis of reciprocity as the Romanians
contemplate. It is one thing to do this with a country of equal stature like the
Soviet Union, but quite unrealistic to expect us to deal on equal cultural terms
with a country like Romania whose cultural, scientific and intellectual
achievements evoke very limited interest in Britain and whose academic
institutions have little appeal for British students. 178
The issue of the former employees imprisoned was approached by the new
Minister in Bucharest, J. Dalton Murray, on the occasion of presenting his credentials to
Gheorghiu-Dej in October 1961. A release would contribute to the further improvement of
relations between the two countries, Murray pointed out.179 In a letter to the Minister of
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Foreign Affairs, Corneliu Manescu, Murray referred to the promises made in June 1961 to
his predecessor, Scott Fox, concerning the former employees of the legation, and
mentioned Constantin Mugur, Paul Bandu, Annie Samuelli, Gheorghe Gelu Balica, Ion
Vorvoreanu, Ludwig Parvu, Sergiu Godeanu180 and Maria Golescu as individuals in whom
the British retained particular interest.181
Annie Samuelly and her sister, Nora, who worked for the British Press Office and
the American Press Office respectively condemned to twenty years imprisonment for
espionage, were released during the year 1961.182 At the end of 1961 Constantin Mugur,
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one time chief of the Romanian staff of the British library, and sentenced to life
imprisonment was also released.184 Paul Bandu was released in 1962, as were Balica,
Parvu, Gheorghe Radulescu, Radu Florescu185 and Elvira Olteanu.186 Bandu, a student at
the time he served as a courier between the British Consul in Constanta and the legation in
Bucharest, was arrested in 1949 and charged with espionage.187 Maria Golescu, Director of
180

Godeanu was the former legal adviser of the British legation.
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military attaché, Ludwig Parvu, who simply disappeared in 1954. NCSSA, Documentary Fond, Dossier
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Five years after being released she wrote a book, published in the U.S. in 1967. The book’s
purpose was, according to the author (Introduction of the book) , not to describe the detention ‘regime’, but
rather to point out the means of survival discovered by the community of women imprisoned and subjected to
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the British Council library in Bucharest, and transferred to the Information Office in
1948,188 was released ‘with four some others’ on 19 June 1962 after thirteen years of
imprisonment. She was arrested in 1949 and condemned to twenty years forced labour for
high treason.189 A few months after being released she was allowed to leave Romania
together with her mother. By the time Golescu arrived in Britain she was sixty four and her
aged mother ninety three; all the files concerning her employment had been destroyed and
the Foreign Office bound by Treasury regulations could do nothing more than pay her a
small lump sum.190 Among the last political prisoners released in 1964 were the former
employees of the oil companies. They would not be prevented from leaving Romania,
Gheorghiu-Dej told Murray.191
By 1963, the newly appointed British Ambassador to Bucharest, J.D. Murray,
judged that the issue of the former employees had been essentially resolved.192 He advised
London not to encourage anti-Romanian publicity at a time when ‘we have, for good
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reasons, adopted a forward policy towards all the satellites, including Romania’.193
Indicating the efforts of the Romanian regime to obtain independence from Moscow,
Murray suggested patience ‘in the hope that, as they achieve more self-confidence, they
will begin to behave less brutally towards opponents among their own people. They are in
an extremely sensitive mood at the moment, looking for signs of encouragement from the
West and perhaps from us in particular, and are unduly upset by adverse publicity.’194 The
1961 policy paper envisaged a dual approach to the Satellites. ‘While we would try to
increase contacts of all kinds, this would not preclude us from continuing to expose those
factors of Satellite policy which were directed against our interests or which we found
particularly objectionable.’ The point should be made clear in the new Satellite policy
paper, Murray maintained, suggesting that IRD should take ‘a new look’ at its general
terms of operation.195 The Ambassador considered that ‘[a] number of things’ which
happened in Eastern Europe were ‘good in themselves and good from the point of view of
Britain’s interests’.196
During the visit of a Romanian delegation to London in 1963, the British avoided
bringing up sensitive issues. The friendly attitude of the British MPs they met enchanted
the Romanians. At a reception given by the Romanian Ambassador in London almost
every speaker mentioned the further development of relations between Britain and
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Romania, avoiding any controversial ideological issues.197 Privately the MP Gilbert
Longden mentioned the issue of political prisoners. Their release ‘would not present any
danger to the regime,’ he assessed since it was firmly established signs of clemency would
contribute to the improvement of relations between the two countries. Handing the
Romanians a list of people who had requested visas to leave Romania for Britain, Sir
Herbert Butcher underlined that the request was grounded not on their disapproval of the
regime but family reunification.’ 198
Cultural relations had improved steadily since 1962 when the Cultural Exchange
Programme was signed. The work of the British Council was supplemented by the East
Europe Committee with the official aim of developing cultural relations with Eastern
Europe outside the official programmes. The committee was created in early 1963 under
the chairmanship of Christopher Mayhew.199
Application of the exchange agreement was dependent upon the regime’s
tolerance of the activities of the British Council, which hoped to function with the same
degree of freedom achieved in Yugoslavia and Poland.200 Apparently the Romanian
authorities accepted that the Cultural Attaché of the Embassy, David Williams, was a
Council Officer.201 Williams arrived in Bucharest on 12 September 1964 to take up his
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Taking the list, a member of the delegation promised that he would hand it over to the
appropriate authorities which would, certainly, examine each case with utmost care. RNA, CC of RCP,
Department of Foreign Relations, Dossier 7/1963, ff. 24-25.
199
The Committee set up a group dealing specifically with Romania (there were groups for each of
the four East European Countries, including Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Bulgaria). The intention was to
produce an all-party organization as an alternative to fellow-travelling ‘friendship leagues.’ Attached to the
British Council, the committee had as Chairman the MP Gilbert Longden. TNA, PRO, FO 371/182503, N
1054/32, Visit of the Minister of State to Romania, 2-7 October 1965. Brief no. R 4.
200
The cultural convention with Yugoslavia created a precedent which made it difficult for the
British to resist pressure to do the same with other communist governments.
A cultural convention with Romania to which the two year programme was to be subordinated
provided was conditioned by the settlement of the British Council in Bucharest. TNA, PRO, BW 53/17, R.L.
Speaight, Cultural Relations Department, FO, to R. Brash, Bucharest, 15 March 1965.
201
‘We should like to take matters one step further and have him officially described in the
diplomatic list and elsewhere as ‘Cultural Attaché and British Council Representative’. We should naturally
expect such recognition would eventually lead to the setting up of separate Council premises with library,
198

152

appointment. His connections with the British Council were not concealed since the
Romanian authorities were aware that ‘the Council was the instrument for carrying out
most of the executive work under the Anglo-Romanians Cultural Agreement.’ 202 That the
Cultural Attaché was in fact a British Council Officer was ‘entirely familiar to and
accepted by the Romanian authorities’ who were looking forward to more effective
cultural cooperation.
“You are the British Council Representative, aren’t you?,” the Head of the
Cultural Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs asked Williams. The
British Ambassador explained that while Williams was a British Council
employee seconded to work on cultural matters on the Embassy staff, he should
not be thought of as the British Council Representative in Bucharest.’203

The Foreign Office seemed to agree to go ‘one further than in Budapest and
Prague and call him a representative with a capital ‘R’- if the Romanians really do not
object. It would establish a valuable precedent’.204 There was hope that in the course of
time it might be possible to negotiate for the establishment of a British Office Council in
Bucharest ‘separate from and independent of the Embassy’.205
Although cultural exchanges developed providing for exchanges of postgraduates,
research workers and specialists of various sorts, 206 the meagre imports of British books
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and periodicals was a disappointment.207 More vexing were the bureaucratic obstacles that
impeded the work of the Cultural Attaché. All his contact with Romanians had to be
orchestrated through the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.208 ‘In this respect Romania
is behind all the rest of Eastern Europe with the possible exception of Bulgaria. Not only in
Budapest and Prague, but also in Moscow members of the Embassy can and do invite
locals direct to parties. No doubt, the locals have to get permission before accepting, but
this is their own affair.’

209

Despite the administrative inefficiency impeding on cultural

contacts210 the exchange programme was ‘reasonably active’211 and a British lecturer was
accepted at the Bucharest University.212
After a decade of isolation the Romanian government approached the West to
resume cultural ties. That the French and the Americans proved to be more amenable to
signing formal cultural agreements than the British reluctance stemmed from two issues:
unwillingness to proceed on an issue of consequence to Romania (culture) before some
headway had been made in the commercial and financial negotiations important to Britain;
and a disinclination to create new cultural links while employees associated with previous
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initiatives remained imprisoned. A compromise emerged in the early 1960s when the
Foreign Office, brushing aside the British Council whose stance was that the imprisonment
of their former employees prohibited any direct cultural liaison with Romania, decided on
the resumption of limited cultural relations with Romania. The Romanians responded by
releasing, in stages, those individuals in which the British were primarily interested.
Although the process was slow, by the time most of detainees were released, cultural
relations were established on solid ground.
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Looking at Romania through the wrong end of the telescope

‘The time for Romania being a hinterland [of
the Soviet Union] has gone. Romania is now an
independent and sovereign country which takes
decisions according to its own interests.’ (Gheorghiu-Dej,
1

1963)

Nothing in the political evolution of Romania in the 1950s could have surprised
the British representatives in Bucharest who wrote their reports without much trouble since
the Romanian leaders consented to all Soviet policies, following a predictable line.2 In
London, Romania was perceived as the most subservient of all satellites. No evidence was
found to contradict this assessment.3 At the beginning of the 1960s the situation changed
since Romanian leaders were constantly challenging the Soviets. Patrick Gordon Walker,
the Labour Shadow Foreign Minister, remarked in 1964 that the Sino-Soviet conflict
enabled other Communist countries to assert their own independence.4
Romania’s idiosyncratic stance during the long Sino-Soviet dispute was one way
in which a new desire for independence was asserted. From 1960 Romanians had refused
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to be drawn into public ostracism of the Chinese.5 Three years later, the Sino-Soviet issue
had not been resolved and both parties remained intransigent.

In July 1960 the Soviets recalled all their experts from China. The withdrawal of
the Soviet councillors and the cancellation of economic agreements which resulted in about
200 enterprises being abandoned was perceived to be a punishment, an economic sanction.
‘Is this consistent with international socialism?’ the Chinese asked the Romanian
delegation a few years later. When the Romanians repeated the Soviets’ version that the
Chinese councillors were put in a delicate situation, the Chinese ‘jumped up and shouted at
us as if we were Soviets, saying “That is not true... Not even a bourgeois state would do
what the Soviet Union did to us!”’ 6
At the beginning of their dispute with the Soviets, the Chinese did not intend to
make the controversy public. Khrushchev, however, stated that exposing disagreements
was the Leninist way to clarify any divergence. The Chinese quickly went public
thereafter.7 The Soviets appear to have believed themselves to be on the defensive and
assessed that it was the Chinese who refused all compromise. On only two issues did the
Soviet leadership believe themselves to have no room for manoeuvre: they would never
give the Chinese the atomic bomb, on the grounds that this would start a world war; and
they would never abandon the principles of Marxist-Leninism in the face of Maoist
revisionism. On these issues, likewise, the Chinese were unwilling to compromise, and
quickly added to the list of disputed items. ‘If others would agree, that’s ok; if not, so be it,
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the sky won’t fall! Women will continue to give birth to children, birds will fly and fish
will continue to swim.’8 On 14 June 1963 the Chinese addressed an open letter to the
Soviets, entitled ‘Proposals concerning the general line of the international communist
movement,’ It contained twenty five items; the twenty first issue criticized Soviet Bloc
economic integration. The Chinese intention, very probably, was to fish for support within
COMECON.9
From the perspective of Bucharest, Moscow’s position seemed to be a repetition
of previous acts of bullying. The Sino-Soviet conflict made Gheorghiu-Dej recall the
earlier split with Yugoslavia, and the ferocious anti-Tito propaganda emanating from
Moscow at that time. He recalled, as well, the improvement of Romania’s relations with
the Yugoslavs occasioned by the split. ‘I don’t even remember what we said to the
Yugoslavs and now we kiss them.’10 He admitted that Romania’s leadership had also
‘thrown rocks in the Yugoslavians’ heads,’ as required by Moscow, and believed that the
time of slavish compliance with Soviet demands was over.11 Labels such as ‘Trotskyism,’
‘renegade,’ ‘deviationist’ should not be applied to any Communist Party founded on
Marxism-Leninism principles. A Communist Party should not be excommunicated ‘just
like that’. ‘Even the Pope does not work this way.’12 There had been a time when Soviet
requirements were received with great respect’ by the Chinese, the Romanians recalled.
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How had this ‘love’ turned into hatred?13 Gradually the Soviet and the Chinese positions
had become irreconcilable.
It is hardly surprising that the Romanian leadership tended to sympathize with the
plight of the Peoples’ Republic of China. ‘Our heart shrunk from pain for the leaders of the
Soviet Communist Party do not behave responsibly’, Gheorghiu-Dej told the Chinese
Ambassador recalling Khrushchev’s assessments that Mao-Tze-dun’s theories counted as
much as a broken shoe. Statements like that were made only because a brother party had
sought to make an independent contribution to socialist theory? ‘Who gave them [the
Soviets] the monopoly on enriching the Marxism-Leninism?’ Gheorghiu-Dej wondered.14
The Romanians publicly announced their willingness to mediate the Sino-Soviet
dispute in 1963. However, understanding Maoist rhetoric proved to be no easy task. How
should statements like ‘Let all the flowers bloom, all schools compete’ be interpreted? 15 It
was equally critical to the Romanian leadership that it manoeuvre in such a manner as to
gain increased independence, rather than a new vassalage. ‘We will not allow in the future
any backstage talks . . . we will not accept chewed things, we will chew them ourselves.’16
The West had to know this. The rumour that Romania now followed the Chinese line was
just ‘a contrivance of the bourgeois journalists.’ Romania’s leadership acted solely ‘for the
unity of the socialist camp’ as stated in the Declarations of the Conferences of Communist
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Parties held in Moscow in 1957 and 1960.

17

To what extent the Romanian delegation’s

trip to Peking had to do with the unity of the international workers’ movement was another
issue.
‘We don’t tell either one or the other to give up their stance,’ Gheorghiu-Dej
maintained, expanding on the idea of reconcilement. We just say “Let’s create an
atmosphere for a calm and serious discussion of the divergent issues, so that controversy
would cease.”18 A party delegation was instructed ‘not to approach the divergent problems,
but to tell the Chinese leaders that one can discuss within an acceptable framework,
without invectives, without qualifications that one does not know later how to remove,’
went to Peking in March 1964.19 ‘This was the mission of our delegation: the end of public
polemic’, Gheorghiu-Dej asserted.20 Party documentation, however, is contradicted by
later accounts. Asked about his mediation in the Sino-Soviet conflict thirty years after the
visit, Ion Gheorghe Maurer, by then Prime Minister, replied, ‘I did not mediate any
conflict. Who said that?’ The purpose of his visit was to make the Chinese aware of the
Romanian policy of getting out of the Soviet hegemony. And even more than that, ‘to
obtain Chinese support.’ 21
The strategy of the Romanian leadership in getting closer to the Chinese was
independence. The Chinese, without knowing that, supposed that the Romanians came to
convince them about the rightful stance of the Soviets.22 The Romanians were also hesitant
since Mao received them with aloofness. At the beginning of the visit, the Romanians
17
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maintained that they ‘did not want to be superficial and did not come to look for negative
issues, shortcomings or mistakes, but to see new and interesting things.’ The Chinese
reacted to such equivocal assurances with curiosity. ‘What do you want from us, Comrade
Romanians? On what side are you?’ The Romanians had their answer prepared: ‘On the
side of Marxism.’ 23‘It was easy to make them think that we were closer to their approach
of Marxism than to the Soviet one,’ the former Romanian Premier, Maurer, assessed.
According to Maurer there was no great ideological difference between the Chinese and
the Russians, but a struggle for hegemony.24 His lengthy talks with Zhou Enlai, the
Chinese prime-minister, allowed him to explain Romanian policy. Yet, the communiqué
issued by the Chinese at the end of the talks was quite cold, ‘no more than two lines,’ in
which it was mentioned that discussions took place in a friendly atmosphere.25
Certainly, the Chinese did not trust the Romanians from the very beginning,
although they seemed to have understood Romania’s isolations within the Communist
camp. But the Chinese too needed allies. In the aftermath of the Romanian visit to China,
the American ambassador in Moscow assessed that Romania had become the most
important country between Moscow and Peking: the Romanians had accumulated the
‘richest experience and knowledge’ in approaching China.26 After an unsuccessful attempt
to approach the Chinese in Warsaw, the Americans were in search of intermediaries to
elaborate an updated policy concerning China.27 Although Romanians were not China’s
envoys, the Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Corneliu Manescu, suggested that the
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Americans should appreciate China at fair value and grant it the status it deserved of a
great power.28
While involving themselves in the Sino-Soviet conflict, the Romanians were
careful to maintain neutrality. Relations of the father-son type should not exist between
parties, Gheorghiu-Dej contended, but mutual respect, rigorous equality and noninterference in domestic affairs.’ ‘Each party should establish its own line according to the
country’s interest.’29 While proclaiming the same principles as the Chinese, the Romanians
were resolute in rejecting both the Soviet or Chinese hegemony. Stalin’s death and
Khrushchev’s exposure of Stalin’s excesses had destroyed the possibility that Moscow’s
line would henceforward be followed without hesitation.
Good Communists as they were, the Romanians continued to pursue friendly
relations with the Soviet Union30 and despite opposing the establishment of supranational
bodies, Romania would continue to cooperate within CMEA.31 Nevertheless, pursuit of
good relations did not mean that differences were not aired. The Romanians’ divergences
from the Soviets had as source the disagreement aired within CMEA. In 1961, a proposal,
called the ‘Valev’s proposal’ for a lower Danubian economic complex outraged the
Romanians. In his speech of 17 January 1961 to the plenary session of the Central
Committee of the Soviet Communist Party, Khrushchev spoke about irrigation, mentioning
the work recently completed for the Volga and Nipru deltas. He also mentioned the
Danube Delta where the work had to be done in agreement with the Romanians for the
advantage of both the Russians and the Romanians.32 In 1948 Stalin had broached the issue
28
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with a Romanian delegation then in Moscow. He was particularly interested in an old
British project for a canal linking the Danube to the Black Sea. Declaring that the Soviet
Union would provide Romanians with the equipment for digging the canal, Stalin rejected
any argument that Gheorghiu-Dej attempted to bring up to oppose the project. Romanian
media presented the project without mentioning whose idea it was.33 The Canal was also
an area of contention. Not only did it absorbed a great part of Romania’s revenues, it was
also a place where many political detainees lost their lives while working in inhumane
conditions.
Proposals for greater economic integration and for the institutional articulation of
CMEA were also troubling Romania’s leaders. Moreover, they were upset for being
criticized for their determination to industrialize the country. Instead receiving
encouragement, they had to face unfair comments such as that they would create trucks for
museums. ‘What then are we allowed to produce?’ Gheorghiu-Dej asked rhetorically.34
The answer was obvious: everything except industrial products since the Soviets had
designated for Romania the role of supplier of raw materials and agricultural products for
the industrialized CMEA economies. 35
The idea of common enterprises and branch unions was presented as following
from the perception that the socialist camp lagged behind the Common Market which had
obtained impressive achievements. A 1962 Polish proposal to establish a single economic
market in the Eastern Bloc was welcomed by the Soviet leadership and every other
member of the Eastern Bloc except Romania. The Soviet Union was once again at
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loggerheads with Romania.36 ‘Do the Romanians still agree with the principle of
international division of labour adopted by the First Secretaries of the CMEA member
countries in June 1962’, Andropov wondered? “We do not just agree, but made active
contribution to their improvement, Gheorghiu-Dej replied.” He reminded Andropov that
although the Romanians opposed the creation of a Common Market, they were fully
supportive of cooperation and joint endeavours when these were consistent with the
interests of the parties involved.37 Such cooperation, however, could never be universal
and mandatory.38 Both ideas failed due to Romanian obstruction.
Seeking to override obstruction, Khrushchev argued from the rostrum of the
plenary of Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party for the creation of an overall
planning body for the CMEA, similar to the institutions being established in the Common
Market.39 Although rejected by the CMEA in June, Khrushchev revisited the proposal in
the autumn of 1962, when he thought events had ‘ripened’ such that CMEA members
might now be ready for a higher level of economic and political co-operation.40 The
Romanians were outraged. While they admitted that ‘the forces of production increase
very fast in a socialist society,’ they confessed that they found it hard to believe that in just
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few months – from June to September -- systemic growth had necessitated a new, multinational co-ordination plan.41
In 1963, the Romanians further vetoed the creation of a Council of Ministers, a
centralised structure within the CMEA, invoking the infringement of the principle of
sovereignty. Under the proposed system common policies for all member nations were to
be adopted following a two-thirds majority in the Council of Ministers, rather than by
unanimous decision as provided by the existing arrangement. In addition to the council, a
directorate was to have been created with the task of coordinating and regulating
investments, prices and economic processes. ‘One can put the question, what would the
Romanian party, the government and comrade Maurer do in this case?’ Gheorghiu-Dej
asked. He added maliciously that the Romanian Premier would have nothing else to do
than hunting – Maurer’s hobby was hunting - if the proposal were accepted.42
Once again the Romanians were alone in their obstruction. Elsewhere, “[a]n
artillery fire of various calibres started’ as all the Eastern leaders rushed to support
Khrushchev and ‘an avalanche of articles were written by economists, lawyers and
journalists’ supportive of greater integration and centralized planning. ‘Please, believe us,
this was not a conspiracy,’ claimed Andropov. The support had not been orchestrated. The
Romanian leadership remained unconvinced. ‘Why else had the Eastern leaders tried to
include in the CMEA statute that once a new process had been adopted, all issues would
become mandatory for all member states?’ If the Soviets would continue to insist on the
idea of economic coordination, ‘there would be a brawl,’ Gheorghiu-Dej warned. This
statement made Andropov declare that a meeting between the two leaders Gheorghiu-Dej
and Khrushchev should not be delayed. With that parting shot, Andropov departed from
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Bucharest directly to Pitunda, where Khrushchev was on vacation, to consult with him
concerning the impasse.43
Rumours about Khrushchev’s secret hunting trip to Romania in October 1963
reached British diplomats.44 It was probably Khrushchev who ‘dictated’ that his visit was
to be unofficial and secret. The Soviet leader might have hoped to persuade the Romanians
‘either to adopt a more forthright attitude in support of the Soviet line in the Sino-Soviet
conflict or to take a less intransigent line in CMEA or perhaps both. If those were his
motives, he did not succeed,’ Khrushchev would not have wished the world to know that
‘Big Brother had been paying court to Romania.’ He seemingly insisted and obtained
Gheorghiu-Dej’s agreement for keeping the visit secret. The secrecy lasted as long as
Khrushchev.
During a long talk in Bucharest with Gordon Walker, Maurer confirmed that there
had indeed been a meeting between Gheorghiu-Dej and Khrushchev. The Romanians
refused to yield to the renewed Russian pressure for a supra-national planning organisation
in which the decisions were to be taken by majority and not by unanimity. Khrushchev
accepted the Romanian position but asked them to maintain silence over the subject. The
Russian economic publications and the debates in the other CMEA countries favoured
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however the surrender of national sovereignty for economic planning, determining the
Romanians to state publicly their position.45
Later, Gheorghiu-Dej discussed Romania’s own problems with Moscow’s
domineering ways with more sympathetic Chinese leaders. ‘We had also problems,’
Gheorghiu-Dej had told the Chinese ambassador in Bucharest, ‘but we stood firmly against
any forms which infringe sovereignty, independence, equality and draw upon interference
in domestic affairs.46 You already know about the economic cooperation; we stood against
this decision and they had to withdraw it. Although I cannot say that we persuaded them.
We were alone: all the others acted in coordination and began to exert big pressures. We
considered every our step and acted only when the matter was clearly established and we
had identified our adversaries’ weak points. The Soviets, in response, repeatedly accused
the Romanian leadership of ‘narrowness and nationalism’.47

The following year, the Soviets announced that a delegation led by N. Podgorny,
Secretary of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party, would visit Romania.
They were expected to arrive in July 1964. Anticipating that Podgorny would renew the
attack, the Romanian leadership decided in advance not to compromise since the ‘the
smallest compromise could entail further concessions.’ Podgorny would be told flat out
that Romanians did not share the Soviet view on the value of greater integration.48 The
Podgorny visit took place soon after Maurer's return from the Soviet Union, and once again
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whatever the intention might have been, the only agreement that could be reached was that
the divergence should not be made public.49 Even on this issue, ‘success’ was modest.
The purpose of Podgorny’s visit was to dissuade the Romanians from circulating a
memorandum detailing their differences with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. It
was not clear whether the proposed statement was to deal primarily with CMEA affairs or
with the Sino-Soviet dispute. According to the Americans the Poles had seen a draft and
the Russians, ‘getting wind of what was brewing, despatched Podgorny to nip it in the
bud.’50 By the time of his intervention, the Romanians had already circulated their
statement inside the Communist Party with copies on the way to other fraternal, national
parties.51
While in May 1963 the outcome of Romania’s defiant stand against the Soviet
economic dictation through the CMEA was uncertain, by July 1964 it was evident that
Romania had won the battle.

52

In the longer term the loosening of the economic bond

between Romania and the Soviet Union ‘should be of political as well as economic
importance for the further diversification of Eastern European relations,’ the Foreign
Office asserted. ‘It confirms our view of the way which Eastern Europe is going and will
continue to go.’ 53
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While the Chinese had been kept informed concerning the evolution of the
disagreement,54 a diplomatic offensive towards the West had also started. The Romanians
were persuasive. A West German trade mission was sent to Bucharest in October 1963.
The same year, the British Legation in Bucharest was upgraded to the level of embassy. 55
The issue of raising the level of diplomatic missions and lifting travel restrictions for
diplomats was also broached by the Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs during visits to
the US and France. Although at first the French Foreign Minister, Couve de Murville,
replied hesitantly, when Manescu clearly asserted Romania’s determination to develop its
relations with all countries, France included, de Murville intervened, ‘mainly with France,
this is our desire.’56 Agreeing to the development of commercial relations, the French
insisted as well on cultural exchanges. 57 Of particular interest was French language taught
in schools and a wider distribution for French books in Romania. Better relations of this
nature were not just desirable, but possible, the French Foreign Minister pointed out,
referring to the affinities of languages and the long cultural connection between the two
countries. Adamant for the dissemination of French literature in Romania -- ‘books not
translated in Romanian’ -- the French were careful to stress that ‘the content of these books
would not embarrass the Romanian government.’ Both parties agreed, ultimately, to work
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to foster improved cultural relations and to encourage cultural exchanges; the Comédie
Française was booked to tour Romania in 1964.58
Britain was also in the game of stepping up contact with the Romanians, reversing
its previously tentative approach. Receiving James Dalton Murray in his new capacity as
Ambassador, on February 18, 1964, the Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs pointed out
the continued development of economic and cultural relations between the two countries.59
In 1964 the British Council organized an Exhibition of Contemporary British Painting in
Bucharest and Iasi and the Royal Shakespeare Company played “King Lear” and the
“Comedy of Errors” before a Romanian audience in Bucharest.60
By 1964, English had already replaced French as the most important foreign
language at the principal universities, with an increase in the number of first-year students
in the English Faculty at the University of Bucharest to 257. Another forty-three students
were studying it as a subsidiary subject. Previously less than twenty-five students were
studying English.
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Asked what foreign language they wanted to study, twenty-seven

students at a secondary school in Bucharest chose English and three French. ‘A single boy,
regarded as quite foolish, chose Russian.’62
Russian ceased to be a compulsory language in Romanian secondary schools from
the educational year 1963-4. A redirection of educational policy away from Russification
was evident. Russian language instruction had been compulsory since the war. Now, the
study of Russian became optional in elementary and secondary schools and pupils were
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offered opportunity to choose the foreign language they wanted to study.63 Just as fifteen
years before it had been difficult to find teachers able to teach Russian, so now teacher
shortages of new languages were apparent.64 Teachers of English were in particularly short
supply. While four thousand teachers had been trained to teach Russian, there were only
eighty capable of providing English instruction. French was in a better position. The
Ministry of Education had at its disposal eight hundred teachers able to teach French, so at
least initially French became the Western language of default for many students.65 English
caught up quickly. In an attempt to satiate public demand for Western language instruction,
English lessons were extensively broadcast on the radio while programs such as ‘Learn
Russian singing’ or songs like ‘I love you, Moscow’ vanished from Romanian air waves.66
The ‘twist’ and the latest pop records from France, the United States and Britain could be
heard over the radio and at the Bucharest night clubs.67
The new cultural redirection taken by the Romanians was evident. One by one the
institutions stressing the connection with Russia were shutdown, replaced, or merged into
other institutions with broader mandates. The ‘Russian Bookstore’ located in Bucharest
vanished overnight and was replaced by the ‘Universal Bookstore.’ The Romanian edition
of the Soviet review of international affairs, Timpuri Noi [New Times] ceased its
appearance and a Romanian weekly political magazine, Lumea [The World] appeared
instead.68 The Museum of Romanian-Soviet Brotherhood and the Institute for Literature,
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‘Maxim Gorki’ simply vanished.’69 The Institute for Russian Studies in Bucharest was
absorbed by the new Institute for Foreign Languages. There were also rumours that the
Soviet-Romanian Friendship Society (ARLUS) ‘is to be disbanded’ or ‘allowed to fade
quietly away’.70 Cautious to make sure that the decision concerning ARLUS proposed by
Gheorghiu-Dej would not be ‘misinterpreted,’ the party claimed that the ‘reorganization’
of ARLUS was determined by the need to reduce expenses. All these institutions
established in the late 1940s had pursued a veritable campaign of Russification.71
What did the Soviet leadership think of the changes occurring in Romania?
Murray was frustrated that his French and American counterparts in Bucharest got ‘a
running stream of comments from Moscow which assists them considerably in forming
their views about Romanian policies and actions’. In contrast, he received ‘virtually
nothing’ from ‘the generously staffed Moscow Embassy’ on ‘the sort of development
about which we might reasonably expect some comments’.72 Although the developments
in Romania ‘may not make much difference to the way the people in the Kremlin behave
or what they think,’ Murray was convinced that the adjustment of Romanian policy would
eventually lead to an alteration of its relationship with the Soviet Union. Even though
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Romania was a minor concern for British foreign policy, and this seemed unlikely to
change much, the British Embassy in Moscow should not look at Romania from ‘the
wrong end of their telescope.’ Murray was convinced that Romania would make
remarkable progress towards greater independence.73
We shall see further evidence of Romanian independent mindedness this year and
it will be interesting to hear how the Russians react or if they do not react to hear
what the Embassy think about their failure to do so. 74

In his report to the Foreign office, the British Ambassador in Moscow, T.
Brimelow, found not a word in the Russian press about de-Russification process that took
place in Romania. This did not mean that the Soviets had not noticed, or approved the
change in direction. The Soviets, in fact, were very proud both of the Russian tradition and
the Soviet contribution.75 They were, in fact, highly offended, as they made clear during a
meeting with a Romanian delegation to Moscow in 1964.
In March 1964, a delegation led by the Prime Minister Maurer passed through the
Soviet Union on the way back from a visit to Peking. London, becoming aware of the
gravity of the Sino-Soviet split, wondered if the Soviets had been consulted about the
delegation’s visit to China. ‘They had been informed’, the Romanians indicated, but had
not been asked for permission.76. On their way back from Peking, the Romanians went to
Gagra to meet Khrushchev, Mikoyan and Andropov. Izvestiya published a brief
announcement: the two parties exchanged opinions on questions of mutual interest. ‘In the
course of discussions particular attention was given to questions connected with the

73

TNA, PRO, FO 371/177622, N R 103138/3, J.D. Murray, Bucharest, to Howard Smith, 15
January 1964.
74
Murray urged the new head of the Northern Department, Howard Smith, to visit Bucharest,
assuring that the visit ‘would be both interesting and worthwhile.’ TNA, PRO, FO 371/177622, N R
103138/3, J.D. Murray, Bucharest, to Howard Smith, 15 January 1964.
75
TNA, PRO, FO 371/177622. NR 103138/3 (A), Thomas Brimelow, British Embassy in Moscow
to H.F.T Smith, Foreign Office, 10 February 1964.
76
TNA, PRO, FO 371/177622, NR 103138/6 – H. Trevelyan, British Embassy, Moscow, to H.F.T.
Smith, Foreign Office, 5 March 1964.

173

struggle for the strengthening of the unity and solidarity of the Socialist countries.’77 It was
in fact a quarrel during which Andropov, responsible for relations with other socialist
countries, reproached the Romanians their ‘adversarial stance’ as proved by the closure of
the bookstore ‘The Russian Book’ and of the Institute ‘Maxim Gorki.’78

In opposing the economic integration within the CMEA, the hitherto unpopular
and feared Romania’s leaders looked for support to nationalist and anti-Russian feeling.
The Romanian Communist Party publicized a resolution pointing out the right to develop a
national policy in light of Romania’s interests. The document formally entitled ‘The
Declaration on the Stance of the Romanian Workers Party Concerning Questions related to
the Communist and Workers movement’ (known as Romania’s ‘Declaration of
Independence’) marked Romania’s foreign policy The ‘declaration’ was read in the
plenary of the Central Committee held between 15 and 22 April 1964.79 It provided that the
principles of independence of national sovereignty, equality, mutual advantage, noninterference in domestic affair and respect for territorial integrity should provide the basis
for relations between Communist and Workers Parties. It stated that ‘as long as there are
national and state distinctions among peoples and countries – and such distinctions will
continue for a very long time even after the establishment of the proletarian dictatorship on
a world scale – the unity of the communist movement does not require the elimination of
diversities or the abolition of national distinctions.’ It asserted Romania’s ideological
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sovereignty, claiming that ‘nobody can decide what is and what is not correct for other
parties.’80 ‘We had long talks about it,’ Maurer, by then Prime Minister, recalled.

All communist parties are equal, we stated, no matter how big or small is the
country. . . Such things, after being heard so many times, seem without
importance, but during Dej times, when we made them public they meant
something! It took a great courage to tell the Soviets that you consider yourself
their equal!’ 81
After being adopted by the Central Committee, the statement was broadcast to the
population.82 Although they needed the support of the people, economic issues were too
pressing to allow the leadership to be content with simple popularity. At party meetings,
participants were told the truth about the unjust relations between Romania and the Soviet
Union and the destructive role played by Sovroms for the Romanian economy.
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The long dissimulation game played during the period of unfair trade with the
Soviet Union was now recalled. No less than sixteen Sovroms were set up in the aftermath
of the Second World War in oil industry, coal, tractor-building, banking, chemistry,
transportation, navy, film production and other industrial enterprises.84 Practically
‘everything except the Patriarchate [the highest Orthodox institution] was Sovrom!’
Gheorghiu-Dej admitted that when he took power he did not care much about Romanian
enterprises, ‘I told myself: The Devil take them! Why should I trouble my head about
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them?’ Iatrov, one of the Soviet representatives in Romania, ‘looked on the country as if he
was its governor. If he saw a company he liked, he used to say, “You cannot manage it, but
we can. This must become Sovrom!” He demanded in fact that all profitable enterprises
become Sovroms.
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Although initially disinterested in the management of the economy,

Gheorghiu-Dej had in fact raised the issue of Sovroms during a meeting with Stalin. He
claimed to have been outspoken about the question. What Stalin replied him remains
however a mystery. Gheorghiu-Dej confessed though that he was asked questions as he
was ‘under investigation’, as the Soviet representatives Iatrov and Merkurov tried to
intimidate him. 86

Gheorghiu-Dej ‘could not adopt a policy [of independence] from the beginning,’
Alexandru Barladeanu, Romania’s representative to CMEA, later asserted. He ‘understood
very well the Soviet reality, and did not want to copy it. He had been waiting for a
propitious time to start on this path.’87 Maurer concurred with this assessment. GheorghiuDej could do nothing at the beginning but carry out Soviet dictates. 88 Most of the changes
introduced in political and economic life were copies of the Stalinist models, for example
the collectivization of agriculture. The fact that serious accusations against Gheorghiu-Dej
were aired in June 1947 seems to confirm Maurer’s assessment. Gheorghiu-Dej’s
discontent with the establishment of Sovroms and the Red Army’s presence brought
against him the accusation of anti-Sovietism.89
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Previously acquiesced in as a ‘powerful factor’ in the development of Romanian
economy,

90

the Sovroms were now expounded as means of damaging it. Although

officially the Sovroms were abolished in 1954, certain of them continued to drain
Romania’s resources even afterwards. In June 1962, during his visit to Romania,
Khrushchev admitted that creation of Sovroms was ‘a stupid thing that Mikoyan had fed
Stalin’.91 Nonetheless, Khrushchev did not agree with the closure of Sovrom Quartz which
extracted and delivered uranium to the Soviet Union.92
The nationalist campaign which followed the Declaration of Independence
staggered the public by its unprecedented intensity.93 A nationwide series of meetings was
held to expound the new independent policy laid down in the Declaration of April 22.94
The Party leadership was praised for using ‘scientific arguments’ in expressing their
disagreements with the Soviets. That was why, the leadership concluded, the ‘party’s
prestige has grown and will grow.’95 The meetings were not confined to party members but
aimed at the whole population. Sessions were held throughout the country, in institutions
and enterprises, schools and universities, and people were encouraged to express their
enthusiasm.96 Speeches took a more strongly anti-Soviet tone than the declaration itself.97
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For the first time Khrushchev was roundly attacked for attempting to interfere in
Romanian affairs and for having shown scant respect for Romanian interests, causing a stir
among the population.98 An informant of the British Minister in Bucharest described the
astonished audience as being like a man sitting in the dentist’s chair, rigidly with his mouth
open.99 The general theme of the meetings appeared to have been opposition to Soviet
economic exploitation of the country, as exemplified by the facts that Romania paid three
times as much as it should have in reparations; it sent food to the Soviet Union although
short itself; and its uranium deposits were exploited solely for Soviet benefit.100 The
dispute within CMEA was also detailed.
Critical party cadres received fuller information still. In addition to the April
Declaration, the transcripts of the talks between the Romanian delegation and the Chinese,
Koreans and Soviets delegations concerning the Sino-Soviet polemic, along with a number
of letters exchanged between the Central Committee of CPSU and the Romanian Party and
certain issues raised in CMEA were tabled. For fifteen hours, on the 19 and 20 of May
1964, all of these things were read. The audience was advised not to take notes but listen to
the materials presented.101 We might imagine that the material presented constituted
several bombshells.
Gheorghiu-Dej was emerging as the most serious challenge to Moscow’s
domination of Eastern Europe since Marshal Tito’s revolt. Hardly surprisingly there were
reports that Khrushchev had tried to oust the Romanian leader. When the attempt failed,
what had become a nasty squabble quickly went public. According to the Daily Mail,
97
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Khrushchev is said to be increasingly disturbed by Romania’s show of
independence, and to have been angered particularly by Gheorghiu-Dej decision
to send a top-level delegation to Washington to seek closer ties with the United
States. Experts on Communist affairs here are convinced that Romania is now
well on the road to becoming as independent as Marshal Tito’s Yugoslavia....
Charges of a Soviet conspiracy to overthrow the party leader are being made at
meetings organised by the Communist party throughout Romania... Party
spokesmen asserted the Russians had tried to enlist another prominent Communist
leader, the Defence Minister, Emil Bodnaras, to lead a revolt against GheorghiuDej. Instead, Bodnaras had appraised Gheorghiu-Dej of the Kremlin plot.102
While Romanian foreign policy was in the midst of a remarkable change, there
were no signs of liberalization of the regime’s internal policies, even though large
numbers of political prisoners had been released from prisons, labour camps, and house
arrest and internal exile had been allowed to return home or otherwise freed.103 Asked
about Romania’s internal and foreign policies in those years, Maurer answered like an
astute politician, ‘It is difficult to determine what is the optimal ratio between the internal
and foreign policy of a country since foreign policy is determined by the politics pursued
by the neighbouring countries, world politics and, of course, by what happens in the
country. A state must start in its foreign policy from the premise that its interests are met.
The focus on specific interests may change from time to time.’104
In May 1964, seeking to capitalize on their newly recovered autonomy, Romania
despatched a high-level delegation to the United States. The visit was well-publicised in
the press.105 Meanwhile, only a short press notice indicated the visit to Moscow of a
delegation led by Chivu Stoica. Soviet concern at recent developments was almost
certainly behind Stoica’s visit whose purpose was declared as being economic, with

102

“Romanians accuse Khrushchev of plotting a purge,” Daily Mail, 1 June 1964, TNA, PRO, FO
371/177622, R 103138/11.
103
TNA, PRO, FO 371/177622, NR 103138/12/G, Foreign Office to Washington, 4 June 1964.
104
Lavinia Betea, Maurer si lumea de ieri [Maurer and the Yesterday World. Testimonies about
Sstalinization of Romania], pp. 181-204.
105
According to the American Ambassador in Bucharest, William Crawford, in response to the
Romanian insubordination, the Russians were about to withdraw their offer to facilitate the development of
the Galati Steel Works. TNA, PRO, FO 371/177622, NR 103138/10, R. H. Mason, British Embassy,
Washington, to Charles Thomson, Foreign Office, 27 May 1964.

179

special reference to the petro-chemical industry. The fact that the Romanian delegation
met the top-ranking Soviet leaders Brezhnev, Podgorny and Suslov led the British to infer
that the talks did not actually focus on petrochemicals. ‘It is not an unreasonable guess
that the Russians have asked the Romanians to come to Moscow for a talk and that the
current anti-Soviet campaign would be on the agenda’, read a minute of Foreign
Office.106 To dampen speculation, it was simply announced that visits like this one were
part of the constant exchanges of views between the two parties on agriculture, industry
and other fields. This visit was not the first and would not be the last. Stoica’s visit
followed from an invitation of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party. 107
Whatever the truth, the Romanian leadership appears to have cared far more about
what was happening in Washington than in Moscow. It was most important that the visit
of the delegation led by Gaston Marin appear a success. However, while giving plenty of
publicity to the visit, the Romanians confess that they did not want a great deal of
propaganda about moving out of the Soviet orbit. The Romanian delegation was
interested in concluding a Consular convention and in the development of trade and
tourism between the two countries. In coulisses the Romanian delegation made it clear
that they were going to move further towards independence. ‘They are saying that they
have always aspired to political independence of the Soviet Union but that their strategy
has been to wait until their economy is on firm foundation before attempting to assert it.’
Washington shared this assessment. The Romanians ‘had consistently gone further than
they need have in asserting their independence of the Russians,’ William Crawford, the
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American Minister in Bucharest, maintained.108 The British Embassy in the United States
also stated their view on the Romanians’ visit to Washington:
After their refusal to accept the Soviet plan as put forward under the auspices of
CMEA for the integration of Eastern European economies, the Romanians might
have been expected to mark time. But this was not at all what happened: they kept
raising the ante. Their expedition to Peking, their declaration of April 22, the
despatch of Gaston Marin to Washington and the anti-Soviet or, if you prefer it,
the Romanian nationalist agitation which is now going on in Romania are all
examples of this.’109
The Romanian position was somewhat more tentative, and it was understood in
Bucharest that something more forthright would have been preferred in the West. The
Declaration of Independence might not have given full satisfaction to everyone, the
Romanians admitted. Some might have desired something sensational or looked for a
total change of the party line. The declaration was actually a restatement, of the political
standpoint expressed in the article signed by Maurer and published in Problems of Peace
and Socialism on 4 November 1963 and not a break with the other socialist countries.110
Even so, the importance of the shift could not be under-estimated and fellow renegades in
both Blocs understood what had transpired.
The French were enthusiastic about the evolution of Romania’s foreign policy.
This development should not be surprising. French ties with Bucharest were old and
integral. Moreover, under De Gaulle France was seeking to assert its own position in the
West – looking, as was Romania, for some middle ground. ‘For the first time in its
history, Romania enters its destiny, becoming a nation in the true sense of the word,’ De
Gaulle stated, adding that ‘the Romanian phenomenon… cannot be ignored. Romania is
no longer a satellite, but an independent country.’ ‘The theses on independence and
sovereignty are important not only for Romania but also for other countries,’ De Gaulle
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contended.111 In a speech in Strasbourg, De Gaulle mentioned the necessity of developing
relations with socialist countries within the framework of ‘the European idea.’ Western
European countries should contribute to the development of Eastern European without
interfering in their political system, De Gaulle believed, establishing for Europe a
position between the superpowers.112 The French seem to have found similarities between
their ‘dissidence’ in the West and the Romanian desire for great independence within the
Eastern Bloc.
Britain’s reaction to the Romanian demarche was less full-blooded, but then
again, the United Kingdom was no renegade.113 Although full of subtleties, the
Declaration of Independence ‘comes to the aid of many parties outside of the communist
camp that could not decide over their perspective between the two points of view, Soviet
and Chinese,’ J. McGhie, the British Charge d’ Affairs, asserted. The Romanian
leadership had expressed clearly a policy which stressed nation first, over ideological
considerations. 114 It was recognized in London, as well, that in taking this position the
Romanians were also motivated by domestic considerations. ‘It will be interesting to see
how far the Romanians will go, the Foreign Office wondered, to secure their home base
by appeal to nationalist sentiments. They must also be interested in safeguarding
themselves from economic pressure by reassurance in the West.’115
Were the Romanian leaders foreseeing a dramatic reorientation towards the West?
Had the campaign foreshadowed further estrangement from the Soviet bloc?116 Nothing
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of the kind was in the mind of the Romanian leaders. Although the Romanian Foreign
Minister emphasized ‘earnestly and emphatically’ Romania’s position as a country which
stands ‘on her feet, shored up by no-one and beholden to no-one,’ he also declared that
the divergences with the Soviets did not extend beyond economic issues.117 The
Romanian leaders did not intend ‘to precipitate a break’ with the Soviet Union. If they
broke with the Soviets ‘they may end up inside rather than on the nationalist tiger.’118
Romania was not going redirect its policy away from the European Communist
Bloc towards the West. To attempt to do so would risk reprisal from Moscow while there
was no guarantee that any ‘free’ Romania would continue to follow a Communist
leadership. The leadership sought freedom of action while remaining a member of the
Warsaw Pact and of CMEA. The freedom of action Romania wanted was primarily
economic. This was of the origin of its divergence from the Soviet Union, the Romanian
Prime Minister told Gordon Walker.119 However, the struggle for economic freedom could
take on a political complexion, the Head of the Northern Department in the Foreign Office,
Howard Smith, believed. Although it was too soon to anticipate the outcome of the friction
between Moscow and Bucharest, it was quite likely that the Russians and the Romanians
‘will come to an understanding by which polemics are avoided and Romania follows a
fairly independent line economically.’
In the shorter term, therefore, we are unlikely to see anything very dramatic. But
in the longer term this loosening of the economic bond should be of political as
well as economic importance for the further diversification of Eastern European
relations. It confirms our view of the way which Eastern Europe is going and will
continue to go.120
The evaluation proved to be correct.
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In the aftermath of the Washington visit, and in an effort to re-establish relations
with the Soviets on new footings, a high level delegation led by Maurer went to Moscow
on July 6, 1964. It aimed to achieve a readjustment of Soviet-Romanian relations on a
lasting basis.121 Maurer’s party included politicians with strong ties to the Soviet
leadership: Emil Bodnaras, Leonte Rautu, a former member of the Comintern, and
Alexandru Barladeanu, who had spent the Second World War in the Soviet Union. The
point of including these men was to demonstrate to Moscow uniformity of purpose, and to
indicate that the relationship offered was the best that could be arranged. The intention was
to signal to the Soviets that the Romanians desired, in the future, to play their own hand,
Barladeanu would later recall. They took the occasion to tell the Soviets ‘certain truths.’
Among them, was an indication of how much Romania had lost as a result of the imposed
economic ‘collaboration’ under Sovrom regime.122 The British Embassy assessed:
[t]hese exchanges were said to have been ‘useful’ and to have proceeded in a
comradely and frank atmosphere which had assisted better mutual understanding
and the strengthening of friendship between the two countries and parties. This
rather tepid statement – by Soviet inter-bloc standards, suggest that there are still
plenty of unresolved differences.123
Upon return, the Minister for Foreign Affairs described the results of the Moscow talks as
being satisfactory. The Romanian desiderata included better treatment for the Romanian
minorities in Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina124 but the main object was simply to
secure the Soviet acceptance of Romania's desire for economic independence.125
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The Russians made some concessions and promised not to press the Romanians
further on co-ordination.126 There may have been a deal in which the Soviet Union offered
to reduce pressure on Romania over CMEA policy in return for a cessation of anti-Soviet
propaganda in Romania. It looked however as if the Romanians had once again won their
point.’127 In exchange for the withdrawal of the Valev plan the Romanians committed to
cooperate more fully in the CMEA.128 Izvestia mentioned that Valev was a purely
academic figure and his proposal for a lower Danubian economic complex did not enjoy
the official backing of the Soviet government. Although presumably delighted by the
gesture, 129 the Romanians seem to have known that the Russians were going to publish a
disavowal of the Valev’s proposal.130
Shortly thereafter, on 27 September 1964, a party and government delegation led
by Maurer departed for Peking to participate in the festivities occasioned by the fifteenth
anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party. The delegation stopped for talks with
Khrushchev in Moscow before proceeding on to Peking.131 ‘Sincere and friendly exchange
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of views took place on problems of common interest’ Scanteia indicated.
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The

Romanian press reported prominently the enthusiastic welcome given to the delegation on
its arrival in Peking. The Chinese must by now have realized that the Romanians were not
‘Soviet stooges’. 133
The Romanians continued their skilful balancing between the Soviets and the
Chinese. Romania’s position suggested that the Romanian leaders wished to appear
devoted to a policy of ‘honest broker’ between the two disputants. However,
notwithstanding delegations, press reports and propaganda, Soviet-Romanian relations
remained chilly.134 Marx’s manuscript “Notes about the Romanians”, in which he
criticized the Russians for helping to crush the Romanian revolutionary movements in the
nineteenth century and for seizing Bessarabia in 1812, was printed by Bucharest in
December 1964.135 It could add only a frost on already chill relations.
Although the slow movement toward de-Sovietisation was obvious, Romanian
officials continued to deny that they were moving out of the Soviet orbit. The British
particularly noted signs of caution.136
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The Romanian leadership shifted in 1960 from conformity within the CMEA to a
more independent course generally. These developments originated in the decision of the
Romanian leadership to resist the programme of economic integration adopted by CMEA
in 1962, which assigned to Romania the function of a primarily agrarian country,
supplying food and raw materials to her industrially more advanced partners. Romania’s
motivation, therefore, was primarily economic. Although relations between Romania and
the Soviet Union deteriorated they were not critically bad. The Romanian leaders
continued to support the Soviets on major ideological issues, especially on the importance
of averting nuclear war. While pursuing a new policy based on an independent economic
policy within Comecon, 60% of Romania’s trade in mid-1960s continued with the Eastern
European allies, especially the Soviet Union.137
Romania’s ‘Declaration of Independence” asserted the right to develop a national
policy consistent with its own interests and domestic requirements. With its emphasis on
the equality and independence on all Communist Parties, the document was a manifesto of
national Communism.138 The Soviet Union could crush signs of divergence, as it had in
Hungary in 1956, or it could tolerate difference up to the point where actual treachery to
socialism was apprehended. The Soviets appear to have determined to tolerate the
endurable. Abandonment of socialism, in any case, would have left the Romanian
leadership, in potential, without a constituency. They would never dare to go so far.
Although interested in developing contacts with the West, the Romanians avoided
tacking too close to the West. De Gaulle’s France might have welcomed a more overt
move. In London’s view, while the Romanians ‘do not wish to be openly regarded by the
West as the favourite child of Eastern Europe,’ they did not like any more being included
137
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in the category of the Soviet Bloc countries either as a manner of speech or where that term
suggested that they were given the same treatment as other East European countries.139 The
Romanians thereafter focused on an improvement of relations with the Western
democracies, particularly with Britain, France, and the United States.
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Romania singled out

In 1964 the Labour Party won the general elections by a majority of four seats.
Harold Wilson became Prime Minister on 16 October and formed his first government. 1
One year after the Labour Government took power, the Foreign Minister, George
Thomson, went to Romania and Bulgaria. Thomson’s visit to Romania which took place
between 2 and 7 October 1965 was the first by a Foreign Office Minister since the War.
The purpose of the visit was to maintain the momentum of ministerial visits before the
Secretary of State’s projected visit. In fact, the British wanted to ‘avoid disappointing the
Romanians, who ascribe great importance to ministerial exchanges, and would look for
political significance in the absence of a visit from a British Minister for so long after the
change of Government in Britain’.2 Thomson’s visit was a ‘primarily goodwill visit’ to
please the Romanians who did not get ‘much ministerial attention’ that year.3

A positive trend was evident in British-Romanian relations in the first half of the
1960s. Both parties hoped that bilateral relations would become closer and more cordial.
Exchanges in cultural, artistic and scientific fields had got off to a good start. Diplomatic
relations had improved and trade between the two countries had increased steadily. The
main point of difference in bilateral relations was over outstanding financial claims and
trade. However, negotiations which began in Bucharest in April 1960 continued in
London, leading to the conclusion of a financial and a trade agreement on 10 November
1960.4 The financial agreement covered the following claims: nationalization (the oil
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companies excluded); reparation payments according to the Treaty of 1947 (the oil
companies excluded); and compensations for personal injury. The agreement provided for
the payment of 1.25 million in settlement of claims. Payment of the sum had to be
completed by January 1967. The agreement did not cover a number of substantial claims in
respect of some of which Romanian offer in earlier negotiations had been regarded as
derisory. Other negotiations were scheduled for 1966 for hard cases, like the
nationalisation of the oil industry.5 The follow-on commercial agreement, signed on 28
September, would be valid for three years. According to the later, Romania would export
to Britain fresh and frozen vegetables and fruit, timber and furniture, clothing, shoes,
cement, carpets, and would import machinery and equipment, rolled products, chemicals,
wool and wool yarn. 6

Outstanding claims included the oil companies claims (value sixty eight million
pounds of which Shell was the main claimant), bonded debt claims of fifteen million
pounds plus accrued and unpaid interest7 and certain other commercial and contractual
debts. The British were aware that any settlement they were able to reach would certainly
be for a far lower sum. The Romanians had persistently tried to link the British claims with
the import of Romanian oil and suggested on numerous occasions that the atmosphere for
the negotiation would be greatly improved if the British could agree to take oil in advance
of the start of the negotiations. The 1960 Agreement was however concluded on the
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understanding with the oil companies that the British Government would not consider
Romanian oil imports until their claims were settled.

Although trade between Britain and Romania had increased steadily it remained
small.8 Any substantial increase in Anglo-Romanian trade was unlikely unless the British
decided to import oil products from Romania. The British government stood firm however
on the policy of not accepting oil from the Communist countries, particularly ones that
owed it money. A breach in this policy was made in 1963 when the British considered a
Soviet proposal to buy ships from Britain which may have involved accepting oil from the
Soviet Union.9 ‘The principle that we should be prepared in certain circumstances to take
Soviet oil might eventually be extended to Romania.’ The first step was conditioned
however by the settlement of oil claims. Another difficulty was represented by the fact that
the Romanians who had a considerable refining capacity of their own wished to export oil
products and not crude oil.10
The Romanians had shown interest in industrial cooperation, which, based on
their expanding productive capacity and cheap labour, was supposed to lead to an increase
in their exports. The Romanians were not however prepared to consider anything involving
shared capital and management between themselves and Western firms; instead, they
bought several complete plants from Britain, projects which were to be financed partly by
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the disposal of some of their products in Western markets.11 The firms Rustyfa Ltd,12
Consolidated Foundry Plant Ltd.13 and Petrocarbon Development Ltd.14 had supplied
machinery and equipment for several Romanian plants totalling several million pounds.15
Although small, trade agreement was important for it could lead to the growth of
contacts in other fields.16 Inter-parliamentary exchanges continued to be encouraged. A
British parliamentary delegation, headed by Ian Mikardo, comprising three Labour and
three Conservatives (Mikardo, N.G. Carmichael and A.E. Hunter from the Labour Party
and J. Brewis, Rear Admiral Morgan Giles and Sir Eric Errington from the Conservative)
visited Romania in November 1965 in return for a Romanian delegation visiting Britain in
1963.17 Accompanied by two members of the Grand National Assembly, the delegation
was given a tour of Brasov, Sibiu and Cluj, taken to the Brazi refinery and the BabesBolyai University. Mikardo gave an interview to the Romanian political review ‘Lumea’ in
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which he underlined along with his impressions on Romania how the British were
surprised at the intensive industrialisation of Romania. 18
Not only did the Romanians ascribe great importance to ministerial exchanges
with Western countries,19 they wanted ‘to discuss and to be seen to have discussed the
main international issues’.20 This was part of their purpose in participating so energetically
in the exceptional level of diplomatic exchange evident by the mid-1960s. The purpose of
all the activity, of course, was to underline the fact of Romania’s new found independence.
At the ninth party congress, in July 1965, Romania was declared a socialist state rather
than a People’s democracy, emphasizing the transition to a new era and stressing
Romania’s status as a sovereign state without previous effusive references to the Soviet
Union and the new ideological status – the same stage of development as the Soviet Union,
Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia.
The Romanians, while trying to get recognition throughout the world as an
independent nation, had developed a ‘nationalist sensitivity’, the British Ambassador
noted.21 ‘They have,’ he thought, ‘a considerable chip on their shoulder about how
unaware we are of the significance of Romania’s role in the Communist world,’ the British
Minister of State mentioned in his report on his visit. The Romanians cultivated ‘a
deliberate detachment, and were at pains to show that they had not taken sides in the SinoSoviet split.22 The Romanians had done their best to avoid being drawn into the divergence
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between the Soviet Union and China, the First Deputy Prime Minister, Alexandru
Barladeanu, also pointed out to Harold Wilson during a meeting in London. 23
Britain had no such interest in seeking increased contact with Romania, but did
find the Romanians to be unusually helpful collaborators. Diplomatic contact established
that London shared more common ground with the Romanians than with other East
Europeans.24 The Romanian leaders were the most receptive to Western diplomatic
overtures. On the Middle East, the Romanians did not follow the Warsaw Pact line. They
maintained relations with Israel and argued for a settlement reached through direct
contacts.25 Similarly, the Romanians were ‘realistic’ in their approach to relations with the
Federal Republic of Germany. Romania was the only East European country to recognise
the FRG (in January 1967) and the West German government established trade missions
with the Romanian government. Romania was the only Warsaw Pact state to respond to the
FRG’s early attempts at Ostpolitik.26 The Romanians also had an interest in détente which
was ‘more enlightened than that of other members of the Warsaw Pact’. At the same time
they held certain views such as the desirability of dismantling the blocs in Europe which
the British regarded as unrealistic at that time.27
British policy-makers portrayed themselves as being among the pioneers of a
policy of fairly frequent exchanges of ministerial visits with the Soviet Union and East
Europe.28 However, British diplomats underestimated the degree to which a one-party state
could stifle dissent without resorting to Stalinist-style police terror. The nomenklatura
23
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system within the USSR and East European country made ideological orthodoxy the
prerequisite for advancement in the party and government hierarchies, industrial
management, the armed forces, academia and throughout ‘socialist’ society, thereby
inhibiting the growth of a more independent-minded, technocratic elite upon which British
government officials had placed their hopes for reform within Eastern Europe. 29
Foreign Office officials hoped that Eastern bloc states would assert their
independence and lose their economic and military ties to the USSR, but also wished this
process to be a gradual one, controlled by the East European regimes rather than being
driven by popular protest. By common consent Western countries opted for a policy of
‘collective inaction’ over Czechoslovakia in order not to exacerbate East-West tensions;
this approach was reflected in the decision not to raise alert levels for the Alliance forces in
the summer of 1968. 30
The British decided that their interests would not be furthered by any
revolutionary upheavals, as any uprising similar to that in Hungary in 1956 would
undermine the ‘evolution of effective co-existence’.

31

Romania and Yugoslavia were of

particular concern to NATO officials since Nicolae Ceausescu and Tito condemned the
Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia.
Nicolae Ceausescu was elected General Secretary of the Romanian Communist
Party after the sudden death of Gheorghiu-Dej, in March 1965. Gheorghiu-Dej brought
Ceausescu onto the Central Committee in 1952. In 1954, he became a full member of the
Politburo and eventually rose to occupy the second-highest position in the party hierarchy.
Ceausescu became soon a popular figure in Romania and also in the Western
World, because of his independent foreign policy. In the 1960s, he eased press censorship
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and ended Romania's active participation in the Warsaw Pact (though Romania formally
remained a member).
In July 1968, when the leaders of the Soviet Union and its allies issued the
‘Warsaw Letter’ which called for the preservation of one-party rule, Romania abstained.32
Ceausescu's denunciation of the invasion marked the apogee of Romanian defiance of the
Soviet Union. He publicly branded the occupation as a ‘shameful event in the history of the
revolutionary movements’.33 Romanian support for Czechoslovakia in the context of
invasion of this country by the forces of the Soviet Union, Poland, East Germany, Hungary
and Bulgaria led to a serious worsening of relations with the Soviet Union to a point at
which it seemed possible that the Russians might invade Romania.34 It was at this juncture
that the British Foreign Minister visited the country.
The Secretary of State’s visit took place in circumstances in which Romania
demonstrated once again that it was not subservient to the will of the Soviet Union, while
indicating also that it had greatly come up in the world. Romania was now a single
destination instead of being included in a group of two or three countries of Eastern Europe
to be visited.35 All were aware, of course, that the Brezhnev doctrine might equally be
applied to Ceausescu as to Alexander Dubcek. It was not unlikely that the Russians would
have liked to see Ceausescu replaced by ‘someone more pliant to their wishes’. At a
NATO meeting several members speculated about the possibility that the Russians might
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engineer a coup against Ceausescu.36 The Russians were determined to get rid of the
Romanian regime by force if necessary, the French Permanent Representative to the
United Nations maintained, notwithstanding the fact that it would have been difficult for
the Soviets to remove Ceausescu since he had a strong Security apparatus at his command
and had gained popularity in the country for his stance during the Czechoslovak crisis.37
Perhaps, the Russians could have sought to prepare the way for such a development
through propaganda and by employing other pressures such that discontent against
Ceausescu developed.38
At his meeting with the British Foreign Minister, and thereafter, Ceausescu
showed great skill in making out a reasoned case for Romania’s policies, calling for world
peace, self-determination, non-interference, and friendship with all.39 Although a
convinced Communist, he shared the view that the Communist party had constantly to
adapt itself to change, ‘subject to keeping ideological essentials intact.’40 Ceausescu set out
to distance Romania from the Soviet Union and himself from Gheorghiu-Dej and gave
reason to hope that the new regime, though equally nationalist, would be more relaxed and
permissive than its predecessor. In essence, he continued the balancing act: seeking
distance from the Soviet Union, while maintaining control domestically, looking to a
nationalist constituency to support continued autocracy; justifying all through continued
economic development and by reference to foreign policy successes and prestige.
Ceausescu took advantage of Gheorghiu-Dej’s policy and of the risks his
predecessor had assumed, the Prime Minister Maurer believed. “Ceausescu never
36
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mentioned Gheorghiu-Dej since April 1964, so sorry he was that it was not him who have
proclaimed the ‘Declaration of Independence’. He never talked about it publicly.”41
Ceausescu had however referred to the independence of Romania on every occasion such
as the anniversaries of the Romanian Communist Party, underlining that Romania placed
its own national interests above the international one, an interesting shift implying the
rejection of the communist past policy.42
Ceausescu struck ‘a risky but brilliant note when he condemned the Soviet led
invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. He could have done nothing better calculated to rally
national support.43 In 1968 the Romanian Communist Party policy was popular particularly
for its policy of independence from the Soviet Union and defiance on behalf of another
errant and independence minded Bloc member.44 Probably responding to the people’s
expectation but more likely inspired by events in Czechoslovakia, the Romanian leadership
even took cautious steps towards modest liberalization.
Much stress is put on the development of socialist democracy that is the free
exchange of views among Party members about questions still open to discussion
and socialism humanism which appears to mean the free expression of
Communist personality. There seems to be a growing confidence in the possibility
of expressing opinions, as long as they are not anti-Communist. 45

A programme of limited decentralization of local government and of industry was
set up. This was combined with the maintenance of Party control over the councils and
boards on whom powers were being devolved. Efforts were made to prove that the
Romanian Communist Party was free of dogmatism and devoted to the good of all the
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people. Doubts were cast on the integrity of the Party hero, Gheorghiu-Dej, although the
view among the Party members was that ‘his sins were committed at the behest of the
Russians’.46
Western approval notwithstanding, Ceausescu had gone about as far as possible,
and risked over-tipping. By 1971, he was given significant reason to believe that he would
be next after Dubcek. The Soviet Union sent military signals to Bucharest that the Red
Army would mount a major exercise on its southern border with Romania. During “South71”, as the exercise was called, the Soviet Union mobilized twelve ground forces
Divisions, and the Soviet Black Sea Fleet operated off the Romanian coast. It requested,
but Romania denied, permission to transport three Divisions across Romania to Bulgaria
for the manoeuvres. “South-71” was an indication of Soviet displeasure with Ceausescu for
making his first visit to China and for maintaining good relations with that communist
rival, capping his previous deviations and defiance. Another military manoeuvre, the
“Opal-71,” followed in August 1971 during which Soviet, Czechoslovak, and Hungarian
units included military exercises along Hungary's border with Romania.47

In short order, however, Ceausescu’s popularity resulting from his firm and
courageous opposition to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia had dimmed and a muted
criticism replaced it. Meanwhile, the danger from within the Warsaw Pact continued.
There was a paradox in Ceausescu’s status. While enjoying the support of his people, he
was almost completely isolated within the Socialist Bloc, which was hardly surprisingly.
He received a deliberately chilly reception from the Soviet leaders at Moscow on his way
back from China in June 1971. In August of that year he was excluded from the summit
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conference in Crimea. In September 1971 Brezhnev made a tour of Yugoslavia, Hungary
and Bulgaria, pointedly leaving out Romania.48
Romania responded with diplomacy. A series of high-level exchanges produced
an improvement of Ceausescu’s relations with the leaders of the Communist Bloc during
1972. In February Janos Kadar led a Hungarian Party and Governmental delegation to
Romania – a notable change from the anxious days in 1971 when the Hungarians were
used by the Soviets as the principal critics of Romanian policy. In May Eric Honecker
brought an East German Government delegation to Romania. And in August Ceausescu
was invited to that year’s summit conference in the Crimea and had private talks with
Brezhnev as well. Later in August he also had talks with Todor Zhivkov, both in Bulgaria
and in Romania. 49
Meanwhile, there continued to be little change domestically. Although there was
some liberalisation in 1968, the regime was conservative by nature and the Communist
party remained in total control of the country. This did not change. Ceausescu’s status was
unique in post-war Romania. Meanwhile, a cult of personality was emerging unique in
Eastern Europe since the death of Stalin, and more obvious than anything Stalin attempted.
As Secretary General of the Communist Party and President of the Council of State, posts
held since 1965 and 1967 respectively, Ceausescu had absolute executive power. He was
also President of the Socialist Unity Front and had himself named President of the
Supreme Council of Economic and Social Development. Ceausescu was also Supreme
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and had assumed direct control of the State
Security organs. Essentially he was a little Stalin, although Stalin was satisfied with the
fact of power without so obviously accumulating, advertising and enjoying it.
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A peasant’s son from the straggling village of Scornicesti in the county of Olt,
with little formal education, Ceausescu succeeded in controlling the Communist Party.50 A
British diplomat was struck by the way in which he dominated his colleagues and they
deferred to him, drawing an analogy with Henry VIII and his advisers. Displaying an air of
‘supreme self-confidence and joviality,’ Ceausescu gave ‘the impression of being in
complete control.’ He had also the ability to switch from banter to something a good deal
tougher at a moment’s notice.51
Within a few years of taking power Ceausescu was proclaimed ‘the most dear and
beloved son of the Romanian people’. In January 1973, the University of Bucharest
awarded him an honorary doctorate for his work in internal and foreign policy and for
modernising the education system.’ ‘Torrents of flowery phrases’ could be heard at the
ceremony occasioned by Ceausescu’s fifty-fifth birthday celebrated on 26 January 1973
with extraordinary pomp.52 ‘Letters from Romanians’ congratulated the ‘beloved
Ceausescu’ on his birthday. ‘Perhaps these early expressions of congratulation and the
doctorate are intended as gentle encouragement to others, including foreign countries, to
make their contribution on the day,’ the British Embassy considered.53
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Seeking to perform as expected, Ceausescu’s birthday was also given
extraordinary international recognition. ‘For a fortnight before the Birthday, international
salutations were solicited by Romanian officials at all levels, and in particular by the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Dean of the Diplomatic Corps, the Polish Ambassador,
was approached by the Chief of Protocol for assistance and enrolled two or three other
Ambassadors as whippers-in. The Deputy Foreign Ministers and other senior officials
helped with the canvassing.54 In the event, a large number of enthusiastic telegrams suited
the Romanians ‘requests’. The Soviet, East German, Czechoslovak, Hungarian and
Mongolian leaders sent fraternal greetings through their Ambassadors. Some few provided
sarcastic comments in protest at being forced into the Romanians’ personality cult. Two
senior Soviet diplomats went so far as to compare Ceausescu’s personality cult with
Stalinism.55 While virtually all diplomats were approached by the Romanians, the British
Ambassador received no request. The omission was deliberate, the British believed, and
was ‘intended to rub in the absence of high-level contacts in our case.’
Mr. Harold Wilson [leader of the opposition] too sent a message, thus focusing
attention on Her Majesty’s Government’s silence. ‘However, we were not
isolated. The French (surprisingly), Danish, Norwegian, Belgian and Spanish
Governments apparently kept their heads, and like us contented themselves with a
personal message from their respective Ambassadors. But in the French case, Mr.
Schuman may well be bringing a special message with him when he arrives today
for an official visit. 56
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Were there any reasons for mounting the ‘gargantuan manifestations of adoration
and adulation,’ including mass demonstrations, festive reunions, banquets, receptions and
congratulatory resolutions and messages? Why had the Romanian leaders decided that
such a manifestation was desirable at that particular time?
Externally, the Romanians were not under pressure from the Russians or anyone
else, so there was ‘no impelling need for the nation to rally round its leader and raise him
on high.’ Internally there were no signs of opposition serious enough to call forth an
overwhelming demonstration of support. A likely explanation was that the Romanians
wanted to play a leading role in the negotiations for a new system of security and
cooperation in Europe and a reduction in military confrontation. Demonstrating
Ceausescu’s stature was a means of reinforcing national influence. Thus, there may have
been a deliberate intention of demonstrating Ceausescu’s unquestioned position as the
leader of modern Romania, supported by the entire nation, in order to make his authority
indisputably clear to the Russians and to any dissidents at home. 57
Dynastic socialism became a reality with the appointment of Elena Ceausescu
member of the Political Bureau in 1973. In 1974 Ceausescu was finally ‘elected’ president
of the republic. By then, Prime Minister Maurer had lost his state and party positions, as
had the most of the technocrats who were replaced by Ceausescu loyalists. The eleventh
Congress of the RCP in 1974 marked the beginning of a presidential regime based on
dynastic socialism and a personality cult.58
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Meanwhile, Ceausescu’s Romania continued to prove anxious for political
consultation at all levels with the British and the development of cultural, scientific and
technical relations.59 A sudden visit to London in May 1974 by two of Ceausescu’s
confidants and subsequent visits by other Romanian representatives to Geneva and
Brussels indicated that a ‘diplomatic offensive’ was underway.60 Ceausescu gradually
came to rely on a court of intelligent but sycophantic advisers loyal to him.61 Two of them,
Stefan Andrei, Secretary of the Central Committee responsible for foreign relations62 and
Vasile Pungan, formerly Ambassador in London,63 were entrusted with the mission of
developing Romania’s links with the West. Besides establishing political contact with the
new Labour Government at the highest level, their visit seemed to have the purpose of
promoting Romania’s views on the CSCE (The Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe) and concerning the enabling machinery.64 The two emissaries announced that they
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were carrying a personal message from Ceausescu to Prime Minister Harold Wilson, and
invited him to visit Romania.65
CSCE was by then at its crucial phase. The Romanians, in marked contrast to
other members of the Warsaw Pact, refused to toe the Soviet line. ‘They may have made
great play with this show of independence,’ the British believed. ‘Their initiatives have not
necessarily been of help to the West and, while we have maintained friendly contact with
the Romanian delegation in Helsinki and Geneva, we have on occasion had to disagree...’66
The Romanians were in favour of the establishment of a working body which would
facilitate participation by all interested in European security. That way ‘the danger that the
solution of European problems would be reserved for the two big powers’ would be
avoided. The British and Romanians were thinking alike on this point, the Prime Minister
assessed. But the task remitted to a permanent body depended on a considerable extent on
the success of the conference.67
In London, Ceausescu’s men moved quickly to do their master’s bidding. Andrei
congratulated James Callaghan on his new appointment.68 As Foreign Secretary and
chairman of the Labour Party, he could do much to improve Anglo-Romanian relations.
Callaghan assured Andrei that ‘the exchange of the shadow for the substance in his office
would make no difference to his outlook or his approach to political problems. Recalling
the conversation he had with Ceausescu in Bucharest in 1973, Callaghan maintained that
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‘some things the President had said had been borne out by events. The British government
was also interested in developing bilateral relations further, Callaghan assured the
envoys.69
On the CSCE Callaghan realised that the exchanges in the field of human
relationship presented a special problem for some members of the Warsaw Pact. Callaghan
recalled that “one East European leader had said to him last year ‘We encourage our
people to visit the West because, until they do, they are under illusion that even the fences
there are made of ‘sausages.’” The Conference would have greater value if it could
produce something more tangible. Human as well as organisational exchanges were in the
interest of Britain, Romania and indeed the whole Warsaw Pact and NATO. The
inviolability of frontiers was a step. If progress on other items could be achieved, then it
could be very appropriate to draw the Conference to a conclusion in July.
Romania was in favour of encouraging both human and organisational contacts,
traffic of ideas and information, Andrei replied. The Romanians rejected racism, fascism,
violence and hatred among nations. They considered that it was the responsibility of each
state not to allow such ideas to be disseminated at home or exported abroad. Romania also
put great emphasis on the need to reach some decision about the institutional follow-up to
the CSCE. In this too he was instructed by President Ceausescu to seek the support of
Britain. Exchanges of persons and ideas would not solve all the problems. Inviolability of
frontiers needed to be solved also, Andrei pointed out. Romania was seeking a strong
European security system and considered it necessary to ensure that a framework should be
set for participation by all European states. Britain did wish to see a follow-up to the
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CSCE, Callaghan maintained. It was only a question of what kind of follow-up it should
be.70
In the 1970s British policy-makers considered themselves among the ‘pioneers of
a policy of fairly frequent exchanges of ministerial visits with the Soviet Union and East
Europe’.71 This was the rationale behind Britain’s own Ostpolitik. After the Second World
War Britain had lost its position in the world, Julian Amery, Minister of State of FCO,
admitted during his meeting with Ceausescu in Bucharest in 1973. Dean Acheson’s
assertion was however no longer valid. Acheson had died before seeing that Britain had
found its place by joining the Common Market, and working there energetically to lay out
the lines of a new Europe.72 Britain’s entry into the European Community in 1973
represented an example of Britain’s adjustment to the new realities.73
Within this new reality, it was clear, economic interests were paramount. The fact
of economic weakness outweighed any fear of foreign encroachments on British
sovereignty. Trade balance was a matter of concern for the British decision makers and
increasing exports to the Soviet Bloc was a means of boosting sales of products leading to
an improvement of trade and protection of jobs. Eastern Europe provided an area for
rebuilding the foundation of a more active British role in international politics.
Ceausescu however remained dissatisfied with the pace of the development of
economic relations with Britain. 74 Romania’s trade with the Federal Republic of Germany
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was four times bigger than that between Romania and Britain.75 Trade imbalance,
moreover, was an increasing concern. Imports from Britain were approximately twice in
value to exports to Britain. Foodstuffs, the products of light industry and wood products
were the main exports, and these needed to grow and diversify. Romanians wanted
especially to enlarge their export of manufactured goods.76 The British had supported a
generalised custom preference of the European Community for trade with Romania.77
The Romanian regime demonstrated a continued commitment to improved
relations and more integral ties with Western Europe. ‘The Romanians had developed a
hyper-active foreign policy,’ the British Ambassador, J.C. Petersen, considered in his
annual review for 1975.78 Ceausescu’s incessant travels to the West provoked a crescendo
of return visits to Romania. Visits to Bucharest by President Ford,79 the Prime Minister of
France, Ministers of Defence from Britain,80 Italy, France and Greece and the American
Chief of the Joint Chiefs of Staff stood out from a long list. All these indicated an
increased readiness of the Western leaders to single out Romania as a special case worth
courting.
Ceausescu had an uncanny ability to get close to American and British politicians
such as Richard Nixon81 and Harold Wilson. Learning about Ceausescu’s desire to meet
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him at the London airport, on 12 June 1975, in a transit stop on his way back from a tour of
Mexico and Brazil, Wilson was prepared to go to Heathrow against the objections of his
staff in order to meet his friend.82 The Foreign and Commonwealth Office indicated that
such a meeting would be a grave breach of protocol. ‘Such a visit to the Airport by the
Prime Minister, and everyone knows they are very rare, is in no way commensurate with
the state of our relations with Romania’. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office also
believed that since Ceausescu was ‘apparently engaged in a personality cult in his country’
he was ‘sticking out for a visit by the Prime Minister to the Airport,’ as ‘part of his
personal self-aggrandizement’. Wilson was prepared in turn to make an exception in this
case, ‘in view of his personal acquaintance of President Ceausescu and their previous
meeting in Romania.’83
In fact, Wilson did rather better than travel to suburban London. He invited
Ceausescu for breakfast at Chequers, the country residence of the British Prime Minister,
and met with him there. British officials did all they could ‘to make the visit a success and
an event of political significance.’ Ceausescu and his large senior entourage were regarded
as official state guests and the Lord-in-Waiting had called in at the breakfast to greet the
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Romanian delegation on behalf of HM The Queen.84 The hastily contrived arrangements
actually worked quite smoothly. Given Ceausescu’s susceptibilities, the British paid extra
special attention to presentation and protocol.85
Within the space of four hours the Prime Minister and the Foreign and
Commonwealth Secretary talked with Ceausescu and some of his most senior advisers.
The ‘breakfast’ at Chequers was a quite remarkable success within obvious limitations. It
was a foreign policy conclave of considerable consequence. Ceausescu had a substantial
and wide ranging discussion with Wilson, demonstrating his grasp of international issues
such as the CSCE and the Middle East and the independence of Romanian thinking on
these matters.86
A large number of senior business executives were invited (‘corralled’ might be a
more accurate term) by the Romanian Embassy for discussions after breakfast. Ceausescu
addressed the assembled gathering with a few generalities on Anglo-Romanian trade.
Approximately fifty high ranking British businessmen joined in the discussions and were
able to register at least an ‘acte de presence’ and to hear the President’s address, a fact
which they would be able to quote to their own advantage in the future. Nevertheless,
Romania was still ‘far from being an important market for Britain even in comparison to
the other CMEA countries’. Both sides in the discussion hoped to change that. They would
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have the opportunity to continue the discussion during the projected Wilson’s visit to
Romania that autumn. 87
Prime Minister Wilson’s visit to Romania together with his wife marked a new
foreign policy departure for Britain.88 It was the first visit by a British Prime Minister to an
Eastern European state other than the Soviet Union since the Second World War. 89 An
important factor in the Prime Minister’s decision to visit Romania was its independent
foreign policy.90 Indicating the ‘energetic and imaginative efforts’ of Ceausescu and the
Romanian ministers to build an ‘increasingly close, fruitful and mutually profitable
relationship’, Wilson underlined the importance of exchanging views on almost any
subject of international importance. The Prime Minister was particularly interested in
Ceausescu’s view on Soviet policies and concerning Sino-Soviet relations.
While Wilson talked with Ceausescu high politics mostly in restricted session, the
Under-Secretaries of the Department of Trade, Deakins, and Ministry of Agriculture,
Fisheries and Food, Strang, held separate talks with their opposite numbers. An agreement
on financial issues was also reached, and from the British perspective this was probably the
most important results of the visit since the Romanian debt had remained a bone of
contention between the two sides for thirty years. Although he gave specific instructions to
the Romanian negotiators that they should agree to the British formulation, Ceausescu
claimed subsequently that the financial arrangements proved to be very disadvantageous
for Romania. The Romanians ‘had perhaps been too generous over the financial claims
issue,’ Ceausescu assessed. Wilson replied that the British had been equally generous so
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the both sides might therefore burry the problem as being solved to the ‘mutual
disadvantage of both sides.’ 91 Ceausescu may have expected to obtain in exchange credits
with a lower interest rate than that generally permissible, since Romania was still classified
as a developing country. ‘Britain too was a developing country as far as the exploitation of
oil was concerned’, Wilson replied. He added that that was a field in which cooperation
with Romania could be mutually advantageous. British businessmen were especially aware
of the possibilities of mutual cooperation in the petrochemical field.92
In the end, Wilson and Ceausescu signed a Long Term Cooperation Agreement,
which was a ten-year agreement on economic, industrial, and technical cooperation. The
two sides expected a growth in trade over the duration of the agreement of two and half
times. There was a vast scope for profitable economic collaboration for both sides: the
production of aero engines for civilian purposes, equipment for nuclear power station,
machine tool industry, heavy machinery, coal. Joint Ventures based both in Romania and
in Britain and operating in third markets could also lead to mutual advantages. 93

Many Briton still remained distrustful of the Romanian regime. Objections were
not economic, but political. However much it might have wanted more trade with Britain,
and however much British businessmen and politicians might have liked to increase the
value of British exports, it was not clear that the Ceausescu regime was any more willing
than its East Bloc neighbours to abide by the Helsinki agreements which provided for free
movement of people, information and ideas. Ceausescu’s authority had increased to the
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level that he was the only person who could make ‘an instant decision’ in any matter of
bilateral concern, including debts and marriage cases.’94
Before Wilson reached Romania, the British press questioned the results of such a
visit when it came to free movement of people.95
. . . Wilson on his forthcoming visit will presumably press for the release of four
men, even five. The fate of her four people was seen by Thatcher as a test case of
how Romania will carry out the Helsinki agreements. It is hard to see how the
release of four, eight or even nine fortunate people, however welcome in itself,
could test anything much.96
Apparently Margaret Thatcher used a 1975 visit to Bucharest to press successfully
for the release of four dissidents, as the Daily Telegraph claimed. Before her visit,
Thatcher had been reminded that her hosts were engaged in a ruthless campaign, not for
free movement of ideas, but to subordinate all cultural and artistic activity to party
ideology, and to eliminate from the creative life all writers and artists who did not directly
serve this end. She might have found candour from the men in power, but she was dealing
with doctrinaire communists, and these she could not abide. ‘We need not presumably
expect to find in Romanian literature or journalism much of that openness and candour
which Thatcher apparently found in discussions with her host’, even the safely Tory Daily
Telegraph editorialized.’97
Indeed, following Ceausescu’s announcement in July 1971 of the ‘cultural
revolution’ the party was ordered to take direct control of cultural policy. The right of the
state to interfere with artists and writers was clearly stated. ‘It was admitted that, in part,
the new cultural policy was designed to reassure the Soviet Union by demonstrating
94
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continuing vigilance and orthodoxy,’ the Director General of the British Council asserted
in his report following his visit to Romania at the end of September 1971.98
While Thatcher praised the regime’s openness to the external world, internally, if
anything, greater controls were in place. Despite the openness claimed by Ceausescu no
other Warsaw Pact state member had such harsh rules for travel outside its frontiers.
Romania regarded emigration not as a civil right but as a concession granted to a limited
number of individuals, mainly on the grounds of family reunification or following
significant foreign pressure and even then only when a suitable quid pro quo had been
identified. In order to keep the number of emigrants as low as possible, the regime erected
a series of politically motivated, bureaucratic and financial burdens. In principle citizens
had the choice of applying for emigration as a Romanian citizen wishing to take up
residence abroad (blue passport) or for an emigration that entailed renouncing one’s
Romanian citizenship (brown passport). In practice the latter entailed the loss of one’s
legal, social and economic rights as a citizen. Once the application had been filled, the
applicant lost his or her existing job and was transferred to manual work.99
It appears, however, to have been external perceptions which mattered. The
Telegraph might chide, but the Wilson Government concluded that ‘[a]lthough Romania
was a communist country it sought to increase and diversify its contacts with all other
countries’. There were reasons to believe that the new policy would lead to ‘a freer flow of
people, information and ideas between Romania and the outside world’.100
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Generally speaking, 1975 was an excellent year for British-Romanian relations
with a highly successful exchange of visits between the Prime Minister Wilson and
President Ceausescu providing top cover for many useful governmental and commercial
contacts. Commercial relations benefited from the warmth of political climate. The
mainspring of Romanian policy continued to be the consolidation of a rigid but
recognisably national brand of Communist orthodoxy at home, in firm control of a nation
growing economically and in international presence. There was however a quest of for
latitude in the scope and handling foreign affairs.
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Britain’s interests in Ceausescu’s Romania

‘For many years the regime contrived
to pursue at the same time the most flexible
foreign policy and the most stifling internal
regime within the Warsaw Pact.’ (FO Minute
1
I.J.M. Sutherland )
‘Britain’s relations with Romania
would be deeper and more substantial than with
some of the Socialist countries.’ (James
Callaghan)2

There was an obvious and striking dichotomy between Ceausescu’s quasi Stalinist
internal policies and his ‘eclectic search for foreign friends and influence, in which
ideology appeared as only a marginal consideration,’ the British Ambassador Petersen
noted.3 The face the regime showed abroad was not at all what looked down at common
Romanians. For the British as for other Western leaders it was a matter of ‘continuing
puzzlement that the internal constraints are so severe’ while Romania’s external policies
displayed a considerable measure of independence, and while the regime leaned as far
toward the West as was possible. ‘For many years the regime contrived to pursue at the
same time the most flexible foreign policy and the most stifling internal regime within the
Warsaw Pact.’4 This was called by the British an ‘idiosyncratic brand of communism’5
By the end of 1977 Ceausescu was at the peak of his power. He had achieved a
measure of success in three important respects: consolidating the independence of the state
and the sovereignty of the Romanian Communist Party, reconciling his policies of
1
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developing contacts with the West and the Third World with the immediate requirements
of alliance with the Soviet Union; and in weathering the effects of the world economic
recession. He had managed to do all of these things both while increasing his apparent
domestic popularity, and without loosening the Party’s stranglehold on national life.
Ceausescu remained a ‘complete’ dictator, but he was also shrewd and playing a very
complicated game. By courting Romanian nationalism he secured a measure of popular
support which enabled him to maintain himself and his regime in power without Russian
assistance. The illiberal nature of the regime in turn served the purpose of showing the
Soviet Union that he was not a Dubcek and helped to allay misgivings about his overtures
to Russia’s enemies. 6
By this juncture, Romania’s relative independence was remarkable, and certainly
unique in the Eastern Bloc. Ceausescu was still given wide credit internationally for having
condemned the Soviet led invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and for his continuing
assertion of Romania’s political independence. He and had cordial relations with China,
Yugoslavia and other ‘renegades’. He cultivated warm relations with the West and the
European Community. He took an irritatingly independent and non-conformist line at
international Communist Party meetings. All these intrigued the British Ambassadors.
Are Ceausescu’s international activities designed mainly to protect his country
against Big Brother Russia or are they a means of keeping himself in power? Is he
basically a patriot or is he seeking, in traditional Romanian fashion, to found a
new dynasty? With his personal style of living and the way in which he is settling
his family in positions of power, there is some evidence for the latter thought. 7

Britain was increasingly intrigued by the possibility of ‘exploiting Romania’s
independent attitude within the Eastern Bloc, although there was no chance of our
persuading Ceausescu to ‘stray widely and become a Tito.’ ‘Yet it occurs to me,’ the
6
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British Ambassador believed, that we should perhaps try from time to time to turn to our
advantage Romania’s readiness to twist the tails of her Warsaw Pact allies: there could be
opportunities at the forthcoming CSCE Review Conference in Belgrade. The process
would be assisted if we could offer, in exchange, the occasional titbit not give to the other
Eastern Europeans. 8
Arriving in Bucharest at the beginning of 1977, the new British Ambassador,
Reginald Seconde, was struck by the ‘depressing air’ of Bucharest,
there is something depressing about it which is hard to define. It is not entirely the
monumental heaviness of the new buildings or the glimpses one gets of the
tattered finery of the past or the wide acres of identical blocks of workers’ flats –
or even the pathetic displays of consumer goods in the shops (all State-owned). I
think it is rather in the look of the people. 9
Seconde would soon found out that a ‘pervading State control’ affected the daily lives of
‘the humblest citizens’. Even Party activists were looking over their shoulders since
someone belonging to security apparatus ‘could be there to control’. ‘Living here, one is
too conscious of the numbing influence of a one-man directed Communism which flows
through every vein of society and every branch of activity.’ The simple freedoms of being
able to air their views, to do what they want with their lives or to leave the country when
they wish, did not exist. ‘Everything and everybody must conform to the wishes of the allpowerful Party and State, in which President Ceausescu is the deity.’ 10

The Ceausescu regime was aware that significant cognitive dissonance was apt to
be produced when foreigners compared what they were told by the regime with what they
could see for themselves. Part of the answer remained to restrict contact between

8
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Romanians and foreigners. The regime did what it could to insulate Romanians from
foreigners in general and diplomats in particular.11
Meanwhile the Securitate was publically urged to concentrate more on the threat
from outside, specifically from foreign agents since the actual power of any domestic
opposition was judged to be small.12 However, British diplomats believed that the primary
focus of the organization remained a potential internal threat. They considered that the
regime was using the excuse provided by a supposed outside threat to justify the intrusive
activities and large size of the Securitate. As well, to work efficiently the Securitate needed
to be able to count upon the active collaboration of working people. Spies were a more
satisfying enemy, for this constituency, than dissidents. In the spring of 1973, Ceausescu
decided that Party control over the Ministry of Interior had to be tightened up. He arranged
for direct Party supervision of State Security. Ceausescu reminded those who might have
forgotten that ‘the whole activity of the Securitate and Militia bodies, of the other units in
the Ministry of Home Affairs, are part of the activity carried on by our Party and State, by
our entire people.’13 The abuses committed by the Securitate and the Militia in the past
were to be checked by the Party. The Securitate, he promised, would be made to observe
the laws.
Measures must be taken against all those who transgressed laws or deviate from
the norms of social cohabitation, who under one form or another damage socialist
property, harm the property of citizens in one way or another, prejudice socialist
construction, the consolidation of our State. But with the same firmness we must
permit nobody –starting of course with the bodies of the Ministry of Home Affairs
– any kind of abuses! Socialist legality has to work two ways and in full unity –
11

TNA, PRO, FCO 28/3072, f. 1. “Ceausescu and the Securitate,” British Embassy Bucharest, 12
January 1977, M.W. Shaw to M.F. Sullivan, EESD.
12
Although it was rare for a dictator publicly to criticise one of the major instruments of his own
control, Ceausescu might have been doing it for certain reasons, the British believed. He might well have
been motivated by: the need to keep the powerful internal body, the Securitate, in its place by periodic doses
of magisterial displeasure; his ‘war’ against corruption and abuse in general, a sensitive point for public
opinion. TNA, PRO, FCO 28/3072, f. 1. “Ceausescu and the Securitate,” British Embassy Bucharest, M.W.
Shaw to M.F. Sullivan, EESD, 12 January 1977.
13
TNA, PRO, FCO 28/3072, f. 1. “Ceausescu and the Securitate,” British Embassy Bucharest, 12
January 1977, M.W. Shaw to M.F. Sullivan, EESD. Ceausescu’s speech delivered on 23 December 1976 to
the higher echelons of the Ministry of the Interior. (published in full the next day in Scanteia).

219

not to leave anybody unpunished who transgresses laws and not to permit that
somebody be punished unjustly. Only in this way shall we make our society assert
itself as the justness and most humane society in the world.’14
The mood of the people might be best described as vigilant attentisme.
‘Convinced ideological belief is rare, but blasphemy is a serious offence,’ the British
Ambassador noted in 1977. Nepotism and networking produced whatever actual dynamism
the regime possessed. Within the political structures networks of personal friendship and
allegiance were ‘a vital element’. Connections were the only guarantee of respect of the
forces of officialdom and minor authority. The security of possessions and individual
rights were to a large extent dependent on having friends in high places.15

The symbols of privilege conferred for status in Party and Government were
obvious and impressive: villas, Mercedes cars, and exclusive access to luxury consumer
goods. So complete was the association of wealth with political power, that signs of
prosperity provided immunity from the sort of petty harassment endemic, and unavoidable
for the rest of the population. A man in country clothes driving an old Moskvitch would be
stopped by the Militia half a dozen times on various pretexts, even in the course of a short
trip. Meanwhile, the driver of a black Mercedes sedan would sweep through every
checkpoint unmolested. Even a new Dacia (the Romanian version of the Renault 12)
commanded some respect as being likely to betoken the existence of friends in high
places.16 ‘Nomenklatura could be recognized through the privileges they enjoyed. Its
members and their families ‘never take the bus or tram. They used the government’s cars
whose colour and the model indicated the owner’s status within hierarchy; the darker the
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colour, the higher the status.’

17

Ceausescu himself justified the striking differentials in

prosperity and position existing in what still claimed to be a committed socialist society.
‘In the context of the division of labour,’ he assessed,
‘there exist in our society various social and professional categories who have
their place and their importance, and working people are paid in conformity with
the provisions of laws, with those which, at any given moment, are considered to
correspond to the possibilities of society as well as to the importance of one sector
or another. Certainly, the relative positions of the various categories are not fixed
for all time; it may be that, during one Five Year Plan, one branch has a more
important place in response to the technical requirements of development and, in
another Five Year Plan, another one comes to the fore, whilst the others stay in
their place.18
The nomenklatura presided over a society, rigidly hierarchical and thoroughly
bureaucratic to its narrow. Every bureaucratic act had to be justified by superior orders,
preferably incorporated in a document. ‘In the conduct of Romanian Foreign Policy, the
passion for signing protocols, agreements and communiqués stemmed from this in part.
Ratified by the State Council or its appendages, all these documents became passports for
action, tickets to ride. Without them there was no quotable authority for, or even legality of
action.’ At the apex of the pyramid sat the President whose words were to all intents and
purposes absolute laws. A summon from the President had to be instantly obeyed.
Ministers were expected to be on call. ‘As soon as the President announced his first piece
of business and sent for the responsible Minister word went quickly around the secretarial
network and everyone else relaxed. Everything is dropped to concentrate on any task
indicated by President Ceausescu.’ The 14-hour days worked by the heads of major
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departments were attributable to the exhausting and time consuming requirement that they
avoid or shift responsibility for all decisions.19
The regime was also characterised by love of ritual, perhaps as demonstration of
power. Important foreign visits could lead to near paralysis while they continued.
When the President received a Head of State or Government the entire hierarchy
goes to the airport for the arrival and departure ceremonies and may spend the better part
of half a day mustered around the walls of a hall in the State Palace simply decorating the
occasion. When Sir Harold Wilson, as Prime Minister, signed the agreed documents at the
end of his visit in September 1975 virtually every senior Minister and Party official stood
about with the Prime Minister’s party doing nothing for well over two hours. 20
Ministers and senior Party officials spent an inordinate amount of time on purely
ceremonial activities. Much time was dedicated to mere attendance at ceremonial
functions. ‘Hence the odd impression that one sometimes gets that the entire senior staff of
a particular Ministry bent on a single job to the apparent exclusion of everything else
including its continuing responsibilities in other directions; and even on answering the
telephone.’21

Although the existing differentials within society were not denied, Ceausescu
used to point out in his speeches the need to raise living standards, ‘material and spiritual,’
of the people generally. The slow improvement of conditions of life in Romania was
attributed to the exceptional high rate of capital investment.22 If conditions remained poor
today, then that was because a much better tomorrow was being prepared. The real reason,
19
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British diplomats assessed, was inefficiency and particularly corruption which remained an
important part of people’s life. Corruption was ‘universal’ and large amounts of cash ‘swill
about in the system and find their way illegally abroad’. ‘I suspect that the large amounts
of Romanian currency which find their way to exchange banks in neighbouring countries
for sale at a heavy discount to tourists and others are simply carted out in the briefcases of
travelling officials who otherwise can take abroad only an exiguous daily dollar allowance
for current needs. Fear of the consequences of too much money openly chasing too few
goods may well lie behind the draconian restrictions on all private trading including that in
second-hand goods’, the British Ambassador Petersen asserted in his report to London. 23
If, by the middle 1970s, Romania had adopted the domestic configuration it would
have until the end of the regime, it had also assumed the Foreign Policy it would continue
to follow while Ceausescu endured. There would be no radical departure from the already
established lines of Romanian foreign policy henceforth. Ceausescu’s talks concerning
foreign affairs usually contained ‘the well-established litany of Romania’s principles of
foreign policy’. During the preparation for the East Berlin Conference of Communist
Parties the Romanians together with the Yugoslavs and the Western Communist Parties
succeeded in extracting from Moscow recognition, in theory at least, of the right of each
Communist Party and country to determine its own policies in the light of its own national
experience. At the same time, the Romanians seemed to have accepted the need to balance
this recognition with a readiness to move towards the restoration of stable bilateral
relations with the Russians and to the reaffirmation of their loyalty to the Warsaw Pact. 24
Surface relations with the Soviet Union remained cool but correct, even though in
a three-hour speech, on 18 December 1975, during which he reviewed major foreign
23
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policy, Ceausescu failed to mention the Soviet Union by name once. When attending
meetings of the Eastern Bloc, Romanians delegates were briefed to assume a
predominantly defensive role. Warsaw Pact contacts remained cool although one staff
exercise and a meeting of the Military Council of the Pact took place in Romania during
Ceausescu’s reign. Romania’s lack of enthusiasm did not go unnoticed. The Romanian
Government later came under fire at the annual Ministerial meeting of the Pact in
November 1976 for its reluctance to meet its share of the organisation’s cost, its too
evident lack of enthusiasm for Warsaw Pact activities and for its insistence on treating each
request for movement of Warsaw Pact personnel across Romanian territory as a separate
issue to be negotiated laboriously from scratch. 25
The necessary formal submissions, however, continued to be offered. Toward the
end of 1976, for example, a common declaration was signed in Bucharest to mark the first
visit of Brezhnev to Bucharest in a decade. In his speech at the welcoming banquet on 22
November 1976, Ceausescu assessed that ‘some differences of opinion on non-essential
questions should not affect collaboration between our parties and states.’ Brezhnev, in his
reply, remarked, ‘there are no important unsolved problems between our countries.’26
The Romanians used diplomacy to defuse apparent differences with other Warsaw
Pact allies.27 Inter-Pact relations improved in 1977 as testified by a series of high level
exchanges and a substantial array of bilateral documents signed.28 Although the Western
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leaders understood that there were limits within which the Romanians operated,29 the
independent and nonconformist line seemed muted since Brezhnev’s visit to Bucharest and
the Warsaw Pact meeting in November 1976. 30
Since last autumn the cracking pace which the President sets in every field of
national and international activity has been noticeably directed towards fencemending with his partners and neighbours. He exchanged an impressive series of
visits with the Russians, the Poles, the East Germans and the Czechs while
Bulgaria is to be added to the list next month. He also met Kadar on the border
and had more constructive relations with the Hungarians than have been seen for
many a year. 31
The tempo of working-level visits on subjects ranging from economics to
ideology with the Soviet Union increased dramatically about the same time, although
Romania refused to reopen issues already settled to its satisfaction.32 While they continued
to remain alive to issues of national sovereignty in CMEA, the Romanians agreed that their
country, as a lesser developed member of the CMEA, could anticipate greater economic
benefits from CMEA coordination.33 Part of the reason for Romania’s movement back
toward the Soviet Union may have been disappointment at the unwillingness of the West
and the EEC to recognise Romania as a developing country and to grant it the economic
concessions commensurate with such status. If this was the case, disappointment did not
prevent the Romanians from attempting continually to improve relations with the West and
the European Economic Community in particular. The perceived desire remained to pursue
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economic benefit while extracting maximum advantage from the unique position Romania
had assumed between Eastern and Western Europe.34

The Ceausescu regime remained attentive to signs of favour. The British
Ambassador was repeatedly told of ‘Romania’s hurt feelings because the European
Community generally, and Britain in particular, seem unappreciative of Romania’s special
position in the Bloc.’ 35 London considered that perhaps the Romanians had a right to feel
aggrieved. It was in the West’s and particularly Britain’s interest ‘to give further
encouragement to Romanian efforts to follow an independent path in foreign affairs,
particularly in the context of detente, at the CSCE, in the UN and in the deliberations of the
Warsaw Pact,’ the Foreign and Commonwealth Office maintained 36 What Britain hoped to
achieve was ‘the maximum benefit from information which Romania can provide on
developments in the world communist movement,’ seemingly fracturing with some help
from Bucharest.37
By diminishing its dependence on the Soviet Union and developing closer
political, economic and commercial contacts with the West, Romania produced difficulties
within the CMEA and the Warsaw Pact and provided opportunities for Britain and the
West generally. Romania’s contacts with the EEC, its distinctive stand at the CSCE and its
independent role at the United Nations had been helpful to the West.38 Romania has
achieved considerable success in pursuing an independent and flexible foreign policy
34
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based on the territorial integrity of the state while maintaining internally the strictest
communist regime in Eastern Europe. 39
Britain could not exert any beneficial influence on human rights issue without
damaging more important interests. Although certain efforts were made to meet Western
criticism, Romania’s application of the Helsinki Basket three provisions had been far from
satisfactory.40 When it came to the commitments to ensure full respect for human rights
and fundamental freedoms and to promote the principles of democracy, Romania obvious
failed. ‘We must chip away, but I doubt whether we shall have any spectacular results,’ the
British Ambassador Seconde concluded. 41 Encouraging the Romanian regime to introduce
a greater measure of individual freedom internally was important in as much as it could
facilitate easier human contacts and allow British consular officials to deal promptly with
bilateral cases concerning British nationals. Representations were frequently necessary to
support applications for travel documents in favour of Romanians to visit or join relatives
in Britain and concerning delays in allowing British and Romanian nationals to marry.42
Even on these minor issues, however, Ceausescu would not budge. When the
British Ambassador Petersen argued for a better mutual understanding which would have
allow practical problems such as marriage cases, and visa problems to be solved,43 the
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Romanians replied that many of the difficulties which arose over humanitarian problems
stemmed from the Herculean efforts to modernise the economy. Before developing a
‘really constructive and mutually beneficial free interchange of people and cultural ideas’
the Romanians had to create a better economic and social environment within the country.
The cost in financial, material and human terms was high and ‘the West should be more
patient’.44
In 1977 the Romanian press suddenly acquired a strident anti-Western tone,
directed at the internal readership, even while Ceausescu aimed to improve relations
abroad. This was the more striking since Romanian newspapers were usually appallingly
dull in their reporting, and strictly predictable in their editorial content.45 There was an
intensive press campaign containing stories about the nastiness of life in the United States
and Western Europe, polemical pieces about the fate of emigrants to Germany, about
unemployment, drugs, racism and violence, about neo-Fascism and the miseries of
immigrant workers, the iniquities of Radio Free Europe propaganda and the Western press
for their accusations on the quality of life in Romania. Ceausescu himself spoke angrily
about the ‘seduction’ of citizens and the activities carried on in ‘certain countries’ to
encourage the Romanian citizens to emigrate which he described as a grave interference in
Romania’s internal affairs. These acts constituted hostile acts against Romania, Ceausescu
maintained.46 However he did allow a distinction between the issues of integrating families

British Ambassador in Bucharest, J.C. Petersen, on the Head of Directorate III at the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, Iuliu Dobroiu, 10 January 1977.
44
Ibid.
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President Ceausescu, the achievements of the regime (with plenty of statistics) and the unhappy state of the
vice-ridden, Western world.’ TNA, PRO, FCO 28/3072, R.L. Seconde, British Embassy Bucharest, to David
Owen, MP, 15 August 1977.
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towards which he showed understanding as ‘justified cases’47 and emigration of which he
strongly disapproved.48
The press campaign seemingly had the purpose of intimidating the Romanians
who wanted to leave the country. Ceausescu’s strictures against those who wished to
emigrate and those in foreign countries who enticed Romanians ‘to forsake their native
land’ followed the Romanian doctrine that each state has the right to pursue its own
policies and to control its own resources, including the vital one of manpower.49
If the tactic of encouraging people to despise and fear the West and to value
more highly the benefits of life in Romania did not have a serious impact on Romanian
thinking, more serious were the decrees clamping down markedly upon the freedom of
contacting the foreign Embassies. Two decrees signed by Ceausescu on 29 March
concerning state secrets and the employment of Romanians by foreign Embassies and
firms were implemented but not published. 50 Increased restriction on foreign travel and on
contacts with foreigners reached an unprecedented level following the re-promulgation of
the 1971 Law of State Secrets. Certain kinds of contact with foreigners were punished by
fines and Romanian officials were again required to obtain advance permission to consort
with foreigners socially. Thereafter they were required to report on conversations.51
Journalists in particular were under strong instructions to stop gossiping with Westerners.
47
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TNA, PRO, FCO 28/3072, f. 8, Martin Shaw, British Embassy Bucharest, to Michael Sullivan,
EESD, FCO, 30 March 1977.
49
‘Romania does have a serious problem over the number of would-be emigrants, since these
include a significant proportion of skilled workers. Ceausescu probably believes that he could defend himself
at Belgrade by arguing that their expertise is essential after the catastrophe of the earthquake. And he no
doubt believes he could take advantage of the apparent surge of national unity in the earthquake’s immediate
aftermath to appeal to the patriotic instincts of ordinary Romanians.’ TNA, PRO, FCO 28/3072, f. 19. B.G.
Cartledge, EESD, FCO to R.L. Seconde, British Embassy Bucharest, 13 May 1977, Anti-Westernism and
Anti-Emigration in Romania.
50
TNA, PRO, FCO 28/3072, f. 14. R.L. Seconde, British Embassy Bucharest, to B.G. Cartledge,
Eastern European &Soviet Department, FCO, 13 April 1977, Anti-Westernism and Anti-Emigration in
Romania.
51
TNA, PRO, FCO 28/2911, ENR 014/1, J.C. Petersen, British Embassy Bucharest, to the
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Annual Review for Romania, 1 January 1976, f. 1.

229

They particularly feared that anything they might say would be used against them once the
state secrets decree was promulgated.52
In addition, under the new dispensation, all visa applications had to be routed
through official channels. Both the British and the French Embassy were told that all
applications would in future be dealt through the Romanian Tourist Agency rather than
applicants coming directly to Embassies. Romanians who violated the new regulations by
attempting to visit the United States Embassy were arrested and interrogated, as were
visitors to the West Germany Embassy. Not surprisingly, a sharp reduction in visa
applications followed. To facilitate detection, taxi drivers were instructed to set down their
passengers fifty yards short of the British Chancery entrance. Notwithstanding official
discouragement, some students continued to go to the British and US libraries.53 If the
regime could discourage contact with foreigners, it retained the power to prohibit and
persecute. Few were as brave as the few students who refused to submit.
Real persecution followed. On 1 April 1977 the dissident Paul Goma was arrested
and a press campaign started against him. Ion Negoitescu, one of Goma’s allies, was
arrested and interrogated one week later. Baptist leaders were released after being arrested
for their denunciation of religious persecution but had to report to Securitate each day. A
Belgrade correspondent of the New York Times, Malcolm Brown, was refused entry into
Romania. 54
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The British speculated about the reason for the anti-foreign and anti-West
campaign. The Foreign Office assessed that a combination of factors was in play.

55

Motives behind the change of atmosphere could have implied the need to prevent a mass
exodus of the German minority, anger against Radio Free Europe, President Carter’s
announcement of increased funds for Radio Free Europe, or more probably perception of
the grumbles of discontent emerging from the population. It could have been a little of all
of these things, and it is difficult to be certain political motivations in a regime as total and
personal as Ceausescu’s.
On the whole, the British ambassador believed, it looked as if the campaign were
primarily attended to scotch at the outset any potential emigration movement from
Romania, following from the establishment of freer education as an item on the human
rights agenda, slated for discussion at the upcoming conference in Belgrade.56 Polemics
were building a new situation of bloc to bloc confrontation. The Romanians were worried
by the hardening in East-West relations generally and the implicit American assumption
that Romania would naturally fall into the Soviet sphere of influence. ‘Perhaps, once again
they fear that President Carter’s attitude will have the effect of polarising East-West
relations and making it more difficult for Romania to maintain her middle position.’57
Revising estimates of what might be possible, given the sudden coolness, the
principal task of Britain’s Embassy in Bucharest was re-established as the encouragement
of British-Romanian commerce and especially export promotion.58 ‘We already have a
healthy trade turnover of about 100 million pounds a year but the potential is much greater’
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the FCO considered.

59

There were excellent trade opportunities which the British were

determined to pursue despite the ‘tiresome Romanian negotiating attitudes’.60
The in-coming British Ambassador did not dissent from the reduction of the scope
of his mandate. He believed that the Romania’s economy was ‘pretty soundly based.’ ‘If
success is judged by purely economic results, then, despite the creaks and groans in
machinery, the Romanians have been very successful indeed – and this faces us with
important and challenging commercial task. Following classic Marxist doctrines, the
Romanian government put all their economic effort into production and the encouragement
of heavy industry. To this end the Romanian worker toils away at the Plan for a long
working week, while the Romanian consumer goes without luxuries and much of what in
the West would be regarded as necessities.’61 Nevertheless, the Romanian drive for
extensive industrialization presented many opportunities for an increase of exports
(particularly in the capital goods, metallurgy and chemical sectors). Romania’s desire to
pay for foreign purchases through barter caused certain difficulties.62 Any deterioration in
its foreign currency position could lead to increased economic dependence on CMEA and
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Joint Commission machinery was an important tool of export promotion and the East Europe
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slow down the drive towards industrial development, from which, of course, benefit to the
UK could be anticipated.63
Although ‘anxious to buy just the kind of things which Britain is best qualified to
sell,’ exporting to Romania was not easy. Romania represented an attractive growth
opportunity not only for the British exporters but also for other Western countries and this
led to a sharp commercial competition. The Romanians, renowned for being ‘intolerable
negotiators,’ attempted to play one off against the other. They used as in their political
dealings ‘every wile and devious trick’; they were ‘shameless hagglers’ who encouraged
all comers from Western and Eastern Europe in order to play off one against the other and
they exploited the slightest loophole in a contract. What the British traders had to do was to
‘adjust themselves to Romanian methods.’ 64
There was a steady improvement in bilateral relations after the announcement in
October 1977 of Ceausescu’s state visit to Britain.65 From the British perspective,
Romania’s interest in Britain was mainly political. The Romanians attached great
importance to expanding their relations with the West, in order to obtain support and
credibility for their independent policies. Britain had become a target because of its
influence within the EEC, NATO and the UN Security Council on matters of trade,
disarmament and the continued progress of détente. Fairly frequent visits by Ministers
(three or four a year) in both directions were highly valued by the Romanians as
demonstrating the continued commitment of the British Government to the maintenance of
good relations.
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The projected State visit of Ceausescu was especially valuable in this respect, the
more-so because the Romanians appreciated Britain as an influential voice in the
development of world economic and financial arrangements.66 Although a member of the
CMEA, by the latter 1970s Romania conducted less than half of its trade with Communist
countries. Its economic strategy was to attain the level of medium developed countries by
the mid-1980s and to build up an industrial base in metallurgy, engineering and the
chemical industry.67 The Romanians’ hope for stronger and beneficial economic ties with
Britain remained strong. One of the main interests focused on getting British advanced
technology especially aircraft engines.
Ceausescu’s distinctive style of foreign policy had given Romania a special
position in the international community and secured for him a reputation as a world
statesman. Ceausescu’s Romania continued to be the least enthusiastic and effective
member of the Warsaw Pact. Unlike the other members of the Pact, in addition to its
contacts with the West and idiosyncratic position concerning the Sino-Soviet split, it made
considerable effort to establish a special relationship with the non-aligned movement and
maintains relations with both Israel and the Arab countries. In the world Communist
movement the Romanians supported the principle of independence of the Communist
Parties and deplored public polemics between parties. 68 Romania’s friendly relations with
Yugoslavia and China and the non-aligned movement were designed to bolster its position.
The departure of Ceausescu might prejudice the Romanians’ ability to continue their
independent policies, the British believed. 69
The main threat to Romania’s independence came from an over-mastering Soviet
Union. The maintenance of friendly relations with Yugoslavia and China and the non66
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aligned movement were designed in large measure to ameliorate this problem. Some of
Romania’s Warsaw Pact allies were also troublesome. Nevertheless, if some room for
manoeuvre could be maintained, and if actual war were averted, some measure of
independence would be possible, Britain’s mission in Bucharest assessed:
Above all they fear the Russians. And their over-riding anxiety is to avoid giving
the Soviet leaders an excuse for intervening in Romanian affairs, or still worse,
for establishing control over the mouth of the Danube and thus obtaining a
stranglehold over Romanian economic life.’ As long as the American and Soviet
commitments to detente and the avoidance of nuclear war constraints the two
Super Powers’ action, as long as the actions in the Middle East or elsewhere did
not precipitate confrontation, the Romanians were reasonably sure that they could
hold the line. 70

Nevertheless, Ceausescu never forgot the Dubcek precedent; nor that the
Romanian Party would not necessarily be the leader of choice for a Romania free to
choose. These balls he juggled. The deliberate policy of normalising relations with its
Warsaw Pact allies created a period of relative calm for pursuing Romania’s national
interests. Romania’s interest in the maintenance of detente provided room for its economic
development and to resist outside political interference. The Romanians remained obsessed
by a fear of anything that might have increased the polarisation of Europe and hated,
particularly, discussion of ‘provocative’ human rights policies. For this reason, the
Government’s policies, internal or external, were never allowed to harden into any easily
defined geo-political concept or nationalist determination. The party as well was in no
hurry to abandon the position of power and privilege it had assumed for itself.
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The Queen’s Guests

‘There is no evidence that denial of human rights and
break-neck forced industrialization are the price Ceausescu must pay to
maintain country’s independence.’ (Ion Ratiu)1
An invitation to pay a State Visit does not, of course,
imply approval of particular policies pursued by the Government of the
visitor’s country. But it does suggest the existence of shared interests,
to which a State Visit would give impetus. (Lord Goronwy-Roberts,
Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs)2

An invitation to come to London to President Ceausescu was issued by Harold
Wilson during his visit to Bucharest in 1975 but the idea of such a visit was in fact first
put forward earlier, in June 1973, during the Conservative administration, when
Ceausescu was asked if he would like to come on Britain on either a State or a working
visit.3 The Conservative Minister of State at the Foreign Office, Julian Amery, raised the
idea in 1973. Ashe, the British Ambassador in Bucharest, on local leave in London until
15 October 1974, argued for the State visit by Ceausescu. ‘We had given the Romanians
strong reason to believe that this would be possible at a not-too-distant date,’ he assessed,
adding that ‘the British interests in Romania would suffer if we did not make good this
promise’. He certainly had in mind political and commercial considerations.4 The delay
was however caused by Ceausescu’s refusal to accept anything else but a full state visit.5
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State visits had to be planned two or three years ahead, James Callaghan told
Ceausescu during their short meeting in London in 1975. The Queen’s Jubilee in 1977,
when thirty-three Heads of Commonwealth countries were to be coming to London was a
major preoccupation. Ceausescu replied that he did not wish to attach too much
importance to the formality of State visits, as his own meeting with the Prime Minister
that day showed. So far as a State visit was concerned he hoped that this could take place
whenever possible, but there was no hurry about it, and he would be happy to wait for
one, two or three years. He emphasized that he did not wish to create any precedents for
other Heads of State.6 The British assured Ceausescu that they would make a formal
announcement of the timing of the State visit. That should not however preclude him
from coming to London on less formal visits meanwhile.7
In part the invitation was intended to recognise the special position of Romania
as a Communist country with an independent foreign policy and one which, by
maintaining good relations with countries of all political persuasions, had a unique
contribution to make to the solution of international problems (the Middle East, for
instance). It was also hoped that the visit would encourage closer commercial relations
between the two countries and thereby increase the opportunities for British exporters in
Romania.8 The Government’s justification for inviting Ceausescu was that he alone in the
Warsaw Pact bloc had consistently taken a foreign policy line independent of Moscow,
and had therefore to be encouraged. He preached a policy of non-interference and he
recognized Israel as well as the Arab states, China as well as the Soviet Union. It was

6

The meeting took place during Ceausescu’s stopover in London on his way back to Romania.
Record of the meeting between Ceausescu and Callaghan, 12 June 1975. TNA, PRO, FC0 28/2750, f. 47,
B.G. Cartledge, EESD, FCO, to J. C. Petersen, C.M.G. Bucharest, 11 July 1975. Visit of President
Ceausescu’s visit to Britain.
7
TNA, PRO, PREM 16/637, Record of the meeting between the PM, James Callaghan, and
President Ceausescu at Chequers, 12 June 1975.
8
TNA, PRO, BW 53/23, f. 16. David Owen, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth
Affairs, to Sir Derek Walker-Smith, MP, 12 May 1978.

237

claimed that he persuaded President Sadat of Egypt to try to break the deadlock by
offering to visit Israel.9
The details of the visit were subject of prolonged and difficult negotiation
between the two sides. The Romanians insisted on having the State visit publicized
internationally.10 The Romanians involved in the preparation of the visit required from
the British that four officers responsible for Ceausescu’s security be allowed to carry
guns. The British Special Branch would take all responsibility for Ceausescu’s security
for the time of the state visit, the Minister of State, Lord Goronwy-Roberts, told the
Romanian Ambassador, Pretor Popa. According to British law, the officers who were in
charge with the President’s security should leave all the armaments in the plane or hand
them the British police officers at the airport. The British regulations were strict and no
exception had been made so far, Lord Goronwy-Roberts added.11 The Romanians also
requested that the Bishop of London or the Bishop of Southwark be invited instead of the
Archbishop of Canterbury since these two were believed to be more favourable to the
Romanian regime than the later. The same applied to Conservative leaders such as W.
Whitelaw, the vice-chief of the Conservatives or Lord Carrington, the chief of the
Conservative opposition in the House of Lords preferred against Margaret Thatcher, a
notorious anti-communist.12 Eventually J. Thorpe was invited instead of Thatcher.
Whether she knew or not about the Romanians’ objections concerning her, Thatcher
declared that when it came to the State Visit there were no divergences between the
Conservatives and Labour. The Conservative Government was, however, the one that had
9
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proposed that Ceausescu be invited to Britain. Julian Amery, as indicated, had conveyed
the invitation in 1973 during his visit to Romania.13
Ceausescu also proved difficult and demanding, as might have been foreseen. He
was insistent he and his wife enjoy the highest honours while in British as were accorded
to only certain other, particularly favoured leaders. To the Ceausescus’ great
disappointment, the presidential plane was allowed to land not at Heathrow but at
Gatwick airport. This had the disadvantage of being forty kilometres away from London.
To make it more acceptable to the Romanians the British suggested that the guests be met
by the Royal family at Victoria Station where the Ceausescus were supposed to come by
train from Gatwick. The only residence acceptable for the three days of the visit was
Buckingham Palace. Ceausescu expected to be transported there in an open carriage,
accompanied by his hosts.14
Further details were gradually hammered out. The program of the visit included
a ceremony during which Ceausescu was to be awarded by the Queen Elizabeth II the
Grand Cross of the Most Honourable Order of the Bath. The President’s wife, Elena
Ceausescu, was to be granted a diploma for her research in Chemistry. Formerly in the
background, Ceausescu’s wife had started performing the role of ‘first lady’ to the full.
Having been made a full member of the Central Committee in July 1972, she was
prominent in internal affairs and was assessed to have a great deal of influence.15 She
was, therefore, to be obliged. ‘Many Romanians think that she played a major part (too
major) in policy making’, Jeffrey Petersen, the British Ambassador reported to London.
For her increasing pretentions to the honours of a Head of State’s consort and for her
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‘drab, grim public appearances, she is not popular and, perhaps, more significantly, has
become the butt of many popular jokes’. 16
The couple’s demands had developed over time, reaching the level of conceding
‘nothing to royalty in their personal exigencies.’ Their assumed isolation was just a
reflection of the socialist society which, while presumably offering equal share of
opportunities for everyone, was clearly stratified in offering privileges. During the visit of
King Baudouin of Belgium to Romania, the King insisted on giving the token return
hospitality of a glass of champagne. Ceausescu made it clear that those invited must be
confined strictly to the royal party, himself and senior member of the Government. ‘All
suggestions that the doors of the reception should be thrown open to a slightly wider
selection of prominent Romanians were firmly turned down. Neither the President nor his
wife at any time felt it necessary to engage in conversation with any members of the royal
party except the King and Queen and when necessary the accompanying Belgian
Minister.’17
Ceausescu’s presidential style on visits abroad had developed progressively.
Already in 1970, however, he expected to be received with the ceremony typically
associated with royalty. During his state visit to Austria between 21 and 25 Sept 1970, for
example, Ceausescu requested to be lodged at the castle of Klesheim, in Salzburg. The
request was made, the Austrian believed, simply because he learnt that The Queen
Elizabeth II had stayed there the year before. Apparently, Ceausescu wished to follow, as
closely as possible, the pattern set by The Queen’s visit. 18 In time the Ceausescus got the
16
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reputation as the world’s most capricious and difficult guests.19 To go to Britain as the
Queen’s guest was a matter of political importance and personal prestige for Ceausescu.

If Ceausescu’s motives in pressing for the visit were prestige and pride, Britain
continued to be motivated primarily by economic considerations. It would be, London
indicated, the first visit of the leader of a Socialist State, and a powerful recognition of
Ceausescu’s contribution to the promotion of a new politics of cooperation between all
world states. The framework created by the visit could have economic results that would
give the visit the character of working trip. The Labour Party would do what it could to
ensure that the visit was a success, Ian Mikardo, the President of the International
committee of the Labour Party, assured.20
The Romanian Government, as might have been expected given its love for
formal paperwork, insisted that a Joint Declaration be signed during the visit. The British
Ambassador to Bucharest, Seconde, was instructed to underline the difference between a
state visit to Britain and those to other Western countries such as the United States where
the Head of State is also the Head of Government. Seconde had to convince the adamant
Romanians that it was a long established practice in Britain that the State visits were ‘not
appropriate occasion for the issue of a solemn declaration of the kind which the
Royalty, the fairly unfortunate effect which his son seems to have had on those who met him and some
ruffled feelings in the corps diplomatique over the manner in which they were treated at Ceausescu’s own
reception, the visit received uniformly favourable, if somewhat meagre, press coverage.’ There were
flattering articles about Romania’s independent ways and the opportunities offered to the Western
businessmen and tourists.
‘Partly perhaps because of the change of government in Austria since President Jonas visited
Romania, there appears to have been almost complete agreement between the two sides on the various
topics discussed during the two sessions of official talks. [... ] The Socialist government here have gone
rather further than their predecessors in welcoming this project. He seems to have made a similar
impression there as he did in Belgium last October. TNA, PRO, FCO 28/2316, f. 2, E.H.B. Gibbs, British
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Romanian authorities have in mind’. If an actual diplomatic instrument could not be
arranged, the British government did agree to make an exceptional concession to satisfy
Romanian requirements: the talks between Ceausescu and the British Prime Minister
would lead to the issue of a Joint Communiqué, which would be referred to by both as a
‘Joint Statement’.21 The Romanian’s were satisfied with this solution, but desired that the
‘Joint Statement’ should be something of substance. It should be regarded, thereafter, as
the authoritative basis for the development of bilateral relations. 22
It was expected that Ceausescu’s visit to London finally scheduled for 13 to 16
June 1978 would open up new prospects for economic, political and cultural relations.23 It
was also likely that the visit would to be marked by protests since Ceausescu’s regime
was one of the least democratic in Eastern Europe.24 Ceausescu had been upset by
protests over the alleged unfair treatment of Hungarians during his previous visit to
Washington; but also because of the great popular concern in the West concerning human
rights abuses. In the run up to the visit, Ceausescu’s repressive domestic policies were
mentioned and publicized far less than his nationalistic foreign policy. Before visiting
Britain, Ceausescu granted an interview to The Sunday Telegraph.25 He denied that
Romania had encountered problems arising from rapid industrialization. He seemed to
have forgotten entirely the Jiu Valley miners’ strike which had occurred one year before
his visit in August 1977. About 35,000 miners participated in the strike, blocking the
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entrances to mines and occupying the mining operations offices for a week.26 A
combination of local grievances and the promulgation of new pension laws sparked off a
work stoppage in at least two mining towns in Jiu Valley area. The miners demanded a
reduction in the working day from eight to six hours, retirement at age of fifty and
concessions on other issues workplace issues. Ceausescu interrupted his Black Sea
holiday and hastily convened a government commission to deal with the crisis. He
travelled to the Jiu Valley. According to the unofficial reports, the President had first a
meeting, unaccompanied by advisers with the strike committee, which had presented him
with a list of demands. One of these was that none of the strike leaders should be
subsequently punished. Others were said to include shorter working hours, a change in
the new pension law, better food and medical facilities, and safer and modern
equipment.27 Ceausescu is said to have agreed to the demands, promising pension
reforms and improvement of working conditions. In spite of Ceausescu’s promises to
meet the grievances and not to take retaliatory measures against the organizers of the
strike, the Jiu Valley was declared a ‘restricted area’, and the army together with security
police began a crackdown. In the following months, several hundred miners were moved
to other mining areas while others were sent to a labour camp on the Danube-Black Sea
canal. 28
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Other evidence suggests that the British public generally was aware that
Ceausescu was far less benign than sometimes portrayed in the press. Letters addressed
by many British people to their MPs, for example, expressed concern for human rights
violation in Romania. One of the issues raised was the psychiatric abuse to which
political prisoners were subjected and their maltreatment in detention. Amnesty
International was in possession of papers indicating that the Romanian authorities applied
psychiatric treatment to subjects found guilty only of having exercised their rights to
freedom of expression and conscience.29 The case of Ion Vulcanescu who succeeded in
leaving Romania a year before the state visit was typical of the experience of the thirty
Romanian victims of psychiatric abuse then known. Between April and May 1975
Vulcanescu was interrogated for between four and sixteen hours daily. The interrogation
usually took place during the night or early morning. He was not allowed food or drink
while being interrogated and he was severely beaten after refusing to sign a document
saying he had committed crimes. The document did not specify however which crimes he
had committed.30
On the evening of 11 May 1975 Vulcanescu was sent to the prison hospital of
Jilava, south west of Bucharest, after he had suffered severe head injuries caused
by kicking. He was held in the psychiatric ward of the hospital until 3 June. This
ward was at this time occupied by both political and common offenders who
were subjected to treatment with various drugs. . . Vulcanescu was irregularly
injected with doses of Plegomazin and Mezoptil – up to 400 milligrams being
administered daily by Dr. Serbanescu and Mr. Velicu. Some of the political
offenders who had been tried already were treated with intramuscular injections
of up to 800 milligrams of Plegomazin and Mezoptil per day. Plegomazin is a
strong sedative generally invoking a state of apathy in a patient and slowing
down both physical and mental reaction. Mezoptil has a similar effect.’31
Another case mentioned by Amnesty International was that of Mihail, one of
signatories of the Human Rights Appeal initiated by the writer Paul Goma. Mihail was
29
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interrogated, beaten and force to drink methyl alcohol while he was in the hands of the
Securitate. These cases were mentioned as evidence that the regime continued to sent to
prison people whose only guilt was that they criticized the regime. Dr. Nicolae Ighisan,
Lae Iorgulescu and Janos Torok were also indicated as suffering political repression.

32

Writing on behalf of the people of Romania, Radu Campeanu, a Romanian exile, voiced
strong opposition to the welcome to be given to Ceausescu. His reception would be a
blow to freedom and an encouragement to totalitarian oppression. He referred to the
brutalities inflicted on Romanians, and in particular to the extermination of the political
and intellectual elite.33
MPs wrote to the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs,
Lord Goronwy-Roberts, enclosing letters from their constituents. Most correspondents
were concerned with human rights violations in Romania and were asking for the
invitation to be cancelled. Since the question of personal freedom in Romania raised so
much concern among the British and formed the subject of the many letters, the officials
felt the need to point out that the British Government had taken ‘suitable opportunities,
most recently during the visit to Britain of the Romanian Foreign Minister in midNovember, to spell out to the Romanian authorities their attitude on matters of individual
liberty. In their replies, the Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs did not forget to mention
that ‘like all other signatories of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe, Romania is committed to respect the freedom of thought,
conscience, religion and belief.’34
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Notwithstanding the criticism, the British Government remained inclined to see
the visit happen, and to make it a success. The Minister of State for Foreign and
Commonwealth Affairs, Lord Goronwy-Roberts, maintained that,
‘governments of both parties have taken the view that contacts and exchanges of
visits with Romania, and with other countries of Eastern Europe, are important
in pursuing detente, in seeking to widen the area of cooperation, and in creating
an atmosphere in which trade can flourish and bilateral problems be discussed
and solved. 35
One aspect of particular concern remained a number of personal cases in which
Romanian citizens wished to marry British nationals or to leave Romania to join
relatives in this country. According to the British the cases had been discussed with the
Romanians ‘with very good results’.36 Nonetheless, when British officials were asked to
intervene in specific cases such as the case of a persecuted Christian family for
belonging to the Pentecostal faith, the standard answer prepared was addressed by the
Foreign Office in response to complaints:37 ‘We should have no real standing to
intervene directly to the Romanian Government in a case of this kind. However, the
general issue of personal freedom is likely to be covered during discussions between
President Ceausescu and the Prime Minister.’38 And although a meeting with the
Romanian President was asked for by the Director of an organization ‘Christian support
for the Persecuted’, it was not normal for a guest of The Queen to meet private groups
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‘unless he specifically asks to do so and a convenient time can be found in the
programme. As it is President Ceausescu’s programme had been fixed for some time,
and it is very full.’39 The British government continually emphasized that:
An invitation to pay a State Visit does not, of course, imply approval of
particular policies pursued by the Government of the visitor’s country. But it
does suggest the existence of shared interests, to which a State Visit would give
impetus. Relations between Britain and Romania have become substantial,
especially in trade, but also in the political and other fields. In the Government’s
view, there is good scope for strengthening and broadening those ties. President
Ceausescu’s State Visit will be an important contribution to this. 40
The MPs were assured that the Prime Minister and other Ministers would during their
discussions with Ceausescu the way in which the provisions of the Final Act have been
implemented.’ 41
On the other hand, and oddly, a large proportion of the letters pouring into
Britain arrived from Italy. Many of these were highly supportive of the visit. Managers
and owners of various companies which had business interests or affairs in Romania
expressed delight at the news concerning Ceausescu’s visit to London and did not forget
to emphasize the ‘improvement of living standard in Romania’ or the ‘harmonious
development’ of the country in which the people had every opportunity to enjoy their
own languages.42 Why did all these Italians felt such a need to write to the British Prime
Minister and inform him on the internal affairs of Romania? It seems probable that the
Ceausescu regime had solicited the letters from its business partners in order to counter
the anticipated avalanche of criticism.

39

TNA, PRO, BW 53/23, f. 30. D.G. Lambert, EESD, to the Director of an organization
‘Christian support for the Persecuted’, 7 June 1978.
40
TNA, PRO, BW 53/23, f. 34, Lord Goronwy-Roberts, Minister of State for Foreign and
Commonwealth Affairs, to Eric Deakins, MP, House of Commons, 15 June 1978.
41
Ibid.
42
TNA, PRO, BW 53/23, ff. 40-45. ‘The various people enjoy the fullest rights guaranteed by
Romanian law.’ BW 53/23, f. 44, 9 June 1978. The president of a company importing foodstuffs from
Romania, wrote on 10 June 1978 a letter to PM James Callaghan in which he mentioned that he had learnt
with pleasure about Ceausescu’s visit and stressed the rise of living standards in Romania. TNA, PRO, BW
53/23, f. 45.

247

In anticipation of Ceausescu’s visit to London, the Romanian press began to
demonstrate a greater interest in British affairs, and with it, a more friendly editorial line.
Britain was seeking, ‘with realism, calm and lucidity’, ways of overcoming the economic
and social difficulties it had to face. The weekly Lumea pointed out that Britain had a
solid tradition of efficiency in industrial, economic and commercial activities and that its
people were highly competent, talented and earnest. Numerous statements by British
political figures on the expansion and consolidation of relations between Romania and
Britain were published including citations from statements by Lord Goronwy-Roberts,
Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, and Denis Hurd, the
Conservative spokesman on international affairs.43
The British press, likewise, began to demonstrate greater interest. A collection of
Ceausescu’s speeches and declaration, entitled ‘Nicolae Ceausescu – An Effort to create a
Modern Romania’ was published in Britain under the supervision of Stan Newens, MP.44
On 1 June 1978 Ceausescu gave an interview to Keith Hatfield of the Independent
Television News. 45 In anticipation of the interview, the Romanians had vetted questions,
and indicated what might be asked. The result was a disappointment. Hatfield was
frustrated by the ‘very standard answers’ he had obtained to some ‘very standard
questions’. There was no prospect of ITN using all of the interview although Hatfield
hoped to use a significant portion by spreading extracts around the various short items
planned for News at Ten before and during the visit. Hatfield had to steer a difficult path
between proper criticism and an appreciation of what was positive in Romania; between
the President’s authoritarian government and the bureaucracy, inefficiency and corruption
43
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of the system in general, and Romania’s foreign policy, her economic achievements and
her treatment of minorities.46

During his visit to London, Ceausescu was protected from disturbances which
might have been caused by a projected meeting of the Romanian exiles in Britain. Their
aim was to signal the repressive nature of the Romanian communism. 47 ‘A small group
of protesters were carrying a placard reading ‘Human rights for Romanian Christians!’.48
The protesters were members of the British-Romanian association, an émigré group
whose demonstration, although authorized by the police, was obstructed. They were
completely obscured from Ceausescu’s view by a police bus parked right in front of
them.’49 One of the protesters, carrying a placard comparing life in Romania to Orwell’s
‘1984’ was arrested for attempting to scale a police barrier. Ion Ratiu, the chairman of the
British-Romanian association, claimed that there was a deliberate action by the police to
block the demonstration.50 Ratiu also claimed to have had difficulty in getting letters
critical of British foreign policy towards Romania into the British press.
If the Government was, indeed, trying to censor Ratiu, it was not entirely
successful. In a letter addressed to The Times, Ratiu revealed the shortcomings of the
regime, pointing out that ‘there was no evidence that denial of human rights and breakneck forced industrialization are the price Ceausescu must pay to maintain the country’s
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independence’.51 ‘Little practical purpose is served by arguing whether or not Romania’s
foreign policy involved genuine defiance of the Soviet Union as was asserted in The
Times’. The British should be aware that Ceausescu ‘relied heavily on nationalistic appeal
and professed a communist ideological purity which he constantly extolled to the party
and country.52 Ratiu expressed the hope that Britain would exert a beneficial influence
over Romania especially concerning human rights.53
Concerned with the human rights abuses that took place in Romania, Lord
Chelwood, a Conservative, asked in the House of Lords,54
Which promises in the field of human rights -- according to the 1947 Peace
Treaty and to the Helsinki Final Act signed by Romania – had President
Ceausescu undertaken to carry out in return for the large increases proposed in
the provision of British technology? 55
The Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Lord Goronwy-Roberts,
avoided being explicit regarding the issue of human rights. He merely stated that
negotiations with Romania were based ‘on normal commercial considerations’. He
expressed his strong belief that Britain and Romania ‘will, indeed, derive very
considerable economic and, it may be, political advantage’ from the agreement
concluded.
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The economic potential of the visit was very important from both British

and Romanian points of view. In the Romanian view, the visit would establish the fact
that the Romanian economy was growing rapidly, and now required greater cooperation
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‘with economically developed countries on the basis of the latest gains of contemporary
science and technology.’57
The more economic ties Ceausescu had with the West, the stronger his political
independence from the Soviet Union would become, the British government seemingly
believed. Human rights, it seemed could wait and would improve provided other agendas
were furthered.
Since Helsinki East-West relations had tended to slide down-hill, according to
the Prime Minister James Callaghan. During the plenary session of talks, which took
place at No.10 Downing Street on 14 June, in the presence of British and Romanian high
officials, Callaghan approached the international situation and disarmament and reviewed
the state of East-West relations and détente. The talks held in the Cabinet room lasted for
about an hour. Besides the Prime Minister, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary,
David Owen, the Secretary of State for Trade, Edmund Dell, and the Minister of State,
from the Department of Industry, Gerald Kaufman, were also taking part. From the
Romanian side besides Ceausescu, his First Deputy Prime Minister, Gheorghe Oprea, the
Minister for Foreign Affairs, Stefan Andrei, the Minister for Machine Building Industry,
Ioan Avram and the Minister for Presidential Affairs, Vasile Pungan took part in the
meeting. The discussion centred largely on international political matters: East-West
relations, detente, disarmament and developments in Southern Africa.
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Callaghan

mentioned three negative factors which led to the regression of détente: Soviet
expenditure on arms which grew very fast; 59 the balance in Africa being disturbed by the
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Soviet Union; and human rights which had been brought to the fore by the Helsinki
Agreement. ‘Like the United States, the UK had a large Jewish community; the fate of
their coreligionists naturally concerned them and this concern had spread into the more
general field of the circumstances of intellectuals and the trials which had taken place for,
in Western terms, no adequate reasons’, the Prime Minister maintained.60 This was
apparently the only time Callaghan mentioned the issue of human rights during
Ceausescu’s state visit. More important considerations were to be tackled.
According to Ceausescu, East-West tensions resulted from the realization of
both Blocs that their influence over the rest of the world was diminishing. ‘The
development of countries outside the two world blocs would inevitably determine the
world balance of forces. This was a trend which would become even stronger. Romania
regarded these changes as a favourable development which would help to bring about
new policies based on the independence and equality of rights of each nation. The new
trends in international relations were being accentuated by the economic crisis, by the
energy crisis – including the crisis in oil supply – and by the monetary and financial crisis
in the Western world. While the Great Powers were seeking to maintain their spheres of
influence and to win new ones, the redistribution of spheres of influence was bound to
lead to further sharpening of international relations.’ 61
Ceausescu also emphasized that in the period following Helsinki certain Western
countries seemed to have lost sight of the essentials of East-West cooperation. This is
why probably he insisted during the following tête-à-tête conversation with Callaghan on
Britain’s greater involvement in Eastern Europe. ‘The Socialist countries were not
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exempt from blame either,’ Ceausescu assessed. ‘They could have done more.’ What it
was certain was that the existing tensions would increasingly limit existing contacts. 62
The plenary session of talks followed a tête-à-tête conversation which the Prime
Minister had with Ceausescu earlier that day. A further tête-à-tête discussion took place
in the President’s suite at Buckingham Palace on 15 June. 63 During their first tête-à-tête
conversation on 14 June, Callaghan asked Ceausescu on his opinion on whether the
apparent deterioration in relations between the Soviet Union and the United States was
real or not. Ceausescu was inclined to doubt that the tension would substantially affect
the common concern of both governments to reach agreements in a number of areas. His
conclusion was that the relations between the two superpowers were unlikely to head
towards real deterioration. The major problems in international affairs could no longer be
solved by the United States and the Soviet Union alone, Ceausescu added. 64
The second tête-à-tête meeting held at Buckingham Palace on 15 June focused
at first on relations between China and the Soviet Union. Callaghan was interested in
Ceausescu’s views on the best ways of regulating one’s relations with the Soviet Union
and China.

65

The British Prime Minister found it difficult ‘to be punched by one and

buffeted by the other into taking up particular positions’. Callaghan referred to this matter
particularly in the light of Ceausescu’s recent visit to Peking. 66
Romania enjoyed good relations with both China and the Soviet Union and was
careful not to interfere in Sino-Soviet polemics when these flared up from time to time,
Ceausescu assessed. He noticed that the Soviets were ‘a bit more suspicious than China
62
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of Romanian policies and did not always regard Romania’s relation with China
benevolently’. The Russians had in fact no reason to be angry with Romania, Ceausescu
added.67 Although he agreed with the Chinese principle that relations between countries
should be based on mutual cooperation and Romania had a good relationship with China,
this relation would not affect those with the Soviet Union or with any other country.68
From his recent visit to Peking, Ceausescu derived the impression that the
Chinese desired to accelerate economic development and were aware that they needed to
cooperate with others. There was some prospect for the improvement of Sino-Soviet
relations such as for the China’s relations with the United States, provided that the
Americans gave up their position regarding Taiwan.69 The Chinese were clearly more
willing to be active in the international arena. This was also clear from their performance
at the United Nations, Ceausescu asserted. 70
Callaghan then tackled what was evidently his main interest: defence sales to
China. The Chinese had given to the British a clear hint that they would like to purchase
the Harrier vertical takeoff (VTO) aircraft for deployment on their border. Supplying
aircraft to China could however create problems in Britain’s relations with the Soviet
Union. In turn, if Britain did not respond to the Chinese request, they would feel rebuffed.
Implicitly, Callaghan asked for an advice from Ceausescu.

71

Britain should be able to

supply Harriers to the Chinese in the same way as the Rolls Royce Spey engines had been
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supplied, ‘without too much publicity’, Ceausescu replied. 72 ‘[I]n these matters, the less
talk, the better – the Chinese are quite competent at keeping secrets.’ Ceausescu added
that, if necessary, the matter could be discussed further between Romania and Britain
through other channels. In the meantime, he saw no reason why Britain should not go
ahead, especially since if the Chinese were to acquire the Harrier, Romania ‘could also
get her hands on it more easily!’ He said that smiling, intriguing Callaghan.73 Was
Romania interested in acquiring Harrier? Not yet, replied Ceausescu. He recalled his
agreement with General de Gaulle made in 1968 for the purchase of French Mirage
aircraft. Besides, his first priority was to implement the programme which he had already
agreed with the British aircraft industry. Romania was manufacturing a military aircraft
of their own which was in the initial stages of development, Ceausescu added.
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Callaghan pointed out the qualities of the aircraft which would be valuable to the
Chinese. Ceausescu assessed that he was sure that the Chinese wanted to buy it.
The situation in North Korea was also approached by the Prime Minister as well
as Romania’s relations with India. Close to the end of their conversation, Ceausescu
insisted that Britain should develop its relations with ‘the other Socialist countries of
Eastern Europe to the extent to that they had done with Yugoslavia’. Britain’s excellent
relations with Yugoslavia had origins in their common experience during the Second
World War, Callaghan mentioned. He reviewed Britain’s relations with Hungary and
Bulgaria which were ‘correct, but rather lacked substance’. With Poland relations were
‘closer, communications more natural and there was a significant higher level of trade’.
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So far as Czechoslovakia was concerned, ‘there was considerable political feeling’ in
Britain about it and he did not see the relations with this country improving as with the
other Eastern European countries. Britain’s relations with Romania would be deeper and
more substantial than with some of the Socialist countries,’ Callaghan pointed out. 75
For their part, Romanians were most willing to develop this relationship.
Although daring, the targets established for Anglo-Romanian trade, were feasible,
Ceausescu maintained. 76 Both Ceausescu and Callaghan reaffirmed their determination
to work towards raising the annual volume of two-way trade by two and a half times
compared with the level achieved in 1974, by 1980.77 The evolution of trade and
industrial cooperation was discussed in depth during the State Visit and the potential for
further progress was taken into consideration.
The growth of trade and cooperation followed the signature of the Long Term
Agreement on Economic Collaboration and Industrial and Technological Cooperation.
GATT agreements and the position granted to Romania under the European
Community’s Generalised Scheme of Preferences also facilitated the access of Romanian
goods to the markets of European Community. 78
The two governments signed memorandums on cooperation in the Aerospace
Industry and technological cooperation in matters concerned with exploration for and
production of offshore oil and gas. 79 Agreements were concluded between the Romanian
Aeronautical Industry and British Aerospace [BAE] and Rolls-Royce on long term
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cooperation in the manufacture of the BAC 1-11 aircraft, and of aircraft engines. The
agreements with Rolls-Royce and BAE were signed at Filton on 15 June.80 Rolls-Royce
signed a framework agreement with Romania for sale of twenty five Spey engines and
collaborative manufacture of 250 more over seventeen years.81 The framework agreement
was valid until 30 September 1978. 82 BAE signed Licensing Agreement and Technical
Assistance Agreement. In addition BAE obtained an instruction to proceed and
commitment to a substantial down payment.
The problem of COCOM restriction on transfer of technology arose in particular
on aero engine castings and forgings. This was solved when Romanians acknowledged,
only after considerable trouble, receipt of letter indicating that at the present time Rolls
Royce could not guarantee transfer of technology for manufacture of all castings and
forgings.83
Documents had been also signed between the British groups Imperial Chemical
Industries [ICI], Northern Engineering Industries, Shell International Petroleum
Company, the National Coal Board and Romanian economic organizations. A record of
understanding continuing for a further year the scientific and technological cooperation in
agriculture and food processing was also signed during the State Visit. 84
The official statement, the Joint Statement, on the talks between Callaghan and
Ceausescu reaffirmed the importance of the Joint Declaration signed by Ceausescu and
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Harold Wilson in Bucharest on 18 September 1975. Callaghan and Ceausescu noted the
development of British-Romanian relations and co-operation since that time and agreed
that Ceausescu’s State Visit represented a further stage in this process.85 They agreed to
continue to work for the intensification of their bilateral relations and cooperation in
Europe, the maintenance and strengthening of international peace and security, the
settlement of current international problems and the construction of a better world. The
Joint Statement underlined the importance of principles contained in the 1975 Declaration
concerning the mutual relations between the two states for the promotion of friendship
between the British and the Romanian peoples, and of international peace and
cooperation. 86 Both sides expressed their concern over the fragility of the détente process
and emphasized the need for further efforts to ensure that this process was continued until
it becomes irreversible. Although they reaffirmed the importance of full implementation
by all participating states of the provisions of the Final Act of the CSCE, there was no
reference to human rights. 87
Ceausescu and Callaghan agreed that meetings at the highest level would
continue to be a decisive factor in the development of bilateral relations. 88 Britain and
Romania would also continue to extend and diversify their cultural exchanges as a means
of promoting fuller knowledge of each of two peoples about the other. As well, an
Agreement on cooperation in the field of education, science and culture was signed. 89
While Ceausescu’s opinions were apparently much valued by the British
officials, he and his wife succeeded in astounding the Buckingham Palace administration,
their hosts during the State Visit. According to Violeta Nastasescu, Elena Ceausescu’s
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interpreter, the presidential couple behaved with unbelievably poor manners. The
President’s wife yelled orders from the office assigned to her, to show perhaps that she
was actually in charge and powerful. She convened and released generals, Security
officers, journalists and assistants, treating them all like they were her servants. They
were running through the palace unsure of what she needed from them to accomplish her
contradictory and illogical instructions. She addressed them insultingly. Even General Ion
Mihai Pacepa, the chief of the Securitate responsible for the couple’s safety, who, used to
adopt an impassable attitude in tense circumstances, although unshaken, went from pale
to red and grey as shock and shame set in.90
Not to be outdone by his formidable wife, the President did not find a better way
to spend time between various events than by strutting through the palace in ‘Napoleonic’
style. His Security officers rushed to convene ministers and councillors. Reaching the
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Andrei, one of those sent for him whispered breathlessly,
‘The Comrade calls you, come quickly!’ ‘What is wrong with you people?’ Andrei
replied. ‘Do you want me be seen running like you, the mockery of the palace personnel?
Come to your senses!’91 Indeed, the Royal household looked on bewildered and tried to
ignore the Ceausescu induced chaos.
Although she was accorded a high distinction, Elena Ceausescu’s mood changed
rapidly. The Romanians’ request that the President’s wife be conferred the title ‘Fellow
of the Royal institute of Chemistry’ was granted. The ceremony was attended by
Professor Mary Dorothy Hodgkin, Nobel Prize’s laureate, Lord Walston, president of the
Centre Britain- Eastern Europe and Sir William Harpham, director general of the Centre
Britain-Eastern Europe.92
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To emphasize the friendship between the two states, high Romanian and British
distinction were awarded during the State Visit. The Queen Elizabeth II made Ceausescu
a Knight of the Order of the Bath. In return, Ceausescu awarded Elizabeth II the high
order of the Star of the Socialist Republic of Romania First Class.93
Overall the visit represented a success for both the British and the Romanians,
marking the culmination of bilateral relations. The lack of emphasis placed on human
rights was probably a mistake, and very shortly after the end of the London meeting
became an embarrassment, as news of how harsh Ceausescu was appeared in the
headlines of Western papers.
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Epilogue

A month after the State Visit an event shocked the Romanian leadership. The
Deputy Director of the Romanian Intelligent Service and special advisor to Ceausescu,
General Pacepa, defected to the United States in July 1978. He remained until the present
time the highest-ranking defector from the former Eastern Bloc. Pacepa was apparently
instructed to conduct assassinations of the Romanian exiles critical of Ceausescu regime.
He refused and defected to the United States where he was granted political asylum. After
his defection and until the end of the Communist regime in Romania, he was the target of
several assassination attempts.94
Among the targets of intimidations identified by Ceausescu had apparently been
the Romanian and Hungarian émigrés in New York who had organized a demonstration
on April 16, 1978. These included Cornel Dumitrescu, editor of the newspaper Lumea
libera [Free World] edited in New York, in whose name the demonstration had been
authorized, Viorel Trifa, leader of the Romanian Orthodox Bishopric in the United States,
and Laszlo Kolman. Following the disclosures General Pacepa made immediately after
his defection, the Securitate renounced the attempt to intimidate those mentioned above.
The Securitate as well, commenced a smear campaign indicating that these émigrés were
fascists and war criminals and that they were to blame for the murder of Jews during
World War II.95
Ion Ratiu, the person who organized the protest in London, was also included on
the list of ‘undesirables’ to be silenced. Following the defection of General Pacepa and
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his disclosures the Securitate did not go beyond the stage of preparation. Ratiu and his
family were however monitored by the Securitate, for being suspected of conducting
‘espionage for the benefit of the British secret services.’

96

At the beginning of 1989

Ratiu received a message through West-German sources that he was targeted by the
Romanian regime and was offered protection. 97

In the 1980s international protests against Ceausescu’s domestic policies eroded
much of the credibility that he gained through its defiance of Moscow. The “utility” of
Romanian deviance seemed to be diminishing. Ceausescu’s efforts to silence all real or
potential opposition within and outside the country had a profound impact on the
perception of the Romanian Communist regime. One of the most known episodes
involved two Romanian dissidents that lived in France. Virgil Tănase, a dissident
Romanian writer and, at that time, French citizen, accused the Romanian government of
mounting a plot to assassinate him and another émigré, Paul Goma, for campaigning for
human rights in Romania.98

Ceausescu’s ‘systematisation’ program which implied a disregard for Romanian
architectural heritage led environmental groups in Western Europe to co-ordinate an
international protest. The most effective in terms of attracting media attention and in
providing moral support to Romanian people was the so-called ”Operation Villages
Roumains” that recommended to Western European villages to ‘adopt’ Romanian ones.
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Consequently, tens of thousands of letters sent from European communities to Romania and
addressed to the mayors of Romanian villages proposing the ‘adoption’.

In 1989 the Prince of Wales criticized Ceausescu`s village resettlement plan and
demolition of churches. In a speech delivered at the opening of Business Design Centre
on 27 April 1989, talking about architectural inheritance and building in harmony with
surroundings, he mentioned the careless type of developer who is not concerned with the
lives of villages or towns but just with profit. According to the Prince of Wales, the
purpose of the systematization was to create a new type of person, utterly subordinate to
Ceausescu’s policy through the destruction of the cultural heritage of Romanians. He
declared that was impossible to remain silent when “the peasant traditions and ancient of
a fellow European society are bulldozed to make way for a uniform and deathly mockmodernity”. The Prince of Wales declared that the British government and its European
partners would bring pressure on the Romanian government ‘to reverse its policies,’
arguing that the “extraordinary cultural diversity of Romania is not only part of her
natural wealth but a possession of inestimable value to all of humanity”. Systematization
eventually ceased as a result of Romanian revolution of 1989 that overthrew the
Communist regime.99
In December 1989, while the Romanian revolution taking place, the Queen, on
the recommendation of Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd, considered cancelling the
honorary knighthood awarded to Ceausescu during his State Visit to Britain in 1978. A
spokesman said the Queen will also return the personal award, the Star of the Socialist
Republic of Romania First Class, given to her during that visit. The Foreign Affairs
Minister, William Waldegrave told BBC TV that the British were seeking ‘every further
weapon we could find to encourage the Romanian people in their truly heroic resistance,
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and anything else we could do to damage Ceausescu.’ Waldegrave admitted that when
the honour was presented to the Romanian dictator it was thought his distancing from the
Soviet Union may signal political reform within Romania and even himself believed it
was a reasonable hope at that time.
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Conclusion

Britain’s relation with Romania evolved during the Cold War from cold and
tense at the 1940s to warm and close in the second half of the 1970s. While at the end of
the Second World War, Britain’s sphere of interests focused on an area which excluded
Romania, in 1978 Ceausescu went to London in a State Visit and was received with much
honour. It was the first time that a leader of a Communist country had been the Queen
Elizabeth’s guest at Buckingham Palace.
In the aftermath of the Second World War, although Britain’s representatives
reported an increased Soviet interference in Romania’s domestic affairs, London warned
them not to provide any advice or encouragement for King Michael and the opposition
leaders. After the November 1946 elections the Communists had a virtually free hand in
Romania. Little was done to protest the incorporation of Romania behind the Iron
Curtain. On 10 February 1947, Britain signed a Peace treaty with Romania. Article 2 of
the treaty contained a formal affirmation of the inviolability of human rights and
fundamental freedoms, in accordance with the Declaration on Liberated Europe
promulgated at Yalta but there was little evidence that the Communists would observe
their undertakings. While in Romania the situation was deteriorating, people being
imprisoned for real or imaginary offenses, certain Labour MPs and Communists’ fellow
travellers invited to visit Romania expressed admiration for the communist regime.
Britain’s relations with Romania virtually ceased after King Michael’s forced
abdication at the end of 1947. The new policy pursued by the Communist regime towards
Britain was marked by accusations of espionage, demands for the recall of British
diplomats and the closure of the Press Office. For more than a decade Romania was
totally isolated from the West. Although nominally a sovereign country, it was in fact a
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very Soviet satellite. Confined to Bucharest, British diplomats could hardly get any
information on what was going on in the country. Significantly, the British Minister to
Bucharest, Allan Dudley, tended to disbelieve the Western press reports on students’
unrest taking place in October 1956 echoing the Hungarian Revolution. Sitting in
Bucharest, he had no access to any source of information independent of the regime.
Peaceful co-existence proclaimed by Khrushchev from the rostrum of the 20th
Congress of the Soviet Communist party inspired a Romanian to approach certain British
MPs with proposals for resuming trade and cultural exchanges. Although admitting that
the Romanians had been less disagreeable in the past two years in their treatment of the
British Legation at Bucharest, the failure of the Romanian government to settle the
problem of the outstanding financial debt and the refusal to release former employees of
the Legation and the British Council hindered any reestablishment of amicable relations.
Except for the short thaw in 1956, for the remainder of the decade, relations
remained uncomfortably frigid. Although the Romanian regime changed its attitude
towards Britain to some extent, no significant improvement was possible. While the
practice of arresting employees of the British Legation and the demands for recall of
British diplomats was discontinued, surveillance of diplomatic missions continued,
accompanied by a virtual confinement of British representatives to Bucharest and a small
perimeter surrounding the capital. Despite the openness they claimed, the Romanians did
not agree to the British proposal for opening reading rooms in Bucharest since that would
be an opportunity for the British to place their agents there. Instead, the Romanians
argued for exchanges of scientists, writers, exhibitions and even exchanges between the
two national Churches.
A compromise emerged in the early 1960s when the Foreign Office, brushing
aside the British Council - according to which the imprisonment of their former
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employees prohibited any direct cultural liaison with Romania - decided on the
resumption of limited cultural relations with Romania. The Romanians responded by
releasing, in stages, the political detainees. Although the process was slow, by the time
most of detainees were released, cultural relations were established on solid ground.
A trade agreement was also signed in October 1960. Although financial claims
represented an important issue in the re-establishment of relations, the fact that Romania
had solved similar legacy debt problems with the United States, France, Switzerland and
Austria, led the British to hope that they would also be able to solve the matter with the
Romanians. The improvement of bilateral relations continued in the 1960s with a 1962
Cultural Exchange Programme. Britain’s Legation was raised to level of Embassy in
September 1963 and the newly appointed British Ambassador to Bucharest, J.D. Murray,
reporting Bucharest’s efforts to obtain independence from Moscow, advised London not
to encourage anti-Romanian publicity.
The Romanians emphasized emphatically a new policy laid down in the
Declaration of 22 April 1964. The Romanian leadership was cautious however not to
precipitate a break with the Soviet Union which almost happened four years later, when
the new leader, Nicolae Ceausescu, stunned the world with a speech in which he
condemned the Soviet led invasion of Czechoslovakia. Romanian support for
Czechoslovakia led to a serious worsening of relations with the Soviet Union to a point at
which it seemed possible that Romania might have been invaded. Romania demonstrated
once again that it was not subservient to the will of the Soviet Union, while indicating
also that it had greatly come up in the world. All were aware, of course, that the Brezhnev
doctrine might equally be applied to Ceausescu as to Alexander Dubcek. It was not
unlikely that the Russians would have liked to see Ceausescu replaced by ‘someone more
pliant to their wishes’. Ceausescu showed however great skill in making out a reasoned
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case for Romania’s policies, calling for world peace, self-determination, non-interference,
and friendship with all. His distinctive style of foreign policy had given Romania a
special position in the international community and secured for him a reputation as a
world statesman.
The Labour Party Manifesto of 1974 provided for the improvement of relations
with the Eastern European countries up to the limit which the situation permitted in each
case. An important factor in the Prime Minister’s decision to visit Romania in 1975 was
its independent foreign policy. Harold Wilson’s visit to Romania was the first by a British
Prime Minister to an Eastern European state other than the Soviet Union since the Second
World War. The visit marked a new foreign policy departure for Britain. Wilson and
Ceausescu signed a Long Term Cooperation Agreement, which was a ten-year agreement
on economic, industrial, and technical cooperation. The two sides expected a growth in
trade over the duration of the agreement of two and half times. An agreement on financial
issues was also reached, and from the British perspective this was probably the most
important results of the visit since the Romanian debt had remained a bone of contention
between the two sides for thirty years.
The Romanians appreciated Britain as an influential voice in the development of
world economic and financial arrangements. The Romanians were interested in British
advanced technology especially as an important supplier of aircraft engines. If Britain had
learned to view Romania primarily through a political and economic lens, Romania’s
agenda might have been more extensive, but the hope for stronger and beneficial
economic ties remained strong.
Romania was the least enthusiastic and effective member of the Warsaw Pact.
Unlike the other members of the Pact, in addition to its contacts with the West and
idiosyncratic position concerning the Sino-Soviet split, it made considerable effort to

268

establish a special relationship with the non-aligned movement and maintain relations
with both Israel and the Arab countries. Romania’s friendly relations with Yugoslavia and
China and the non-aligned movement were designed to bolster its position.
By this time Ceausescu was at the peak of his power. He had achieved a measure
of success in three important respects: consolidating the independence of the state and the
sovereignty of the Romanian Communist Party; reconciling his policies of developing
contacts with the West and the Third World with the immediate requirements of alliance
with the Soviet Union; and weathering the effects of the world economic recession. He
had managed to do all of these things both while increasing his apparent domestic
popularity, and without loosening the Party’s stranglehold on national life. While he
might have appeared relatively liberal to London, and the Western world generally,
Ceausescu remained in fact a ‘complete’ dictator, but he was also shrewd in playing a
very complicated game. By courting Romanian nationalism he secured a measure of
popular support which enabled him to maintain himself and his regime in power without
Russian assistance. The illiberal nature of the regime in turn served the purpose of
showing the Soviet Union that he was not a Dubcek and helped to allay misgivings about
his overtures to Russia’s enemies.
By this juncture, Romania’s relative independence was remarkable, and certainly
unique in the Eastern Bloc. Ceausescu was still given wide credit internationally for
having condemned the Soviet led invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and for his
continuing assertion of Romania’s political independence. He had cordial relations with
China, Yugoslavia and other ‘renegades’. He cultivated warm relations with the West and
the European Community. He took an irritatingly independent and non-conformist line at
international Communist Party meetings.
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Britain was increasingly intrigued by the possibility of ‘exploiting Romania’s
independent attitude within the Eastern Bloc, although there was no chance of our
persuading Ceausescu to ‘stray widely and become a Tito.’ It was in the West’s and
particularly Britain’s interest to give encouragement to Romanian efforts to follow an
independent path in foreign affairs, particularly in the context of detente, at the CSCE, in
the UN and in the deliberations of the Warsaw Pact. The Foreign Office was interested in
achieving the maximum benefit from information which Romania could provide on
developments in the world communist movement, seemingly fracturing with some help
from Bucharest. By diminishing its dependence on the Soviet Union and developing
closer political, economic and commercial contacts with the West, Romania produced
difficulties within the CMEA and the Warsaw Pact and provided opportunities for Britain
and the West generally. Romania’s contacts with the EEC, its distinctive stand at the
CSCE and its independent role at the United Nations had been helpful to the West. While
maintaining internally the strictest communist regime in Eastern Europe, Ceausescu
achieved considerable success in pursuing an independent and flexible foreign policy.
During 1975 four British Ministers went to Romania and five Romanian
Ministers visited Britain. The momentum of exchanges continued in 1976 with six
Romanian Ministers going to Britain and three British Ministers visiting Romania. The
tempo of working-level visits on subjects ranging from economics to ideology with the
Soviet Union also increased dramatically. Although the Western leaders understood that
there were limits within which the Romanians operated, the independent and
nonconformist line seemed muted since Brezhnev’s visit to Bucharest and the Warsaw
Pact meeting in November 1976.
The deliberate policy of normalising relations with its Warsaw Pact allies
created a period of relative calm for pursuing Romania’s national interests. Quieter
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policies and safe-guarding gains pursued in the second half of the 1970s had an
explanation. The Romanian leaders were in no doubt that they were continuously under
critical surveillance through Moscow’s ideological telescope. They knew that they could
not provoke the Russians too far. The necessity of keeping up Marxist-Leninist
appearances was somehow imprinted on the collective mind by the events of 1956 and
1968. Keeping up on the ideological front internally was important.
In pursuit of foreign policy advantage, and export potentials, the cultural and
human rights agendas were quietly shelved. The Romanian perspective on human rights
was not encouraging. Romania’s application of the Helsinki Final Act concerning free
movement of people, ideas, and information, had been far from satisfactory. Britain could
not exert any beneficial influence on human rights issue without damaging more
important interests. Encouraging the Romanians to introduce a greater measure of
individual freedom internally was important in as much as it could facilitate easier human
contacts and allow British consular officials to deal promptly with bilateral cases
concerning British nationals. Representations were frequently necessary to support
applications for travel documents in favour of Romanians to visit or join relatives in
Britain and concerning delays in allowing British and Romanian nationals to marry.
While the Romanian officials were in frantic search for new friends and
associates in the Western world, official vigilance increased at home amounting almost to
a freeze in foreign contacts concerning average people. In 1977 Ceausescu himself spoke
angrily about the ‘seduction’ of citizens and the activities carried on in ‘certain countries’
to encourage the Romanian citizens to emigrate which he described as a grave
interference in Romania’s internal affairs, hostile acts against Romania. However he did
allow a distinction between the issues of integrating families towards which he showed
understanding as ‘justified cases’ and emigration of which he strongly disapproved.
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Although the British saw in Romania excellent trade opportunities which they
were determined to pursue, British exports to Romania in 1977 totalled only 80.6 million
pounds (0.25% of the UK total). The British share of total Romanian imports was higher
(2.72%). Although a member of the CMEA, by the latter 1970s, Romania conducted less
than half of its trade with Communist countries. The Romanians attached great
importance to expanding their relations with the West in order to obtain support and
credibility for their independent policies.
Ceausescu’s visit to Britain from 13 to 16 June 1978 was the first State Visit to
Britain by a Communist Head of State. In part the invitation was intended to recognise the
special position of Romania as a Communist country with an independent foreign policy
and one which, by maintaining good relations with countries of all political persuasions,
had a unique contribution to make to the solution of international problems. The
Government’s justification for inviting Ceausescu was that he alone in the Warsaw Pact
bloc had consistently taken a foreign policy line independent of Moscow, and had
therefore to be encouraged. The visit also encouraged closer commercial relations
between the two countries and thereby increased the opportunities for British exporters in
Romania. Notwithstanding the criticism, the British Government remained inclined to see
the visit happen, and to make it a success.
Britain’s relations with Romania would be deeper and more substantial than with
some of the Socialist countries,’ Callaghan pointed out during Ceausescu’s visit to
London. Both Ceausescu and Callaghan reaffirmed their determination to work towards
raising the annual volume of two-way trade by two and a half times compared with the
level achieved in 1974, by 1980. The growth of trade and cooperation followed the
signature of the Long Term Agreement on Economic Collaboration and Industrial and
Technological Cooperation.
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In the 1980s, Ceausescu’s infringement of human rights became notorious. He
lost much of the credibility that he had previously gained through his defiance of
Moscow. His efforts to silence all real or potential opposition within and outside the
country had a profound impact on the perception of the Romanian communist regime. In
London Ceausescu reached his apogee. Ten years later he was executed during the
Revolution of December 1989 which put an end to the Communist regime in Romania.
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Appendix
Diplomatic relations’ level:
1944-1946 representation in ACC [Allied Control Commission]
Political mission: 8 October 1947-1 August 1955
Legation between 1 August 1955 and 26 September 1963
Embassy since 26 September 1963.

Britain’s Heads of Mission:
1947-1948 Adrian Holman
1949-1951 Walter Roberts
1951-1954 William Sullivan
1954-1956 Dermot MacDermot
1956-1959 Alan Dudley
1959-1961 David Scott Fox
1961-1963 Dalton Murray
1963-1965 Dalton Murray, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
1965-1967 Leslie Glass
1967-1968 Sir John Chadwick
1969-1971 Denis Laskey
1972-1975 Derrick Ashe
1975-1977 Jeffrey Petersen
1977-1979 Reginald Seconde
1980-1983 Paul Holmer
1983-1986 Philip McKearney
1986-1989 Hugh Arbuthnott

Romania’s Heads of Mission:
1946-1947 Richard Franasovici
1947-1952 Nicolae Cioroiu
1953-1956 Pavel Babuci
1956-1957 Nicolae Korcinski
1957-1961 Petre Balaceanu
1961-1964 Alexandru Lazareanu
1964-1966 Alexandru Lazareanu, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
1966-1972 Vasile Pungan
1972-1980 Pretor Popa
1980-1986 Vasile Gliga
1986-1990 Stan Soare
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